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ABSTRACT
One of the most important steps in hazard analysis is determining whether a particular design can
reach a hazardous state and, if it could, how to change the design to ensure that it does not. In most
cases, this is done through testing or simulation or even less rigorous processes -- none of which
provide much confidence for complex systems. Because state spaces for software can be enormous
(which is why testing is not an effective way to accomplish the goal), the innovative Hazard
Automaton Reduction Algorithm (HARA) involves starting at a hypothetical unsafe state and
using backwards reachability techniques to obtain enough information to determine how to design
in order to ensure that state cannot be reached.
State machine models are very powerful, but also present greater challenges in terms of reachabil-
ity, including the backwards reachability needed to implement the Hazard Automaton Reduction
Algorithm. The key to solving the backwards reachability problem lies in converting the state
machine model into a controls state space formulation and creating a state transition matrix. Each
successive step backward from the hazardous state then involves only one n by n matrix manipula-
tion. Therefore, only a finite number of matrix manipulations is necessary to determine whether or
not a state is reachable from another state, thus providing the same information that could be
obtained from a complete backwards reachability graph of the state machine model. Unlike model
checking, the computational cost does not increase as greatly with the number of backward states
that need to be visited to obtain the information necessary to ensure that the design is safe or to
redesign it to be safe. The functionality and optimality of this approach is proved in both discrete
and hybrid cases.
The new approach of the Hazard Automaton Reduction Algorithm combined with backwards
reachability controls techniques was demonstrated on a blackbox model of a real aircraft altitude
switch. The algorithm is being implemented in a commercial specification language (SpecTRM-
RL).
SpecTRM-RL is formally extended to include continuous and hybrid models. An analysis of the
safety of a medium term conflict detection algorithm (MTCD) for aircraft, that is being developed
and tested by Eurocontrol for use in European Air Traffic Control, is performed. Attempts to vali-
date such conflict detection algorithms is currently challenging researchers world wide. Model
checking is unsatisfactory in general for this problem because of the lack of a termination guaran-
tee in backwards reachability using model checking. The new state-space controls approach does
not encounter this problem.
Thesis Supervisor: Nancy G. Leveson, Ph.D.
Title: Professor of Aeronautics and Astronautics
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"Then you should say what you mean," the March Hare
went on.
"I do, " Alice hastily replied; "at least I mean what I say,
that's the same thing, you know."
"Not the same thing a bit!" said the Hatter "Why, you might
just as well say that "I see what I eat" is the same thing as "I
eat what I see!"
Lewis Carroll, Alice in Wonderland
Nomenclature
Chapter 2
6: a transition relation, where 8 = Q x Q
Q: a non-empty set of states
QO: a non-empty set of start states
q: single state in a state machine
Chapter 3
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Chapter 4
9
Chapter 5
Q: Set of States of the Hazard Automaton A
qO: Start State of the Hazard Automaton A
QH: Set of High Risk States of the Hazard Automaton A
qH: High Risk State of the Hazard Automaton A, qH e QH
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QL: Set of Low Risk States of the Hazard Automaton A
qL: Low Risk State of the Hazard Automaton A, qL e QL
z: Set of Hazardous States of the Hazard Automaton A
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w : Finite string of input elements of Z in A
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q: State of the Hazard Automaton A
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A': Reduced Hazard Automaton of A, where A' = (Q, qo, QL, QH1 Z, Z, 8') and 8'c- 8
qj: ith state in a valid execution ... qiayq, 1G.I... of the Hazard Automaton A
ay: ith input in a valid execution ...qjjq + I1 ... of the Hazard Automaton A
P,,.A: Set of Predecessor States of q for the reduced Hazard Automaton A'
W: External Variables in a hybrid Hazard Automaton HA
X: Internal Variables in a hybrid Hazard Automaton HA
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Alice came to afork in the road.
"Which road do I take?" she asked.
"Where do you want to go?" responded the Chesire Cat.
"I don't know," Alice answered.
"Then," said the cat, "it doesn't really matter."
Lewis Carrol: Alice in Wonderland
CHAPTER 1
When one does something right, one only confirms what is
already known: how to do it. A mistake is an indicator of a
gap in one's knowledge. Learning takes place when a mis-
take is identified, its producers are identified and it is
corrected.
R.L. Ackoff, 'Its a Mistake!', Systems Practice, 1994
One can only show the presence of errors, not their
absence.
John Djikstra
Introduction
Etymologically, the word safe is traceable to several sources. For example, the Latin sal-
vus translates into safe, whole, or healthy and is akin to salus, which may be translated as
health or safety. The derivation from the Greek relates to the word holos, which means
complete or entire; and the Sanskrit word sarva means unharmed or entire. The process by
which these roots were transformed into the modem adjective safe becomes evident
through an examination of the old French variations, salf, sauf, sof, and sal, and the varia-
tions used in Middle English, sauf, saf and save.
The Oxford English Dictionary (2nd Ed.), defines the adjective safe as:
1. Free from hurt or damage; unharmed:
Unhurt, uninjured, unharmed; having been preserved from
or escaped some real or apprehended danger. Chiefly (now
only) with quasi-adverb. force after verbs of coming, going,
bringing, etc.
2. Free from danger; secure:
Not exposed to danger; not liable to be harmed or lost;
secure. Of a place or thing: Affording security or immunity;
not exposing to danger; not likely to cause harm or
injury.Of an action, procedure, undertaking, plan, etc.: Free
from risk, not involving danger or mishap, guaranteed
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against failure. Sometimes = free from risk of error, as in it
is safe to say. In stronger sense: Conducive to safety.
There are, of course, a variety of satisfactory definitions for safety, any one of which
can be used as a starting point for system safety considerations. The definition used in the
following text for safety is derived from [71]:
The freedom from accidents and losses, in the absolute
sense.
It can, of course, be argued that there is no such thing as absolute safety, and thus
safety is often defined in terms of acceptable loss. However, the dilemma then becomes
defining what loss is deemed acceptable, and to whom. Thus, for the purposes of this text,
absolute freedom from loss can be regarded as the ideal state, and the actual state of the
system would wish to asymptotically approach this state.
The antithesis of safety, and the villain of the text, is the hazard. A hazard is defined
[71] as a state or set of conditions of a system (or an object) that, together with other con-
ditions in the environment of the system (or object), will lead inevitably to an accident
(loss event). It must be noted that a hazard is defined with respect to the environment of
the system or component. In addition, what constitutes a hazard depends upon where the
boundaries of the system are drawn. In summary, the definition of a hazard can also be
considered to be somewhat arbitrary, and one of the first steps in designing a system is to
decide what conditions will be considered to be hazards that need to be eliminated or con-
trolled.
1.1 Brief Historical Overview
Until the advent of modem scientific theory, technical progress was made by a sophis-
ticated process of trial and error. Engineers and designers learnt not only by their own mis-
takes but also from other people's misfortunes. This process was quite successful, as
16
evidenced by the rapid progress made by master builders in the design of the great twelfth-
and thirteenth-century cathedrals and abbeys. Admittedly, there were many building col-
lapses, when attempts were made to build vaults too high or columns too slim, but the sur-
vival of so many of these magnificent buildings provides evidence of the development of
their builders' skills.
The role of safety in society was intensified at the time of the Industrial Revolution.
New sources of power, using water or steam, not only gave great opportunities for the
rapid development of manufacturing technology but also provided a terrible potential for
death and injury when things went wrong. The demand for new machinery and factory
premises thus increased. In designing the necessary machines and buildings it had become
possible to make use of the growing body of scientific knowledge, although designers still
relied heavily upon past experiences. Scientific development at that time was along
strongly deterministic lines; theories strove to provide an exact and unambiguous account
of natural phenomena. Failure to produce such an account was invariably considered to be
a limitation of the theory rather than a fundamental impossibility.
Among the first industrial artifacts to give serious concern about public safety were
boiler pressure vessels. In the second half of the nineteenth century, pressure vessel explo-
sions were almost regarded as 'acts of God', since the underlying mechanisms of failure
were poorly understood. Early steamships used sea-water in the boilers, and the boilers
had to be shut down at regular intervals so that the accumulated salt could be removed.
The corrosive properties of salt were apparently not known about, or else not heeded.
Gradually, however, codes of practice for design and operation came into use, and the
needs of insurance dictated regular inspections for any defects. A boiler explosion in Mas-
sachusetts in 1905 was largely responsible for the introduction of the American Society of
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Mechanical Engineering (ASME) design codes [89]. Also, a better understanding of the
mechanics of metal failure evolved during and after the First World War.
The chemical industry expanded greatly following the First World War. Because of
the overtly hazardous nature of many of the materials being handled, and the need to have
some sort of independent assessment of the hazards of a process plant for the calculation
of insurance premiums, an actuarial approach to safety assessment was adopted within the
industry. Indeed, the term used to this day in the chemical industry, loss prevention, has its
origins in insurance; the loss refers to the financial loss of plants, third party claims and
lost production.
In the years following the Second World War, the growth in military electronics (still
largely based on thermionic valves) began to generate new problems. One study revealed
that only one-third of US military electronic equipment in the late 1940's was available at
any given time, the remainder was under repair [107]. This difficulty lead to the appear-
ance of reliability engineering. Electronic reliability improved greatly in the 1950's as the
vacuum tube was replaced by transistors. Reliability was also of importance in spacecraft,
and the high failure rate of space missions in the late 1950's and early 1960's was steadily
improved in later years.
The nuclear industry grew rapidly in the years following the Second World War. The
industry was exempted from the requirements of full third-party insurance coverage in
some countries (e.g. the Price-Anderson Act in the U.S.A) in an effort to promote devel-
opment of the industry, and because its associated hazards were not, at that time, fully
understood. Although, as was pointed out [89], "all other engineering technologies have
advanced not on the basis of their successes but on the basis of their failures", the nuclear
industry could not afford to do likewise, because of its associated hazards. Indeed, as the
scale of other technologies has increased, many technologies now have the potential to
18
cause unacceptable damage, and progress through failure is seldom nowadays justifiable.
Nevertheless, the nuclear industry has learned much from a number of non-catastrophic
accidents, notably the Windscale fire in 1957 and the Three Mile Island accident in 1979
[111]. Much more is being learned from the Chernobyl accident in 1986, which repre-
sented, in terms of the magnitude of the consequences, about as bad a nuclear power sta-
tion accident as is conceivable.
Figure 1.1: Three Mile Island
At first, the nuclear industry adopted an approach to safety assessment based on the
concept of a 'maximum credible' accident. In this approach, a worst possible accident was
proposed and the plant was designed to accommodate or minimize the effects of the acci-
dent. The difficulty with this approach is that it presupposes that any more severe acci-
dents are 'incredible'. It has been suggested that a more rigorous approach to the
assessment of nuclear plant safety, using probability, was more representative of circum-
stances. The essence of the proposal was as follows: for any given factory or other indus-
trial installation, the acceptable frequency of accidents that may harm third parties varies
inversely with the magnitude of the consequences of those accidents. It was therefore pro-
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posed that nuclear power stations should have to meet a safety criterion expressed in terms
of probability and consequence.
Whilst the scope and complexity of science and technology have grown at an ever
increasing rate in the last one hundred years, the full implications of these advances did
not, in many instances, begin to be understood by the public until the 1980's. Advances in
transport, power generation and chemicals in particular have often been 'sold' on their
direct and obvious benefits, rather than on a full disclosure of their consequences. The
designers of engineering systems have frequently been able to place their main priority on
performance, with the consideration of safety a secondary objective [115].
The nuclear reactor incident at Three Mile Island (TMI) prompted a very critical look
at the overall safety of that source of power. Paradoxically, the TMI event demonstrated to
scientists and engineers that the overall safety of the plant was in many ways satisfactory,
in that a major catastrophe was prevented despite the events that occurred. Not unreason-
ably, this optimistic interpretation was not shared by the general public [111].
1.2 System Safety
Much of the development of system safety is tied to the development of aerospace safety
directly following World War II. The Air Force was experiencing many aircraft accidents
in which both planes and pilots were lost. Most of these accidents were blamed on the
pilots. However, industry flight engineers argued that the cause was not so simple: Safety
must be designed and built into an aircraft, just as are the qualitites of performance, stabil-
ity and control [71].
System safety arose out of the intercontinental ballistic missile program. When the Air
Force began to develop intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM's), there were no pilots
to blame for accidents, yet the liquid-propellant missiles frequently blew up. In the fifties,
20
when the Atlas and Titan ICBM's were being developed, intense pressure was focused on
building a nuclear warhead with delivery capability as a deterrent to nuclear war. On these
first missile projects, system safety was not identified and assigned as a specific responsi-
bility. Instead, each designer, manager, and engineer was assigned responsibility for
safety. Within 18 months after the fleet of 71 Atlas F missiles became operational, four
blew up in their silos during operational testing. Not only were the losses themselves
costly, but the resulting investigations detected serious safety deficiencies in the system
that would require extensive modifications to correct. The decision was made to retire the
entire weapons system and accelerate deployment of the Minuteman missile system. Thus,
a major weapon system, originally designed to be used for ten years, was in service for
less than two years [106].
Aside from the economic aspects of neglecting safety requirements, the advent of
nuclear fission presented a unique problem. The catastrophic consequences of an inadvert-
ent nuclear explosion are so serious that even one accident cannot be tolerated. For safety
reasons, the Atomic Energy Commission established stringent controls on the use and
handling of nuclear materials. In addition, the Department of Defense (DoD), through the
Defense Atomic Support Agency, maintained tight control over all nuclear weapon
designs and uses. Meeting the controls of these agencies was a major influence in identify-
ing system safety as a separate discipline in the late 1950's.
The first military specification on system safety was published by the Air Force (Bal-
listic Systems Division) in 1962, and the Minuteman ICBM became the first weapons sys-
tem to have a contractual system safety program. The first system safety specification was
a document created by the Air Force in 1966 (MIL-S-38130A). In June 1969, this became
MIL-STD-882, System Safety Program for Systems and Associated Subsystems and
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Equipment: Requirements for, and a system safety program became mandatory on all
DoD-procured products and systems [1].
The space program was the second major application area to use system safety
approaches in a formalized fashion. Until the Apollo 204 fire in 1967 at Cape Kennedy, in
which three astronauts were killed, NASA had basically ignored the issue of system
safety. The accident alerted NASA, and they commissioned the General Electric Company
(among others) to develop policies and procedures that became the model for civilian
aerospace safety.
As computers became increasingly important components of complex systems, con-
cern about the safety aspects of software began to emerge in both NASA and DoD pro-
grams. Some of the earliest software safety activities were attempted on the Space
Transportation System (STS) program in the 1970's.
The rocket exploded seconds after launching
Figure 1.2: Ariane 5 Accident
A recent example of a software failure is the Ariane 5 rocket, which exploded on June
4, 1996, less than forty seconds after it was launched. The committee that investigated the
accident found that it was caused by a software error in the computer that was responsible
for calculating the rocket's movement. During the launch, an exception occurred when a
large 64-bit floating point number was converted to a 16-bit signed integer. This conver-
sion was not protected by code for handling exceptions and caused the computer to fail.
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The same error also caused the backup computer to fail. As a result incorrect attitude data
was transmitted to the on-board computer, which caused the destruction of the rocket. The
team investigating the failure suggested that several measures be taken in order to prevent
similar incidents in the future, including the verification of the Ariane 5 software.
Similarly, NASA's Mars Exploration program, under its "Faster, Cheaper, Better" phi-
losophy has been plagued with software problems. The Mars Climate Orbiter (MCO)
failed to achieve Mars Orbit on September 2 3rd 1999 due to a navigation error that
resulted in the spacecraft entering Mars atmosphere instead of going into Mars orbit.
Spacecraft operating data needed for navigation were provided to the Jet Propulsion Labo-
ratory navigation team by prime contractor Lockheed Martin in Imperial units rather than
specified Metric units. A lack of proper testing, and improper review of the interface spec-
ifications can be cited as the primary cause for this failure [120]. The MCO project cost
approximately $115 million, not including the launch vehicle.
Figure 1.3: Mars Polar Lander (Simulation)
The Mars Polar Lander (MPL), along with the two Deep Space 2 microprobes, was
launched on January 3 rd 1999. After an 11-month cruise, the spacecraft arrived at Mars on
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December 3 rd 1999, targeted for a landing zone near the edge of the south polar layered
terrain. The planned communication after landing did not occur, resulting in the determi-
nation that the MPL mission had failed. Extensive tests have demonstrated that the most
probable cause of failure is that spurious signals were generated when the lander legs were
deployed during descent. The spurious signals gave a false indication that the lander had
landed, resulting in a premature shutdown of the lander engines and the destruction of the
lander when it crashed into the Martian surface [120].
It is not uncommon for sensors involved with mechanical operations, such as the
lander leg deployment, to produce spurious signals. For MPL, there was no software
requirements to clear spurious signals prior to using the sensor information to determine
that landing had occurred. During a test of the lander system, the sensors were incorrectly
wired due to a design error. As a result, the spurious signals were not identified by the sys-
tems test, and the systems test was not repeated with properly wired touchdown sensors.
While the most probable direct cause of the failure is premature engine shutdown, it is
important to note that the underlying cause is inadequate software design and systems test-
ing. The MPL mission cost roughly $120 million dollars in total, not counting the cost of
the launch vehicle or the microprobes [120].
Clearly the need for safe and functional hardware and software systems is critical. As
the involvement of such systems in our lives increases, so too does the burden for insuring
their safety. Unfortunately, it is no longer feasible to shut down a malfunctioning system in
order to restore safety: In many cases, a system is less safe when it is shut down, such as
an aeroplane. Even when the failure is non life-threatening, the consequences of having to
replace critical code or circuitry can be economically devastating.
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1.3 Current Software Safety Techniques
Software in computer based control systems is ever increasing. Computer software and
hardware replace more and more of the functionality of mechanical and electromechanical
system parts. The traditional engineering disciplines are founded on science and mathe-
matics, enabling modelling and prediction of different designs' behaviours. Software engi-
neering has become, however, a craft based more on trial and error. Computers differ from
regular physical systems on two key issues:
1. They exhibit discontinuous behaviour.
2. Software lacks physical restrictions (like mass, energy, size etc.) and lack structural/
functional intrinsic properties (like strength, density etc.)
The main physical entity that can be modelled and measured by software engineers is
time. There exists sound work and theories on the verification of systems' temporal prop-
erties and attributes [111]. Several general approaches to software safety and reliability are
addressed in the following sections.
1.3.1 Abstraction and Modularity
Having no physical limitations, complex software designs are possible and no physical
effort is necessary to accomplish this complexity. Complexity is a source for design faults.
Design faults are often due to a failure to anticipate certain interactions between a sys-
tem's components. As complexity increases, design faults are more prone to occur as more
interactions make it harder to identify all possible behaviours. The most formidable
weapon against complexity is abstraction. Abstraction allows the user to concentrate on
the general problem and disregard the low level details. However, a danger lies in basing
abstraction on modular decomposition in absurdum [106]. Complexity increases if the
system is decomposed modularly further then necessary, due to unforeseen interactions
between modules. Similarly, the notion of information hiding, upon which Object-Ori-
ented methodologies are based, leads to increased abstraction and reuse. However, infor-
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mation hiding decreases testability, and, if used too zealously, increases complexity. It also
does not necessarily lead to fewer faults.
1.3.2 Robustness
Software is not a physical entity, it is purely a design construct. Software cannot be
worn-out or "broken", per se. All system failures due to errors in the software are design
faults and are built into the system from the beginning. Generally, software is not designed
to be robusti since its focus is primarily on what the system should do, and not on what it
should not do; as a consequence, testing usually does not cover abnormal inputs or out-
puts. In order for software to be robust, its state machine must satisfy the following [71]:
1. Every state must have a behaviour (transition) defined for every possible input.
2. The logical OR of the conditions on every transition out of any state must form a
tautology2
3. Every state must have a software behaviour (transition) defined in case there is no
input for a given period of time.
Applying robust design to software in order to accommodate all design flaws does not
yield completely safe software. If an impossible or unspecified event does happen, a local
reaction may have unfortunate global results and the complex interaction between mod-
ules cannot be determined.
1.3.3 Redundancy
In order for a redundant system to function properly, it must avoid common mode fail-
ures. Design faults are the main source for common mode failures, so fault tolerance
against design faults seems futile. Adaptations of the redundancy concept have been
applied to software, most commonly: N-version programming and Recovery Blocks. Both
approaches use multiple version of dissimilar software produced from a common specifi-
1. Robust systems are designed to cope with unexpected inputs, changed environmental conditions
and errors in the model of the external system.
2. A tautology is a logically complete expression (i.e. always true).
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cation. Unfortunately, empirical studies have concluded that the benefit of using N-version
programming is questionable [71,106]. Both approaches suffer from the same major
design flaw: they try to compensate for design faults using diverse designs. Thus, they will
not be able to recuperate from faults in the requirements specification and are likely to be
afflicted by common mode faults relating to how people think in general.
1.3.4 Verification and Validation
The task of considering all system behaviours and all the circumstances it might
encounter during operation may be intractable. Software behaviour is generally not con-
tinuous in nature: quantization errors are propagated and boundaries to the representation
of numbers can affect the output. The software's execution path changes for every deci-
sion depending on whether or not a condition is true. For example, a simple sequential list
of 20 if-statements may, in the worst case, yield 220 possible execution paths. A small
change in input can have a severe effect on which execution path is taken, which in turn
may yield an enormous change in output [105].
1.3.5 Formal Methods
Just as traditional engineers can model their designs with different kinds of continuous
mathematics, formal methods attempt to supply computer software engineers with mathe-
matical logic and discrete mathematics as a modelling framework. Formal methods can be
used in two fashions [89]:
1. They can be used as a syntax to describe the semantics of specifications which are
later used as a basis for the development of systems.
2. They can be produced as in the above point, and then used as fundamental tool for
the verification of the design
If both fashions are employed, then it is possible to prove the equivalency of the pro-
gram and the specification. Unfortunately a proof, when possible, cannot guarantee cor-
rect functionality or safety. In order to perform a proof the correct behaviour of the
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software must first be specified in a formal mathematical language. The task of specifying
the correct behaviour can be as difficult and error-prone as writing the software [71]. The
difficulty comes from the fact that it cannot be known whether or not the actual system has
accurately been modelled. Thus, it is impossible to ascertain whether or not the specifica-
tion is complete. This distinction between model and reality attends all applications of
mathematics in engineering, however, physical validation of mathematical models is pos-
sible for most engineering disciplines.
Nonetheless, using formal methods to verify correspondence between specification
and design does seem like a possible pursuit to gain confidence. The fact that more than
half of all software errors can be traced to the requirements and specifications problems
[80,71] gives the application of formal methods some weight. The mathematical verifica-
tion of large software systems is currently intractable for most cases, but may become fea-
sible in the future with more compact and usable formal methods.
1.3.6 Testing
Software does not wear out over time. It is therefore reasonable to assume that as long
as faults are uncovered, reliability increases for each fault that is eliminated. This notion
relies on the supposition that maintenance does not introduce any new faults. According to
many reliability growth models [32], failures are distributed exponentially with time. Ini-
tially, a system fails frequently, but after faults are discovered and amended the frequency
of failures decreases. One problem with this method is that it would take years to remove a
sufficient amount of errors to achieve a critical standard of reliability. For safety-critical
systems where the required failure rate is 10-9 failures per hour, testing would have to be
performed for at least 115 000 years in order to achieve the required rate. What makes
matters even worse is the fact that more than half of the errors in many systems are due to
ambiguous or incomplete requirements specifications. The intention of testing is often to
28
verify that a specific input will yield a specific output, defined by the specification. No
mention is made of how the system will behave in response to non-specified inputs, and
many testing techniques overlook hazards that can be generated in this fashion. Thus, the
confidence gained by testing software can be severely limited by the specification. This
brings into focus the issues of safety and reliability: a system may be reliable, but not nec-
essarily safe, and vice versa.
1.4 Safety vs. Reliability
Reliability, as defined by Leveson [71], is the characteristic of an item expressed by the
probability that it will perform its required function in the specified manner over a given
period of time and under specified or assumed conditions. Safety, on the other hand, is
defined as the freedom from accidents and losses, in the absolute sense. There are other
definitions of safety that are expressed in terms of 'acceptable risk'. However, risk, accept-
able or otherwise, is merely probability taken personally; in other words, it is the science
of bad mathematics.
Thus, one can say that safety and reliability are overlapping quantities, but not identi-
cal. Techniques that increase reliability, such as parallel redundancy and standby sparing,
may not necessarily increase safety, and in some cases, may deteriorate safety perfor-
mance. Safety can be seen as having a broader scope than failures, and failures do not nec-
essarily compromise safety. Many accidents can occur without component failure. A
system may have high reliability, yet fail catastrophically in a particular fashion or mode.
Generalized probabilities and reliability analyses may not apply to specific, localized con-
ditions, and so no conclusions can be drawn about the safety of such localized systems.
More significantly, accidents are often not the result of a simple combination of compo-
nent failures.
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When components are operating together at a system level, safety is regarded as an
emergent property. Reliability is a component property, unlike safety, that cannot be
defined or measured without considering the environment. The events leading to an acci-
dent can be a complex combination of faults, failures and mishaps, to say nothing of ordi-
nary contributing circumstances and coincidences. Reliability only quantifies the
frequency of failures, disregarding the consequences of a failure. From a safety point of
view, it is important to consider the consequences of failures, especially the failures that
lead to hazards. Reliability analysis only embraces the possibility that an accident is
related to a failure, it does not consider the potential damage that could result from a suc-
cessful operation of the individual components.
An accident can be the result of a sequence of events, none of which involved a com-
ponent failure: individual components work as specified, but together create a hazardous
system state. Reliability uses a bottom-up approach to evaluate the effect of component
failures on system function, while safety requires a top-down approach that evaluates how
hazardous states can occur from a combination of both incorrect and correct component
behaviour [71].
One of the most critical trade-offs between reliability and safety results from the fact
that redundancy, used to increase reliability, will at the same time decrease safety. The
more reliable a component, the more likely it is to operate spuriously. In many cases, spu-
rious operation may be more hazardous than the failure of the system to function at all.
This does not even consider the fact that, if redundancy is employed without using design
diversity properly, then the system may fall prey to common mode failures. Redundant
components increase complexity, which acts to decrease safety. One can even say that, as
error rates in a system decrease and reliability increases, the safety of the system may be
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decreasing. This can be due to complacency on the behalf of the operators and/or the envi-
ronment.
This is not meant to paint reliability in an unflattering light; while it cannot replace
system safety, it can certainly supplement it, if used correctly. There must be a clarity in
regards to the purpose of reliability engineering; that is, to improve the system's tolerance
to hazardous random failures. Applying the techniques of reliability assessment towards
system safety can be perilous indeed. Reliability assessment measures the probability of
random failures, not the probability of hazards or accidents. Absurd risk estimates based
on failure rates can result from this type of analysis. Also, if a design error is found, the
simplest solution is to remove the error, not to convince someone that it will never cause
an accident. Hence it can be said that the major drawback in reliability models are not
what they include, but what they do not include.
1.5 Objectives: Can We Get to Where We Want to Go?
Software by itself is not hazardous. It can be conceived that software will be hazardous
when executed on a computer, but even then there exists no real danger. A computer actu-
ally does nothing physical except generate electrical signals. In reality, hazards first occur
when the computer and software start monitoring and controlling physical components.
Thus, safety is a system property, and not a software property.
Traditionally, in order to design and assert that a safety critical system is not only cor-
rect with respect to functionality but also safe, a hazard analysis is undertaken. A hazard
analysis determines what hazards are afflicting the system as a whole. Once a list of haz-
ards has been found, a cause-effect analysis is usually performed. However, to design a
safe system it is not sufficient to only identify the hazards in a system. The knowledge of
their existence must also be taken advantage of during the system design process. The goal
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is to eliminate the existence of hazards at the lowest reasonably practical level (the
ALARP principle, meaning As Low As Reasonably Practical). When the hazard cannot be
eliminated, one must try to reduce the impact of its existence. If this is not possible, an
attempt must be made to control the hazard. There are several safety design principles that
apply to computer based systems [71].
The approach suggested in this work is to identify the hazards, then attempt to design
them out of the system, using a backwards reachability technique. Basically, once a sys-
tem has been modelled, and the hazards have been identified, one can attempt to trace the
path of propagation of the hazards in a backwards manner. If one begins with the hazard-
ous state, and considers all the possible states to which this hazard is a successor, one can
attempt to divert the system to a non-hazardous path using design techniques. For all pre-
decessor states of the hazard, the ability to take the hazardous path is then blocked,
thereby removing the hazard from this particular behaviour of the system. Thus, the haz-
ard can then be controlled effectively, if not completely designed out of the system. This
dissertation applies this approach to actual aerospace examples in order to verify that a
specific hazard has been eliminated or controlled.
1.6 Scope of Dissertation
The first chapter of this dissertation serves as an introduction to the topic of system safety,
and provides motivation for the ensuing discussion and hazard elimination techniques.
Traditional methods of hazard analysis are investigated in the second chapter of this the-
sis. However, for extremely large systems, such as the Flight Management System of an
aeroplane, these methods may become impractical. Formal methods are also explored,
with the domains of model checking and theorem proving being emphasized. Unfortu-
nately, these methods are often intensely mathematical, and can be difficult to use.
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Many systems nowadays have both continuous and discrete characteristics. These sys-
tems are aptly named hybrid systems. Different approaches for modelling these systems
are then addressed, with the advantages and disadvantages of each being considered. A
brief survey of model checking tools is conducted, and the modelling language Specifica-
tion Tools and Requirements Methodology-Requirements Language (SpecTRM-RL) is
introduced. The discrete modelling language SpecTRM-RL is then formally extended to
encompass the modelling of hybrid systems.
The notion of reachability is then introduced, in the context of several disciplines
including computer science, operations research and control systems. A technique for
determining the reachability of state space controls systems is developed. Then, a general
mathematical approach to establish backwards reachability as a tool of state machine haz-
ard analysis is proposed. This novel approach involves converting state machines into
state space formulations in order to use control theory techniques to determine reachabil-
ity. A general bound is achieved on the complexity of the approach.
An innovative approach in order to eliminate hazards from an automaton without gen-
erating the entire backwards reachability graph of the automaton is then expounded in a
theoretical manner. The notion of a hazard automaton is introduced, and the Hazard
Automaton Reduction Algorithm (HARA) is formally specified. The algorithm is
regarded as being optimal in the sense that it only eliminates hazardous behaviours from
the system, and does not eliminate non-hazardous or potentially desirable behaviours.
This is formally proved for both the discrete and hybrid cases of the algorithm. There are
subtle differences when the algorithm is applied to a continuous system as opposed to the
discrete case, and these are elucidated fully.
The algorithm is then applied to two real systems. One is modelled as a purely discrete
system, while the other is modelled as a hybrid system. The altitude switch is a simple dis-
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crete example, and the mathematics of the algorithm is worked through explicitly. The
Medium Term Conflict Detection (MTCD) is a hybrid example, and only a portion of the
entire system is analyzed. Conclusions are then made as to the viability of this approach,
and its scalability for large systems.
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CHAPTER 2
If I have seen further [than certain other men] it is by stand-
ing upon the shoulders of giants.
Isaac Newton (1642-1727), Letter to Robert Hooke, February 5, 1675.
Literature Review
2.1 Hazard Analysis
Hazard analysis is at the heart of any effective safety program. Although hazard analysis
alone cannot ensure safety, it is a necessary first step. Hazard analysis is not just per-
formed at the start of a project or during fixed steps, it is iterative, and should be continu-
ous throughout the life of the system. Different models allow for various types of analysis
or manipulation of the model to learn more about the system. The models and analysis
techniques also imply different underlying accident and human error models, which influ-
ence the hazards and causes that will be identified and considered. There is often a trade-
off between the difficulty of building and analyzing the model and the quality of informa-
tion that can be derived from it. No one model or analysis technique is useful for all pur-
poses, and more than one type may be required for a project.
2.1.1 Checklists
Checklists are a way to pass on hard-earned experience garnered from projects in engi-
neering. They serve as a repository for mistakes, and provide feedback to the engineering
process. They are the most useful in the design of a well-understood system, for which
standard design features and knowledge have been developed over time. Basic checklists
are simply lists of hazards or specific design features, while other, more thought-provok-
ing variations stimulate inquiry by providing open-ended questions that require more than
a yes or no answer. Checklists are commonly used in all life-cycle phases of a project,
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including hazard identification, design and operation. They are an excellent way to pass
on lessons learned, especially for hazard identification. However, they may encourage
over-reliance on the part of the user, and they may be cumbersome in length, in order to be
comprehensive. Also, if the circumstances under which the checklist is employed are not
carefully considered, then a more hazardous situation might be created, due to false confi-
dence on the part of the user. Thus, more sophisticated analysis techniques than a checklist
are needed for most complex systems [71].
2.1.2 Fault Tree Analysis
Fault tree analysis (FTA) is utilized extensively in nuclear industries, electronics and,
of course, the aerospace industry. FTA is primarily a means of analyzing the causes of haz-
ards, and does not aid in the identification of hazards. FTA uses Boolean logic to describe
the combinations of individual faults that can constitute a predetermined hazardous event.
Each level refines the one immediately above it by listing more basic events that are nec-
essary and sufficient to cause the problem shown in the level above. Thus, FTA is a top-
down search method. It has four basic steps:
1. System definition
2. Fault Tree Construction
3. Qualitative analysis
4. Quantitative analysis
System definition requires determining top events, initial conditions, existing events and
impermissible events. Once the system is defined, a particular system state and top event
are assumed. Then, the causal events relating to the top event and the logical relations
between them are constructed. This process continues with each level of the tree being
refined until primary events, or leaf nodes, are reached. Qualitative analysis can be per-
formed by reducing the tree to a logically equivalent form showing the specific intersec-
tions of basic events sufficient to cause the initial hazard (top event). Quantitative analysis
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can be accomplished by assigning probabilities to the occurrence of basic events [57].
Fault tree analysis in software can be used for verification of existing code. It might be
applied to the software design representations to locate problems early. Probabilistic anal-
ysis is not applicable when software logic is described by fault trees [94]. Although
generic fault trees can be constructed before the details of design and construction are
known, they are of limited usefulness. FTA may be applied to completed or existing sys-
tems to prove they are safe. Fault trees can help identify scenarios leading to hazards and
can suggest possibilities for hazard elimination or control. Common-cause failures can
best be identified from the minimum cut sets of the fault tree, and a solution for their
removal can be proposed. However, the most useful fault trees can be constructed only
after the system is completely designed, and thus safety measures are often difficult to
implement so late in the life cycle. FTA shows little more than cause and effect relation-
ships between events, and is not always sufficient to design an effective safety measure.
The relative simplicity of a fault tree can be misleading, and simple AND/OR gates do not
provide any temporal aspects to the analysis. Finally, transitions between states are not
represented; partial failures and multiple failures can cause difficulties [37].
2.1.3 Management Oversight and Risk Tree Analysis
Management Oversight and Risk Tree Analysis (MORT) is basically a standard fault
tree augmented by an analysis of managerial functions, human behaviour, and environ-
mental factors. It aims to identify problems, defects, and oversights that create hazards or
prevent their early identification, by use of an extensive checklist. MORT has the advan-
tages of any checklist, but it also considers organizational, managerial, and information
factors. It is not used very often due to the complexity of the checklist, which possesses 1
500 basic events or factors [109].
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2.1.4 Event Tree Analysis
Event Tree Analysis (ETA) uses forward search to identify the various possible out-
comes of a given initiating event, by determining all sequences of events that could fol-
low. The initiating event might be a hazardous event, or even some circumstance external
to the system. The states in the forward search are then determined by the success or fail-
ure of other components or pieces of equipment. The event tree is drawn from left to right,
with branches under each heading corresponding to two alternatives:
1. Successful performance of the protection system (upper branch)
2. Failure of the protection system (lower branch)
After the tree is drawn, paths through it can be traced by choosing a branch under each
successive heading, corresponding to each accident scenario.
Event trees tend to become quite large. They are usually applied using a binary state
system, where each branch of the tree has one failure state and one success state. A proba-
bility can then be assigned to each branch of the event tree. If a greater number of discrete
states are defined for each branch, then a branch must be included for each state. The path
explosion problem quickly becomes the dominant drawback to this form of analysis. Tim-
ing issues can cause problems in event tree construction, as can possible dependencies
between the various probabilities arising from common-cause failures [1].
Like FTA, ETA is appropriate only after most of the design is complete. Fault trees lay
out relationships between events, while event trees display relationships between
sequences of events linked by conditional probabilities. Thus, one could say that while
fault trees are more powerful in identifying and simplifying event scenarios, event trees
are better at handling notions of continuity. Event trees are practical when the chronology
of events is stable and the events are independent of one another [70]. However, event
trees can become exceedingly complex, especially when a number of time-ordered system
interactions are involved [29]. A separate tree is required for each initiating event, making
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it difficult to represent interactions between event states in the separate trees or to consider
the effects of multiple initiating events. The usefulness of event trees depends on being
able to define the set of initiating events that will produce all the important accident
sequences. Defining the functions across the top of an event tree and their order is diffi-
cult. To solve the ordering problem, a detailed understanding of all plant systems, and how
they operate and interact, is necessary. Of course, as with fault trees, continuous, non-
action systems are inappropriate for event tree analysis.
2.1.5 Cause-Consequence Analysis
Cause-Consequence Analysis (CCA) starts with a critical event and determines the
causes of the event (using top-down or backwards search) and the consequences that could
result from it (forwards search). The cause-consequence diagram shows both time depen-
dency and causal relationships among events. The initiating events should be traced back
to spontaneous events covered by statistical data. Several cause charts may be attached to
a consequence chart. Logic symbols used in the charts to describe the relationship between
events are primarily gates (AND, OR), while vertices (AND, OR, XOR, Either OR etc.)
are used to describe the relations between consequences [98].
CCA shows the sequence of events explicitly, which makes the diagrams useful for
studying startup, shutdown and other sequential control problems. They allow the repre-
sentation of time delays, alternative consequence paths, and combination of events. They
also take account of external conditions and the temporal ordering of events. Unfortu-
nately, the diagrams can become unwieldy, separate diagrams are necessary for each initi-
ating event, and outcomes are related only to the cause being analyzed, even though they
could have been caused by other initiating events [37].
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2.1.6 Hazards and Operability Analysis
Hazards and Operability Analysis (HAZOP) is based on a systems theory model of
accidents that assumes accidents are caused by deviations from the design or operating
intentions. The technique focuses not only on safety, but also on efficient operations.
HAZOP is a qualitative technique whose purpose is to identify all possible deviations
from the design's expected operation and all hazards associated with these deviations.
HAZOP is able to elicit hazards in new designs as well as hazards that have not been con-
sidered previously. Hence, the hazards do not all have to be identified before the analysis,
which is a major asset. HAZOP will consider several factors of a process plant:
1. The design intention of the plant
2. The potential deviations from the design intention
3. The causes of these deviations
4. The consequences of such deviations
There is an automated variant of HAZOP, called Deviation Analysis, which can be applied
to software requirements specification [105].
HAZOP uses detailed process descriptions, and by the time such information is avail-
able, it is too late to make changes in the design. Thus, hazards end up being controlled by
protection devices rather than removed by design changes. HAZOP does not attempt to
provide quantitative results, but systematizes a qualitative approach. This method is sim-
ple and easy to use, and has an open-ended approach to identifying potential problems.
Unfortunately, HAZOP is labour-intensive and is limited by the search pattern that deter-
mines the factors that will be considered. HAZOP covers hazards caused by process devi-
ations, but still leaves out hazards that have more stable determining factors as the only
contributors [110].
2.1.7 Interface Analysis
Various analysis methods are used to evaluate connections and relationships between
components, including incompatibilities and the possibilities for common-cause or com-
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mon-mode failures. The relationships examined can be categorized as physical, func-
tional, or flow [49]. These analysis methods generally use structured walkthroughs to
examine the interface between components and to determine whether a connection pro-
vides a path for failure propagation. Interface analyses are similar to HAZOP, but general-
ized somewhat, and thus have the same benefits and limitations. Effectiveness depends
upon the procedures used and the thoroughness with which the analysis is applied [71].
2.1.8 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) uses a forward search process based on
an underlying chain-of-events model, where the initiating events are failures of individual
components. The first step is to identify and list all components and their failure modes,
considering all possible operating modes. For each failure mode, the effects on all other
system components are determined along with the effect on the overall system. Then the
probabilities and seriousness of the results of each failure mode are calculated. The results
are documented in a table with column headings such as component, failure probability,
failure mode, percent failures by mode, and effect. FMEA is appropriate when a design
has progressed to the point where hardware items may be easily identified on engineering
drawings and functional diagrams [71].
FMEA is effective for analyzing single units or single failures to enhance individual
item integrity. It can be used to identify redundancy and fail-safe design requirements, sin-
gle-point failure modes, and inspection points and spare part requirements. The strength of
the technique is its completeness, but that means it is also very time consuming and can
become very tedious and costly if applied to all parts of a complex design. All the signifi-
cant failure modes must be known in advance, so FMEA is most appropriate for standard
parts with few and well-known failure modes. The technique itself does not provide any
systematic approach for identifying failure modes or for determining their effects and no
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real means for discriminating between alternate courses of improvement or mitigation.
FMEA does not normally consider effects of multiple failures. FMEAs pay little attention
to human errors in operating procedures, hazardous characteristics of the equipment, or
adverse environments [48]. FMEAs can be used in safety analyses as long as their limita-
tions are known and understood: Not all failures lead to accidents, and not all accidents are
caused by failures.
On a similar note, Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) is basi-
cally just a FMEA with a more detailed analysis of the criticality of the failure. Two addi-
tional steps are added to the FMEA:
1. Means of control already present or proposed are determined.
2. The Findings modified with respect to these control procedures.
Sometimes a Critical Items list is generated from the results of the FMEA or FMECA. The
same advantages and disadvantages apply to the FMECA as to the FMEA.
Fault Hazard Analysis (FHA) is basically a FMEA or FMECA with both a broader and
more limited scope. The scope is broadened by considering human error, procedural defi-
ciencies, environmental conditions, and other events that might result in a hazard caused
by normal operations at an undesired time [38]. At the same time, the scope is more
restricted than that of a FMEA or FMECA, since supposedly only failures that could result
in accidents are considered. Two new pieces of information are added about upstream and
downstream effects:
1. Upstream components that could command or initiate the fault in question
2. Factors that could lead to secondary failures
Like FMEAs and FMECAs, FHA primarily provides guidance on what information to
obtain, but it provides no help in actually getting that information. It also tends to concen-
trate primarily on single events or failures [71].
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2.1.9 State Machine Hazard Analysis
A state machine is a model of the states of a system and the transitions between them.
State machine models are often used in computer science. The main problem with such
models is that a large number of states must be specified in order to model any realistically
complex system. If a model of a system is created and its entire state space generated, it is
theoretically possible to determine if the state space contained any hazardous states. This
involves a forward search that starts from the initial state of the system, generates all pos-
sible paths from that state, and determines whether any of them are hazardous.
State Machine Hazard Analysis (SMHA) was first developed to identify software-
related hazards. SMHA can be used to analyze a design for safety and fault tolerance, to
determine software safety requirements (including timing) directly from the system
design, to identify safety-critical software functions, and to help in the design of failure
detection and recovery procedures as well as fail-safe requirements. SMHA works on a
model, not the design itself, thus it can be used at any stage of the life cycle, including
early in the conceptual stage to evaluate alternative designs and design features.
SMHA's most important limitation is that a model must be built, which may be diffi-
cult and time consuming. A second limitation of SMHA is that the analysis is performed
on a model, not on the system itself-it will apply to the as-built system only if the system
matches the model. Other types of mathematical models, such as logic or algebraic models
of software or systems, also could be used for hazard analysis by using mathematical
proof methods to show that the models satisfy the safety requirements. The most impor-
tant limitation of these algebraic and logic languages is that they are usually very hard to
learn and use. In addition, models and languages used must match the way that engineers
think about the systems they are building, or the translation between the engineer's or
expert's mental model and the written formal model will be error prone. The advantage of
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using state machine models is that they seem to match the internal models many people
use in trying to understand complex systems [71].
Recall that SMHA initially involved a forward search from the initial state to deter-
mine whether or not any hazardous states could be reached. However, the enormous num-
ber of states makes this approach impractical, even with computerization. In order to
avoid this state explosion problem, models that abstract away from all the states to a
smaller number of higher-level states, from which the entire state machine can be gener-
ated, must be used. The complete state space may never be generated, but many properties
of the state-space can be inferred from the higher-level model.
Furthermore, backwards and top-down search methods would entail starting with the
hazardous states and working backward from each to see if the initial state is reached. The
number of backwards paths is enormous for most real systems, even if only those ending
in hazardous states is considered. A practical solution is to start from the hazardous state
and only work far enough back along the paths to determine how to change the model to
make the hazardous state unreachable. Only a small number of the states will need to be
generated in most cases. The drawback, although not serious, is that the hazardous states
eliminated from the design might not actually have been reachable, so more hazards may
be eliminated than were actually present.
2.2 Model Checking
Model checking is a technique for verifying finite-state concurrent systems such as
sequential circuit designs and communication protocols. It has a number of advantages
over traditional approaches that are based on simulation, testing, and deductive reasoning.
In particular, model checking is automatic and usually quite fast. Also, if the design con-
tains an error, model checking will produce a counter-example that can be used to pinpoint
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the source of the error.
The main challenge in model checking is dealing with the state space explosion prob-
lem. This problem occurs in systems with many components that can interact with each
other or systems with data structures that can assume many different values. In such cases,
the number of global states can be enormous.
A state machine is a model for computational processes. Systems of interacting com-
ponents are best modelled as some kind of combinable state machines. Complex systems
must sometimes be viewed at a high level of abstraction. A state machine consists of:
Q, a non-empty set of states
Q0 c Q, a non-empty set of start states (2.1)
c G QxQ, a translation relation
and we can write:
q -+ q' to denote (q, q')e (2.2)
Now, a state machine (Q, Q0, 8) is deterministic if: |Q0j = 1 and
Vq e Q, 3 at most one q' such that q --+ q'. That is, the next state is always determined by the
previous state, and the start state is unique. Otherwise, the state machine is non-determin-
istic. The behaviour of the computational process is then modelled by executions of the
state machine. An execution is a (possibly infinite) sequence q0, q1, q2, ... such that:
q0 E Q0  A (2.3)
Vi> 0![qi -4+ ,1] 23
A state is reachable if it is the final state in some finite-length execution. The set of
reachable states of a state machine are of interest, as they define the possible behaviours of
the state machine.
Although the restriction to finite state systems may seem to be a major disadvantage,
model checking is applicable to several very important classes of systems. In some cases,
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systems that are not finite state may be verified using model checking in combination with
various abstraction and induction principles. Finally, in many cases errors can be found by
restricting unbounded data structures to specific instances that are finite state.
2.2.1 Model Checking Process
Applying model checking to a design involves three separate tasks:
1. Modelling
2. Specification
3. Verification
The first task, modelling, involves converting the design into a formalism accepted by a
model checking tool. In many cases, this is simply a compilation task. In other cases, due
to limitations on time and memory, the modelling of the design may require the use of
abstraction to eliminate unnecessary details. After the system has been modelled, it
becomes necessary to state the properties that must be satisfied by the design. The specifi-
cation is usually given in some logical formalism. It is common to use temporal logic to
state behaviour of the system as it evolves over time. Model checking provides a means
for checking that the model of the design satisfies a given specification, but it is impossi-
ble to determine, via model checking, whether the given specification covers all the prop-
erties that the system should satisfy. Thus, completeness of the design is an external issue.
Finally, in an ideal model checker, verification of the properties is automatic. However, in
practice, it often involves human assistance. For instance, the analysis of verification
results must be done manually. In the case of a negative result, an error trace is generated.
The error-trace is a counter-example that illustrates a behaviour of the model which vio-
lates the property being checked. It requires human intuition to determine whether or not
the error trace has resulted from an actual behavioural violation, or from incorrect model-
ling of the system or specification. A final possibility is that the verification task will fail
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to terminate due to the size of the model [25].
2.2.2 Temporal Logic
Temporal logics allow for the ordering of events in time without introducing time
explicitly. Temporal logics are often classified according to whether time is assumed to
have a linear or a branching structure. The meaning of a temporal logic formula is always
determined with respect to a labelled state-transition graph, called a Kripke structure [58].
Several researchers, including Burstall [21], Kroger [62], and Pnueli [102], have pro-
posed using temporal logic for reasoning about computer programs. However, Pnueli
[102], was the first to use temporal logic for reasoning about concurrency. His approach
involved proving properties of the program under consideration from a set of axioms that
described the behaviour of the individual statements in the program. However, since
proofs were constructed by hand, the technique was often difficult to use in practice.
The introduction of temporal-logic model checking algorithms by Clarke and Emerson
[22,39] in the early 1980's allowed this type of reasoning to be automated. At roughly the
same time, Quielle and Sifakis [103] gave a model checking algorithm for a subset of
computation tree logic, but they did not analyze its complexity. Later, Clarke, Emerson
and Sistla [22] devised an improved algorithm that was linear in the product of the length
of the formula and the size of the state transition graph. The algorithm was implemented in
the EMC model checker, which was widely distributed and used to check a number of net-
work protocols.
Pnueli and Lichtenstein [78] reanalyzed the complexity of checking linear time formu-
las and discovered that although the complexity appears exponentially in the length of the
formula, it is linear in the size of the global state graph. Based on observation, they argued
that the high complexity of linear-time model checking might still be acceptable for short
formulas.
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Alternative techniques for verifying concurrent systems have been proposed by a
number of other researchers. Many of these approaches use automata for specifications as
well as for implementations. The implementation is checked to see whether its behaviour
conforms to that of the specification. Because the same type of model is used for both
implementation and specification, an implementation at one level can also be used as a
specification at the next level of refinement.
The use of language containment is implicit in the work of Kurshan [63], which ulti-
mately resulted in the development of a powerful verifier called COSPAN [50]. Vardi and
Wolper [117] first proposed the use of o-automata (automata over infinite words). They
showed how the linear temporal logic model checking problem could be formulated in
terms of language containment between o-automata. Other notions of conformance
between the automata have also been considered, including observational equivalence and
various refinement relations [28].
2.2.3 Symbolic Algorithms
In the fall of 1987, McMillan [95], a graduate student at Carnegie Mellon University,
realized that by using a symbolic representation for the state transition graphs, much larger
systems could be verified. The new symbolic representation was based on Bryant's
ordered binary decision diagrams (OBDD) [18]. OBDD's provide a canonical form for
boolean formulas that is often substantially more compact than the conjunctive or disjunc-
tive normal form, and very efficient algorithms have been developed for manipulating
them. This model checking system developed by McMillan for his doctoral thesis is called
Symbolic Model Verifier (SMV) [95]. It is based on a language for describing hierarchical
finite state concurrent systems. Programs in the language can be annotated by specifica-
tions expressed in temporal logic. The model checker extracts a transition system repre-
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sented as an OBDD from a program in the SMV language and uses an OBDD-based
search algorithm to determine whether the system satisfies its specification.
A number of other researchers have independently discovered that OBDDs can be
used to represent large state-transition systems. Coudert, Berthet and Madre [30] have
developed an algorithm for showing equivalence between two deterministic finite-state
automata by performing a breadth-first search of the state space of the product automata.
They use OBDD's to represent the transition functions of the two automata in their
algorithm. Similar algorithms have been developed by Pixley [101]. In addition, several
groups including Bose and Fisher [14], Pixley [101] and Coudert, Madre, and Berthet [31]
have experimented with model checking algorithms which use OBDDs. In related work
Bryant, Seger and Beatty [19] have developed an algorithm based on symbolic simulation
for model checking in a restricted linear time logic.
2.2.4 Model Checking for Software
Verifying software causes some problems for model checking. Software tends to be
less structured than hardware. In addition, concurrent software is usually asynchronous,
that is, most of the activities taken by different processes are performed independently.
without a global synchronizing clock. For these reasons, the state explosion phenomenon
is a particularly serious problem for software. Consequently, model checking has been
used infrequently for software verification.
The most successful technique, to date, for dealing with these software model check-
ing problems is based on partial order reduction [45,100]. This technique exploits the
independence of concurrently executed events. Two events are independent of each other
when executing them in either order results in the same global state. The most common
model for representing concurrent software is the interleaving model, in which all of the
events in a single execution are arranged in a linear order called an interleaving sequence.
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Thus, concurrently executed events appear arbitrarily ordered with respect to one another.
The partial order reduction technique makes it possible to decrease the number of inter-
leaving sequences that must be considered. When a specification cannot distinguish
between two interleaving sequences that differ only by the order in which concurrently
executed events are taken, it is sufficient to analyze only one of them. As a result, the
number of states that are needed for model checking is reduced [116].
The idea of reducing the state space by selecting only a subset of the ways one can
interleave independently executed transitions has been studied by many researchers. One
of the first researchers to propose such a reduction technique was Overman [99]. How-
ever, he only considered a restricted model of concurrency that did not include looping
and nondeterministic choice. The proof system of Katz and Peled [60] suggests using an
equivalence relation between interleaving sequences that correspond to the same partially
ordered execution. Their system includes proof rules for reasoning about a selection of
interleaved sequences rather than all of them. Model checking algorithms that incorporate
the partial order reduction are described in several different papers. The stubborn sets of
Valmari [116], the persistent sets of Godefroid [44], and the ample sets of Peled [100] dif-
fer on the actual details, but contain many similar ideas.
2.2.5 State Explosion: A Way Forward
Although symbolic representations and partial order reduction has greatly increased
the size of systems that can be verified, many realistic systems are still too large to be han-
dled. Thus, it is important to find techniques that can be used in conjunction with the sym-
bolic methods to extend the size of the system that can be verified.
Compositional reasoning exploits the modular structure of complex protocols [27].
Many finite state systems are composed of multiple processes running in parallel. The
specifications for such systems can be decomposed into properties that describe the
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behaviour of small parts of the system. An obvious strategy is to check each of the local
properties, using only the part of the system that the property describes. If it is possible to
show that the system satisfies each local property, and if the conjunction of the local prop-
erties implies the overall specification, then the complete system must satisfy this specifi-
cation as well. If there are interdependencies in the components, a form of assume-
guarantee reasoning can be employed. When proving a property about one component,
assumptions are made about the behaviour of all the other components. The assumptions
must then be proved when the correctness of the other components is established [47].
Symmetry can also be used to reduce the state explosion problem [24]. Finite state
concurrent systems frequently contain replicated components or structures. Having sym-
metry in a system implies the existence of a non-trivial permutation group that preserves
the state transition graph. Such a group can be used to define an equivalence relation on
the state space of the system and to reduce the state space. The reduced model can be used
to simplify the verification of the properties of the original model express by a temporal
logic formula.
Induction involves reasoning automatically about entire families of finite-state sys-
tems [26]. Such families can arise in the design of reactive systems in software, as well as
hardware. A process control system can be parameterized, defining an infinite family of
systems. The goal is to prove that every system in a given family satisfies some temporal
logic property. In general the problem is undecidable, but it is possible to provide a form
of invariant process that represents the behaviour of an arbitrary member of the family.
Using the invariant, the property can be checked for all members of the family at once. An
inductive argument is then used to verify that the invariant is an appropriate representa-
tive.
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Finally, the technique employed to the greatest advantage is called abstraction [7,27].
This technique appears to be essential for reasoning about reactive systems that involve
data paths. The use of abstraction is based on the observation that the specifications of sys-
tems that include data paths usually involve fairly simple relationships among the data
values in the system. The abstraction is usually specified by giving a mapping between the
actual data values in a system and a small set of abstract data values. By extending the
mapping to states and transitions, it is possible to produce an abstract version of the sys-
tem under consideration. The abstract system is often much smaller than the actual sys-
tem, and as a result it is usually much simpler to verify properties at the abstract level.
Thus, it seems plausible, that by a combination of clever modelling techniques, and
assiduously chosen abstracted state variables, it is possible to generate an algorithm that
would be able to check a given design, be it software or hardware, for the presence of
identifiable hazards.
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CHAPTER 3
The sciences do not try to explain, they hardly even try to
interpret, they mainly make models. By a model is meant a
mathematical construct which, with the addition of certain
verbal interpretations, describes observed phenomena. The
justification of such a mathematical construct is solely and
precisely that it is expected to work.
John Von Neumann (1903-57)
Process Control System Modelling
The hazard analysis procedure is influenced by the underlying model of the system being
considered. Thus, when a process control system is being modelled, careful consideration
must be given to how elements are modelled. For instance, software is primarily modelled
as a discrete system, making logical changes given the state of the process system and the
inputs to the system. However, software is employed to control processes, such as the
flight of an aeroplane, which directly involve continuously evolving variables as time
progresses. Depending on how the software and system are modelled, certain hazards can
be masked. Thus, a decision must be made, whether or not to model a component as being
discrete or continuous. Systems which have both discrete and continuous components are
commonly referred to as hybrid systems.
3.1 Discrete (Logical) System Modelling
Consider a machine that can exist in any one of a number of different states. It changes
state depending on an input and its current state. Such a machine is called afinite automa-
ton, a simple idealized computer. Finite automata are defined in terms of their states, the
inputs that they allow, and their reaction to the inputs. Finite automata come in two types,
deterministic and non-deterministic, depending on how well defined the ability to change
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states is. The main characteristics of finite automata are that they have discrete inputs and
outputs, and they have a finite number of internal states.
3.1.1 Deterministic Finite Automata
Formally, a deterministic finite automaton (DFA) M is defined as a collection of five
things:
1. An input alphabet X.
2. A finite collection of states Q.
3. A start state q0 e Q
4. A finite collection of accept states F _ Q
5. A transition function 8:Q x Z -+ Q
It should be noted that there can be zero accepting states in the automaton, that is,
F= 0. For a deterministic finite automata, the transition function 6 specifies exactly one
next state for each possible combination for a state and an input variable. Consequently,
there is a one-to-one mapping between Q x E and Q, and the state is fully determined by
the information present in the state-input pair (q, a), qi E Q, a e 1. Thus, a deterministic
finite automaton M is described as:
M = (Q, Z, 8, g0, F) (3.1)
A string x is accepted if 8 (qo, x) = q e F. The language L(M) of a DFA M is defined as
L(M)= {x|S(q0, x) e F}, which is the collection of all strings that move M from its initial
state to an accepting state. One final thing to note is that finite strings of any length are
regarded as being acceptable input for a DFA, however, infinite strings are not acceptable
as input.
3.1.2 Non-Deterministic Finite Automata
Non-determinism is a useful concept that has a great impact on the theory of computa-
tion. When a deterministic finite automaton is in a given state and reads the next input
symbol, the next state is always known, that is, it is determined. This is referred to as
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deterministic computation. In a non-deterministic machine, several choices may exist for
the next state at any point. Non-determinism is a generalization of determinism, so every
deterministic finite automaton (DFA) is automatically a non-deterministic finite automa-
ton (NFA). The main difference between an NFA and a DFA is the transition rule. For an
NFA, the transition rule associates pairs (qj, a), qi e Q, a E I with zero or more next states.
The rule relates the pairs (qj, a), q, e Q, a e Z with a collection of states. Thus, the transi-
tion relation is a rule between Q x Z and Q, or a relation on (Q x Z) x Q. In addition, con-
sider that the empty string E can trigger a state change in a non-deterministic finite
automaton. Define Z. = Z u {}, to be the alphabet of the automaton with the epsilon tran-
sition. Furthermore, define P(Q) to be the powerset of Q, that is, the collection of all sub-
sets of Q.
Hence, a formal definition of a non-deterministic finite automata N is given by:
1. An input alphabet X.
2. A finite collection of states Q.
3. A start state qO e Q
4. A finite collection of accept states F C Q
5. A transition relation A:Q x IE - P(Q)
Thus, a non-deterministic finite automaton N is described as:
N = (Q, Z, A, qO, F) (3.2)
Deterministic and non-deterministic finite automata recognize the same class of lan-
guages. Thus, every nondeterministic finite automaton has an equivalent deterministic
finite automaton. This is exceedingly useful, for if a property can be proved about a DFA,
it can also be proven for its equivalent NFA.
3.2 Continuous (Evolving) System Modelling
For a causal system with m inputs uj(t) and p outputs y;(t) (hence m+p manifest vari-
ables), an nth order state space description is one that introduces n latent variables x;(t)
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called state variables in order to obtain a particular form for the constraints that define the
model. Letting:
u(t) t)= . ,x(t) = ... (3.3)
-uM(t' y,(t )xn(t)
an nth order state space description takes the form:
i(t)= f(x(t), u(t), t) (3.4)
y(t) = g(x(t), u(t), t) (3.5)
where equations (1.4) and (1.5) are, respectively, the state evolution equations and
instantaneous output equations.
A key feature of a state-space description is the state property:
Given the initial state x(to) and input u(t) for to t < t, (with
to and tf arbitrary), the output y(t) can be computed for
to 0 t <tf and the state x(t) for to<t < t,.
Thus, the state at any time to summarizes everything about the past that is relevant to
the future. Note that the state property holds for functions f(.) that are well behaved
enough for the state evolution equations to have a unique solution for all inputs of interest
and over the entire time axis. Furthermore, if the functions f(.) and g(.) are both linear and
time-invariant, the state space description simplifies to:
f(x(t), u(t), t) = Ax(t) + Bu(t) (3.6)
g(x(t), u(t), t) = Cx(t) + Du(t) (3.7)
It is of note that if a continuous time system is implemented digitally, the continuous
system is sampled and a discrete system is obtained. Thus, the evolution of the discrete
sampled system is formulated by replacing:
i(t) = x(t + 1), t e Positive Integers (3.8)
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3.3 Hybrid System Modelling
Hybrid systems involve both continuous dynamics as well as discrete phenomena. The
continuous dynamics of hybrid systems may be continuous-time, discrete-time, or mixed
(sampled-data), but are generally given by differential equations. The discrete-variable
dynamics of hybrid systems are generally governed by a digital automaton, or input-out-
put transition system with a countable number of states. A hybrid system can be assumed
to be a run with a sequence of steps. Within each step the system state evolves continu-
ously according to a dynamical law until a transition occurs. Transitions are instantaneous
state changes that separate continuous state evolutions. There are several theoretical for-
mal models for hybrid systems, a few of which are presented in the following sections.
3.3.1 Hybrid Input/Output Automaton
The Hybrid Input/Output Automaton (HIOA) of Lynch [88], is based on the concept of
infinite state machines whose states can change by discrete actions or by continuous tra-
jectories. The discrete transitions are labelled with actions, which allows for the synchro-
nization of transitions of different automata when they are composed in parallel. The
evolution described by a trajectory may be described as either a continuous or discontinu-
ous function. The variables and actions are divided into the categories of internal and
external. External behaviour of an automaton is characterized by hybrid traces, which are
the external actions and trajectories of the evolving external variables. The actual model
is composed of the seven-tuple:
A = (W, X, Q, 9, E, H, D, T) (3.9)
where W is defined as a set of external variables and X is defined as a set of internal vari-
ables, disjoint from each other. V is defined as: V = W u x. The set of states, Q, is defined
as Q < val(X). The non-empty set of start states, E, is defined as e = val(X). The set E of
external actions and the set H of internal actions are disjoint from each other. Ac is defined
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as Ac = E u H. The set D, of discrete transitions is defined as D = val(X) x Ac x val(X) .
Finally, T is the set of trajectories for V, which obey prefix, suffix, concatenation and ini-
tial external valuation closure (i.e. point trajectories). This model allows one automaton
to be implemented by another, which is useful when modelling both the system and
required properties, as well as for stepwise refinement, where different levels of abstrac-
tion are used. The model includes the notions of implementation, simulation, composition
and hiding operations, and receptiveness.
3.3.1.1 Executions and Traces
Sets of trajectories in HIOAs are described using differential and algebraic equations
and inclusions. Let us consider the time domain T to be R, and t to be a fixed trajectory
over some set V where v e V is a variable for the HIOA. If we misuse the variable name
v to denote the projection of the trajectory T on the variable v, we have a means of
expressing the value of the variable v at all times during the trajectory r. Similarly, if we
view any expression e containing variables from V as a function over the domain of the
trajectory T, we can say that T satisfies the algebraic equation:
v = e (3.10)
which means that the constraint on the variables expressed by the equation v = e holds for
each state on the trajectory t. Furthermore, suppose that the expression e is integrable. We
can say that r satisfies:
v=e (3.11)
iff for every time t in the domain of the trajectory,
v(t) = v(0)+ fe(t')dt' (3.12)
This interpretation of the differential equation makes sense even at points where v is not
differentiable.
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An execution fragment of a hybrid automaton A is an action-trajectory sequence:
a = Toazia2 ... (3.13)
where:
1. Each T, is a trajectory in T and
2. If r1 is not the last trajectory in a then the last state in 1i can map, under some
action a + 1 , to a first state in some trajectory ,i + I.
An execution fragment records all the details of a particular run of a system, including
all the discrete state changes and all the changes to the state and external variables that
occur while time advances. The set of execution fragments of A is defined as fragsA. An
execution fragment a is defined to be an execution if the first state of cc is a start state of
the hybrid automaton A. The set of executions of A is denoted by execsA. A state is defined
to be reachable if it is the last state of some closed execution of A.
The external behaviour of a hybrid automaton is captured by the set of "traces" of its
execution fragments, which record external actions and the trajectories that describe the
evolution of external variables. Formally, if c is an execution fragment, then the trace of
a, denoted by trace(a), is the restriction of a to the external actions and external vari-
ables. A trace fragment of a hybrid automaton A, from a state x of A, is the trace of an exe-
cution fragment of A whose first state is x. A trace of A is a trace fragment of A from a
start state of A, that is the trace of an execution of A. The set of traces of A is denoted by
tracesA.
Hybrid automata A, and A2 are comparable if they have the same external interface
(i.e. W1=W2 and E1 =E 2). If A, and A2 are comparable, then we can say that A1 implements
A2 if the traces of A, are included among those of A2 (i.e. tracesA, C tracesA2).
3.3.1.2 Simulation Relations
Simulation relations between hybrid automata may be used to show that one hybrid
automaton implements another, in the sense of inclusion of sets of traces.
59
Let A and B be comparable hybrid automata. A simulation from A to B is a relation
R c QA x QB satisfying the following conditions, for all states xA and XB of A and B respec-
tively:
1. If XA e eA then there exists a state XB E 0 B such that xARXB.
2. If xARXB and a is an execution fragment of A consisting of one discrete action sur-
rounded by two point trajectories, with the first state of a being xA , then B has a closed
execution fragment p with the first state of p being xB, trace(p) = trace(a), and the last
state of a maps to the last state of p via the relation R.
3. If xARxB and a is an execution fragment of A consisting of one trajectory, with the
first state of a being xA , then B has a closed execution fragment 0 with the first state of p
being XB , trace(p) = trace(a), and the last state of a maps to the last state of 0 via the
relation R.
The definition of a simulation from A to B yields a correspondence for open trajecto-
ries of A. We state the following theorem without proof:
Theorem 1:
Let A and B be comparable hybrid automata and let R be a simulation from A to B.
Then tracesA CtracesA 2 .
The proof of the preceding theorem can be found in Lynch et al. [84].
3.3.1.3 Composition
The operation of parallel composition for hybrid automata allows an automaton repre-
senting a complex system to be constructed by composing automata representing individ-
ual system components. The composition operation of Lynch et al. [84] identifies external
actions with the same name in different component automata, and likewise for external
variables. When any component automaton performs a discrete step involving an action a,
so do all component automata that have a in their action sets. Likewise, when any compo-
nent automaton performs a trajectory involving a particular evolution of values for an
external variable v, then so do all component automata that have v in their variable set.
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Composition is defined by Lynch et al. [84] as a partial, binary operation on hybrid
automata. Since internal actions of an automaton A1 are intended to be unobservable by
any other automaton A2 , we allow Al to be composed with A2 only if the internal actions
of Al are disjoint from the actions of A2. Similarly, we require disjointness of the internal
variables of Al and the variables of A2. Formally, the hybrid automata Al and A2 are com-
patible if H, n A2 = H2 r A1 = 0 andX1 r V2 = V2 n X, = 0.
If Al and A2 are compatible, then their composition A1 I| A2 is defined to be the struc-
ture A = (W, X, Q, E, E, H, D, T) where:
1. W =W 1 u W2 and X =X 1 u X2
2. Q = {x e val(X)|(x restricted to Xi) E Q A (x restricted to X2) E Q2}
3. E = {x e val(X)|(x restricted to XI) e Ei A (x restricted to X2) E 021
4.E= E1 uE 2 and H= HIuH 2
5. For each x, x' e Q and each a E A , x aA >x' iff for i=1,2, either
-a e A, and x restricted to X a' : x'restricted to X, or
*a 0 A, and x restricted to X, = x'restricted to X,
6. Tc trajectories(V) is given by T e T,#> T restricted to V, e T, A T restricted to V2 E T2
Another theorem stated without proof is:
Theorem 2:
If Al and A2 are hybrid automata, then A 1 II A2 is a hybrid automata.
Again, the proof is found in Lynch et al. [88]. A form of projection lemma can be
derived from this, which says that the executions of a composition of hybrid automata
project to give the executions of the component automata.
3.3.1.4 Hiding
There are two hiding operators for hybrid automata, one which hides external actions,
and another which hides external variables. The hiding operation reclassifies external
actions or external variables as internal actions or internal variables. We shall call the
action hiding function ActHide and the variable hiding function VarHide.
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1. If E C EA , then ActHide(EA) is the hybrid automaton B that is equal to A except that
EB = EA-E and HB = HAUE
2. If Wc WA , then VarHide(W,A) is the hybrid automaton B given by:
*WB = WA-W
*XB = XAU W
*QB = {xe val(XB)|(x projected on XA) e QA}
*EB = {x e val(XB)I(x projected on XA) e A}
*DB = {(x, a, x') e val(XB) x AB x val(XB)|(x restricted to XA, a, x' restricted to XA) e DA}
SEB= EA, HB = HA, TB = TA
3.3.1.5 Hybrid Input/Output Automaton
A hybrid input/output automaton (HIOA) A is a 5-tuple (H, U, Y, 1, 0) where:
1. H = (W, X, Q, E, E, H, D, T) is a hybrid automaton.
2. U and Y partition W into input and output variables respectively
3. I and 0 partition E into input and output actions, respectively
The following additional axioms are satisfied:
- Input Action Enabling: For every x e Q and every a e I, there exists x' e Q such that
x -- > x'
- Input Trajectory Enabling
Input action enabling is the input enabling condition for ordinary I/O automata. Input
trajectory enabling is a new, corresponding condition for interaction over time intervals. It
says that an HIOA should be able to accept any input trajectory, that is, any trajectory for
the input variables, either by letting time advance for the entire duration of the input tra-
jectory, or by reacting with a locally controlled action after some part of the input trajec-
tory has occurred. For a more in depth discussion of the HIOA and its properties, several
papers by Lynch et al. are available for reference [84,88].
3.3.2 Graphical Model (Timed Reactive Modules)
Many different approaches have been taken to modeling hybrid systems. A hybrid
model can be viewed as a finite automaton that is equipped with a set of variables. The
control locations of the automaton are labeled with evolution laws, and at a control loca-
tion the values of the variables change continuously with time according to an associated
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law. The transitions of the automaton are labelled with guarded sets of assignments. A
transition is enabled when the associated guard is true. The execution of the transition
modifies the values of the variables according to the associated law. Each location is also
labelled with an invariant condition that must hold when the control resides at the location.
The model proposed by Alur et al. [2] is based on a graphical method whereby hybrid sys-
tems can be specified as graphs whose edges represent discrete transitions and whose ver-
tices represent continuous activities. A hybrid system H consists of six components:
H = (Loc, Var Lab, Edg, Act, Inv) (3.14)
where Loc is a finite set of vertices called locations. Var is a finite set of real valued vari-
ables. A valuation v for the variables is a function that assigns a real value v(x) E R to each
variable x e Var. A state is a pair (1, v) consisting of a location 1 and a valuation
v(x) e Reals, x E Variables. Then Z is considered to be the set of states. The Alur-Henzinger
model describes Lab as a finite set of synchronization labels that contains the stutter label
T. Edg is a finite set of edges called transitions. Each transition consists of e = (1, a, p, I')
where 1 e Loc is a source location, 1 E Loc is a target location, a E Lab is a synchroniza-
tion label and pt = V x V is a transition relation. Act is a labelling function that assigns to
each location 1 a set of activities. Finally, Inv is an invariant function that assigns to each
location 1 an invariant. The hybrid system H is time-deterministic if for every location
I e Loc and every valuation v E V, there is at most one activity f e Act (1) with f(O) = v. The
activity,f, is denoted by 01[v].
3.3.2.6 Runs of a Hybrid System
At any time instant, the state of a hybrid system is given by a control location and val-
ues for all variables. The state can change in two ways [3]:
1. By a discrete and instantaneous transition that changes both the control location and
the values of the variables according to the transition relation
2. By a time delay that changes only the values of the variables according to the activ-
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ities of the current location.
The system may stay at a location only if the location invariant is true; that is, some dis-
crete transition must be taken before the invariant becomes false. A run of the hybrid sys-
tem H, then, is a finite or infinite sequence:
p FO -+ a0 -+f a2 -+ (3.15)
of states ac = (ii, vi) e E, non-negative reals t, e R 0, and activities f, e Act(li), such that
for all i < O,
1. f1 (O) = vi
2. V[O t < ti.]f(t) e Inv(1j)
3. the state ay 1 is a transition successor of the state ail = (lA,f (t))
The state a;' is called a time successor of the state ac; the state ai+1 a successor of a,. The
set of runs of the hybrid system H is written as [H].
If all activities are required to be smooth functions, then the run p can be described by
a piecewise smooth function whose values at the points of higher-order discontinuity are
sequences of discrete state changes. Also, for time deterministic systems, the subscripts f1
can be omitted from the next relation -+ .
The run p diverges if p is infinite and the infinite sum Zti diverges. The hybrid sys-
i 0O
tem is nonzeno if every finite run of H is a prefix of some divergent run of H. Nonzeno
systems can be executed.
3.3.2.7 Parallel composition of Hybrid Systems
Let H1 = (Locl, Var Lab1 , Edgj, Act,, Inv,) and H2 = (Loc2, Var Lab2, Edg2, Act 2,
Inv2) be two hybrid system over a common set Var of variables. The two hybrid systems
synchronize on the common set Lab1 n Lab2 of synchronization labels; that is, when-
ever H1 performs a discrete transition with the synchronization label a e Lab, rn Lab2 , then
so does H2 [3].
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The product H, x H2 is the hybrid system (Loci x Loc 2, Var, Lab, u Lab 2, Edg, Act, Inv)
such that:
* ((li, 12), a, p., (11', 12')) E Edg +
1. (li, a, pi, li') e Edg and (12, a, 92, 12') E Edg2
2. Either ai = a2 = a OR ai e Lab2 and a 2 = T, OR ai = T and a2 0 Labi
3. g= p n 2
* Act(11 , 12) = Act 1 (11) n) Act 2 (12 )
* Inv(11, 12) = Inv1(11 ) n Inv 2(12)
It follows that all runs of the product system are runs of both component systems:
[H1 x H 2 ]LoL C [HI] and [H1 x H 2 ]Loc 2 c [H2] (3.16)
where [H1 x H2]Loc, is the projection of [H, x H2] on Loci. Note that the product of two
time-deterministic hybrid systems is also time-deterministic. It is stated here without proof
that for every hybrid system, the set of runs is closed under prefixes, suffixes, stuttering
and fusion. For more detail, see Alur et al. [2,3,4].
3.3.3 Unified Hybrid System Model
Several other models are also used in control systems [15,16]. Branicky presents a unified
model for most control approaches. The discrete state space is specified as Q = Z : (pos-
itive integers). The continuous state space for x(.) is X = {xi}I= where each Xi is a subset
of some Euclidean space Rd', di E Z "0 . The regions Ai, C;, Di E X, are all specified a priori.
There are the autonomous jump sets, controlled jump sets and jump destination sets,
respectively. Let A, C, and D denote the unions UAi x {i}, U Bi x {i}, and UD, x {i},
i i i
i E Z 0 , respectively. The U, V be the sets of continuous and discrete controls, respec-
tively. The following maps are assumed to be known:
1. Vector fields fi: (Xi x X, x U -+ Rd') i E Z :
2. Jump transition maps Gi: A x V - D
3. Autonomous transition delay A,, : A1 x V -+ R 0
4. Controlled transition delay A,,: C, x V --> R 0
As shorthand, define G: A x V -+ D in the obvious manner, and similarly for Aa and A,.
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The dynamics of the control system can now be described as follows. There is a
sequence of pre-jump times {T1 } and another sequence of post-jump times {fr} satisfying
0 = Fo0 s TI <F 1 <T 2 <1 2 <... 0 -, such that on each interval [. _1 , T) with non-empty inte-
rior x(.) evolves according to the differential equation:
x(t) = (t) , t >0 (3.17)
for some X1 , i E Z 50 . At the next pre-jump time (say, tj ) it jumps to some Dk E Xk accord-
ing to one of the two possibilities:
1. x(Te) E Ai, in which case it must jump to x(rF) = Gi(x(T), v1) E D at time
F = tj + a, (x(Tj), vj), vj E V being a control input. This phenomenon is called an autono-
mous jump.
2. x(Tr) E Cg and the controller chooses to (it does not have to) move the trajectory dis-
continuously to x(F1) E D at time r = Tj + A,, (x(Tj), x(rF)). This is called a controlled or
impulsive jump.
For t e [0,00), let [t] = max1{jf rj: t}. The vector field (t) of equation (3.17) is given
by:
(t) = fL(x(t), x[t], u(t)) (3.18)
where i is such that x(t), x[t] E X, and u(.) is a U-valued control process.
This model encapsulates all of the characteristics of Witsenhausen's Model, Tavern-
ini's Model, the Back-Guckenheimer-Meyers Model, the Nerode-Kohn Model, the Ant-
saklis-Stiver-Lemmon Model and Brockett's Model. For more detail, there are several
papers by Branicky et al. [15,16].
3.3.4 Temporal Logic of Actions
The Temporal Logic of Actions (TLA) can be used to model continuous systems. A
temporal formula is built from elementary formulas using Boolean operators and the
unary operator (defined as Always). The semantics of temporal logic is based on behav-
iours, where a behaviour is an infinite sequence of states. We interpret a temporal formula
as an assertion about behaviours. Formally, the meaning of [F] of a formula F is a Boolean
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valued function on behaviours. Letting a[F] denote the Boolean value that the formula F
assigns to the behaviour a, we can state that a satisfies F iff a[F] equals true. Thus, we
can say that Z F asserts that F is always true. We can also define O F = -,[ -'F, which
asserts that F is eventually true. There are several other derived semantic operators in
TLA, which can be found in [68,69]. The Raw Temporal Logic of Actions (RTLA) is
obtained by letting the elementary temporal formulae be actions. An action [A] is a Bool-
ean valued function that assigns the value s[A]s' to the pair of states s, s'. So we define s,s'
to be an A step iff s[A]s' equals true. Thus, we can define [A] to be true for a behaviour iff
the first pair of states in the behaviour is an A step. RTLA formulas are built from actions
using logical operators and the temporal operator. TLA is a subset of RTLA, which adds
the notion of stuttering steps to RTLA. The notions of liveness and fairness, as specified
by Lamport, can be added as well. To finish the definition of the syntax and semantics of
simple TLA, the addition of the unchanged step, which preserves the state of the function,
is needed.
TLA has a limited domain of applicability. TLA is moderately useful for proving sim-
ple invariant properties of programs., and type correctness. Eventuality properties are also
relatively easy to ascertain. Proving one program implements another via simulation rela-
tions is not very easy, as it is occasionally difficult to determine if one has expressed the
correct relation as a valid TLA formula, and intuitive reasoning is sometimes misleading.
TLA is primarily useful for specifying and verifying safety, and to some extent, liveness
properties of discrete systems. This is because one can regard a safety property as specify-
ing that something bad does not happen, and that a liveness property asserts that some-
thing good does eventually happen. Thus, temporal operators are natural constructs to
frame these requirements.
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The most significant drawback of TLA is that TLA properties are True or False for an
individual behaviour. Thus one cannot express statistical properties of entire sets of behav-
iours [68].
TLA can be used to reason about discrete systems even if its behaviour depends on
continuous physical values. Best and worst case time bounds on algorithms can be
expressed as safety properties and proved with TLA. A real-time algorithm can be speci-
fied by conjoining timing constraints to the TLA specification of the untimed algorithm.
In a real-time specification, the variable now is different from all of the others because the
continuous nature of time is not abstracted away. The specification allows now to assume
any of a continuum of values. The discrete states in a behaviour mean that we are observ-
ing the state of the system, and hence the value of now at a sequence of discrete instants.
There are of course, quantities other than time whose continuous nature we wish to
specify. For instance, in an air traffic control system, we wish to represent the positions
and velocities of the aircraft as continuous variables. Such a system which has inherent
continuously varying quantities is a hybrid system. In general, hybrid systems are treated
by TLA in a manner similar to that of real time system, except that in the specification the
formula RTNow(v) is replaced by one that describes the changes to all variables that repre-
sent continuously changing physical quantities. The Integrate operator will allow you to
specify those changes for many hybrid systems. Some systems will require different oper-
ators. For instance, describing the evolution of some physical quantities might require an
operator for describing the solution for partial differential equations. Theoretically,
though, if you can describe the evolution equations in a mathematical format, you can
technically specify these equations in TLA [68].
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3.4 Model Checking Tools for Hybrid Systems
3.4.1 HyTech
HyTech is a tool that allows automatic model verification for linear hybrid systems, a
subclass of hybrid systems. Given a temporal requirement, HyTech computes the condi-
tion under which the requirement is satisfied by a linear hybrid system. Hybrid systems
are specified as collections of automata with discrete and continuous components, and
temporal requirements are verified by symbolic model checking. If the verification fails,
then HyTech generates a diagnostic error trace. HyTech was developed by Henzinger, Ho,
and Wong-Toi [52,53].
A hybrid system typically consists of several components that operate concurrently
and communicate with each other. The component automata coordinate through shared
data variables and synchronization labels. The hybrid automaton that models the entire
system is then constructed from the component automata using a product operation. The
definition of the product operation can be found in several papers [55,56].
HyTech can only deal with linear hybrid systems. Here we define a linear hybrid sys-
tem [55]:
A linear term <p over a set of variables V is a linear com-
bination of the variables in V with rational coefficients. A
linear formula is a boolean combination of inequalities
between linear terms. A linear hybrid system is a hybrid
system where invariant, initial, jump, and flow conditions
are all defined by linear formula. Furthermore, the flow
conditions are defined by linear expressions over i only.
(i.e., the flow conditions can not depend on variables x).
The main function that HyTech performs is the verification of safety properties: given
an initial region and an unsafe region, HyTech verifies whether the system starting with
the initial region ends up within the unsafe region. The verification is done by forward or
backward reachability analysis. The verification procedure is not necessarily decidable,
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i.e., the computation could go on with no guarantee of termination [54,55,56]. The reach-
ability analysis is not necessarily decidable even for linear hybrid automata. In fact, it is
not decidable except for some special cases. It is decidable for timed automata (systems
that have only clocks that run with an identical rate) or simple multi-rate systems. The
simple multi-rate system is a system with clocks only, and no stopwatches. The clocks can
run at different rates but all invariant conditions and guards in jump conditions are of the
form x s k and the assignments are of the form x = k or x = x. For the problems that are
decidable, most of them are PSPACE-hard (see papers [53,54,55,56]).
3.4.2 Stanford Temporal Prover (STeP)
STeP provides a toolset for verifying linear-time temporal properties of reactive and
real-time systems [91]. Its deductive methods include verification rules, verification dia-
grams, decision procedures as well as a tool for invariant generation. STeP contains a
model checker that can automatically verify or disprove linear-temporal properties of
finite-state systems [8]. Assertion graphs are used to simplify and summarize the models
of safety formulas [9], and proofs of specifications generally can be presented using verifi-
cation diagrams [8].
The basic inputs are a reactive system expressed as a transition system, and a system
property to be proved, represented by a temporal logic formula. However, STeP has been
extended to include verification of safety properties of real-time systems using the clock
transition system computational model. Three interface components that STeP contains
are the Top-level Prover, the Interactive Prover, and the Verification Diagram Editor [10].
Specification for system descriptions are given in the form of a Simple Programming
Language (SPL) program. The input to STeP is an SPL program and a temporal-logic for-
mula that represents a property to be verified. When an SPL program is loaded, a fair tran-
sition system is automatically generated. The syntax and semantics are shown in the STeP
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manual [13]. Also, an SPL program is compiled into a fair transition system. To describe
specific types of systems, STeP provides syntax (support) for Fair Transition Systems,
Modular Transition Systems, Clocked Transition Systems, and Hybrid Transition Systems
(manual).
STeP contains tools for automatic generation of invariants based on analysis of transi-
tion systems for reactive and real-time systems [11,12]. Rules shown in papers by Manna
et. al. [91] are used to prove hybrid system properties. The general validity of a set of first-
order verification conditions is obtained by using the rules to reduce the system validity of
a temporal formula. Moreover, to specify properties (specifications) of reactive systems
linear-time logic is used. Proofs of temporal system specification can often be represented
with verification diagrams [8].
Two techniques for automatically generating hybrid systems invariants are described
in Manna et. al. [91] as follows. The first technique characterizes the set of states that is
either an initial state or can be reached by either a discrete transition or a time-step transi-
tion, starting from anywhere in the state space. The second technique takes advantage of
time invariance properties. Time invariance ensures that the possible effects of taking two
successive transitions of duration DI and D2 are the same as taking one transition of dura-
tion DI + D2.
Two approaches to verifying temporal specification of reactive and concurrent systems
are bottom-up or top-down. Bottom-up is referred to as forward propagation and is a sym-
bolic forward execution of the system yielding an invariant that characterizes the set of
reachable states. Top-down is referred to as backward propagation and is a symbolic back-
ward execution of the system from the states satisfying the invariance property being
proved. The result is an invariant that characterizes the states that maintain the invariant
property. Unfortunately, there is no guarantee for success in forward or backward analysis.
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Additionally, Bjorner et al. [8] suggests that verification of real-time systems should first
involve verification that the system description is non-Zeno. If the description is Zeno,
then it contains computation prefixes that can be extended to computations in which time
can grow beyond any bound.
3.4.3 UPPAAL
UPPAAL is an integrated tool environment for modeling, validation and verification
of real-time system modeled as networks of timed automata, extended with data types
(bounded integers, arrays, etc.). UPPAAL is developed jointly by Basic Research in Com-
puter Science at Aalborg University in Denmark and the Department of Computer Sys-
tems (DoCS) at Uppsala University in Sweden. It is appropriate for systems that can be
modeled as a collection of non-deterministic processes with finite control structure and
real-valued clocks, communicating through channels or shared variables [119,65]. Typical
application areas include real-time controllers and communication protocols, in particular
those where timing aspects are critical.
UPPAAL consists of three main parts: a description language, a simulator and a
model-checker. The description language is a non-deterministic guarded command lan-
guage with simple data types (e.g. bounded integers, arrays, etc.). It serves as a modeling
or design language to describe system behavior as networks of automata extended with
clock and data variables. The simulator is a validation tool that enables examination of
possible dynamic executions of a system during early design (or modeling) stages and
thus provides an inexpensive means of fault detection prior to verification by the model-
checker, which covers the exhaustive dynamic behavior of the system. The model-checker
is used to check invariant and reachability properties by exploring the state-space of a sys-
tem, i.e. reachability analysis in terms of symbolic states represented by constraints.
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The basis of the UPPAAL model is the timed automata of Alur and Dill [2,17] derived
from an extension of the classic finite state automata with clock variables. To provide a
more expressive model and ease the modeling task, timed automata are extended with
more general types of data variables, such as Boolean and integer variables. In the current
implementation of UPPAAL, a system description consists of a collection of timed autom-
ata extended with integer variables in addition to clock variables. The edges of the autom-
ata possess several types of labels: guards, actions, clock resets and assignments. A guard
is a condition on the values of clock and integer variables that must be satisfied in order
for the edge to be taken. A synchronization action is performed when the edge is finally
taken. Clock resets and assignments are then optional means by which variables can be
changed before entry into the new state. Control nodes may possess invariants, which are
constraints on the clock values in order for control to remain in the node.
Formally, states of a UPPAAL model are of the form (l,v) where 1 is a control vector
indicating the current control node for each component of the network and v is an assign-
ment given the current value for each clock and integer variable. The UPPAAL model
determines two types of transitions between states: delay transitions and action transitions.
However, these two types of transitions may be overruled by the presence of urgent chan-
nels and committed locations.
The UPPAAL model checker is designed to check for simple invariant and reachabil-
ity properties. A number of other properties, including bounded reachability properties,
may be checked by reasoning about the system in the context of testing automata.
The two main design criteria for UPPAAL have been efficiency and ease of usage. The
application of on-the-fly searching technique has been crucial to the efficiency of the
UPPAAL model-checker. Another important key to efficiency is the application of a sym-
bolic technique that reduces verification problems to that of efficient manipulation and
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solving of constraints [119,66,67,6]. To facilitate modeling and debugging, the UPPAAL
model-checker may automatically generate a diagnostic trace that explains why a property
is (or is not) satisfied by a system description. The diagnostic traces generated by the
model-checker can be loaded automatically to the simulator, which may be used for visu-
alization and investigation of the trace.
3.5 Specification Tools and Requirements Methodology
Most accidents in which software plays a part can be traced to requirements errors, not
coding errors [71]. However, few techniques exist for validation of requirements. Specifi-
cation Tools and Requirements Methodology (SpecTRM) is an experimental systems
engineering development environment for heterogeneous safety-critical systems that
includes specification and analysis tools integrated with a safety information system.
Modem high-tech systems are usually complex and made up of electromechanical,
digital, and human components that must work together to achieve a system goal without
creating hazardous states. SpecTRM includes a set of tools to assist in development and
documentation of the complete system specification including requirements traceability
and design rationale, a formal modeling language called SpecTRM-RL for those aspects
that can benefit from the use of formal methods, and a set of analysis tools to assist the
system engineer in detecting requirements and specification flaws and omissions.
The formal modeling language, SpecTRM-RL (SpecTRM Requirements Language),
can be used to specify the blackbox functional requirements for the system components,
including the software, hardware, and human tasks. To validate system design and compo-
nent requirements, various analysis tools can be applied to the system specification. Cur-
rent requirements analysis tools or those in development include completeness and
consistency analysis, software deviation analysis (robustness of the software when operat-
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ing in an imperfect environment), execution and animation of SpecTRM-RL models, sys-
tem and software hazard analysis, analysis of the potential for inducing human errors such
as mode confusion, test data generation and requirements coverage analysis, and operator
task analysis.
SpecTRM-RL is a formal modeling language that is both executable and analyzable.
At the same time, it is easy enough to read by engineers and programmers that it can serve
as the system specification. A previous language based on similar concepts, named
RSML, is being used for the official system specification of TCAS II, a collision avoid-
ance system required on most commercial aircraft that fly in U.S. airspace [76]. Spec-
TRM-RL builds on what was learned while designing and using RSML in order to make
the language even more readable and reviewable, to eliminate error-prone features (such
as internally broadcast events), and to provide more guidance in building models [75].
SpecTRM Requirements Language (SpecTRM-RL) acts as a formal specification lan-
guage that overlays the low level requirements state machine (RSM) that forms the basis
for the language. The RSM is based on a simple Mealy automaton with outputs on the
transitions between states. The RSM is very low level and is not appropriate as a modeling
language for complex systems. As long as the mapping between SpecTRM-RL to the
RSM is unambiguous and well-defined, formal analysis is possible on both the underlying
RSM formal model as well as the higher-level SpecTRM-RL specification itself [97].
The notation has been designed to be practical for specifying very large and complex
systems and to enhance readability and reviewability. Each component of the system is
specified using SpecTRM-RL models. The models are blackbox in that only externally
visible behavior is specified-no internal (implementation) design is included. The system
specification is the composition of the blackbox component models. A slightly different
notation is used for specifying human procedures to make them more easily understood by
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human factors experts [72]; the underlying formal model is the same, however, so they can
be executed and analyzed in conjunction with the other system component models.
Environment
Sensors
Measured Variables
TE Measured
M STA " " E Feedback
Control Input
CONTROL
Suerisr MODE: Controlled
Device
Display Output
Controlled
Command
output
Figure 3.1: Form of a SpecTRM-RL Model
A SpecTRM-RL model has three components: (1) a specification of the supervisory
interface to the component, (2) a specification of the control modes for the component,
and (3) a model of the controlled process or plant including relevant operating modes,
state variables, and interface variables.
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State Variable
Altitude
Obsolescence: 2 sec
Timing Behaviour:
Exception Handling: Because the Altitude Status Signal changes to obsolete
after 2 seconds, Altitude will change to unknown if all input signals are lost for two
seconds
Description: The altitude variable is used by the altitude switch to indicate whether the
threshold has been reached.
Comments:
References:
Appears in: DOIPowerOn
DEFINITION
= Unknown IF
Powerup T**
Controls.Reset *T*
Analog-Alt=Unknown * T
Dig-Alt1 =Unknown * *T
Dig-Alt2=Unknown * *T
Figure 3.2: Sample And/Or Table from the Altitude Switch Specification
The events and conditions causing transitions between states are described in AND/
OR tables. The behaviour in real systems is too complex to write on arrows between cir-
cles. Instead, we use a tabular representation in disjunctive normal form of a predicate
logic statement over the various states, variables, and modes in the specification. The far
left column of an AND/OR table lists the logical phrases of the predicate. Each of the col-
umns is a conjunction of those phrases and contains the logical values of the expressions.
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If one of the columns evaluates to true, then the entire table evaluates to true and the tran-
sition is enabled. A column evaluates to true if all of its elements match the truth-values of
the associated predicates (a dot indicates "don't care"). Timing statements are allowed as
well as references to previous values of state variables.
Disturbances D
System Input Is System Output Os
Process7
Manipulated PControlled
Variables V, Variables V
Actuators Sensors
A
t Controller
Output 0 C Input I
Command Signal C
Figure 3.3: Process Control Loop
A multivariable controlled process can, in its most generalized sense, be modeled as
above (Fig 3.3). The process, here denoted by the plant P(s), has the controlled input, Is,
and the disturbance input D, along with the controlled variables Vc and the system output
O. The sensor (S) output I is fed into the controller, which is modeled by C(s). The con-
troller then creates the control signal 0 in order to actuate (A) the correct behavior in the
plant.
The Requirements State Machine (RSM) is defined as a seven-tuple
(Z, Q, go, P, Po, y, 6), with respect to the control loop above where [59]:
1. S is the set of input and output variables, I and 0 to the controller.
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2. Q is the finite set of states of the controller C and qO is the initial state of C.
3. Pt is the set of Boolean functions over S; they represent predicates on the values and
timing of the inputs I from the sensors. These predicates are called trigger predicates
because they trigger a state change in the RSM.
4. PO is the set of Boolean functions over S; they represent predicates on the outputs 0
of the controller.
5. y is the trigger-to-output relationship mapping from Q x P, to PO. That is, y(q, p),
where q e Q and p E P, gives the predicate describing the output 0 to the actuators to be
generated when the transition with input predicate p is taken out of state q.
6. 8 is the state transition function mapping Q x P, to Q. That is, 8 (q, p) where q e Q
and p E P, defines the next state when the system is in state q and takes the transition hav-
ing p as the input predicate.
In addition, the RSM has the following properties [59]:
1. Predicates in Pt and PO are expressed using the standard Boolean operators and ordi-
nary arithmetic operators. The expression X I represents an input or output occurrence of
X. This expression evaluates to true the moment input X arrives at the black-box boundary
or output X is produced and presented at the black-box boundary. The value of a variable X
is denoted by val(X).
2. When an input I arrives at the black box boundary, it is denoted as Ii or simply I. The
previous occurrence of the same input is denoted I _1 and so forth. The ordering of outputs
is expressed in the same manner. The first variable I arriving at the black box boundary is
referred to as I,, not 10.
3. A clock and a function giving the absolute time of an event are needed to express
timing. The expression t(I 1) denotes the time when I arrives at the black-box boundary.
The clock is started when the system receives the signal to startup.
3.5.1 Extending SpecTRM-RL to Hybrid Systems
For many hazard analysis problems a discrete model suffices. However, for some anal-
ysis problems, a hybrid model is preferable. Adapting this formalism into a language
capable of representing a hybrid model, that is, a model containing both discrete and con-
tinuous components, is relatively simple. The only element missing in the present formu-
lation of SpecTRM-RL is the ability to allow the state of the system to evolve over time,
without any discrete actions occurring.
Thus, in order to adapt the present formalism of SpecTRM-RL, there only remains to
be added the final qualification of a set of time-passage steps:
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At / qq ->q'
(3.19)
asserting that "from state q the system can move to state q' during a positive amount of
time At in which no trigger predicate is received and thus no discrete action occurs". The
key characteristic of the continuous state evolution under time is the specific interpretation
of the individual time steps. The system must always satisfy the following two properties.
First, if time can advance by a particular amount At = At+ At in two distinct steps (with2 2
no intervening discrete actions), it can also advance by At in a single step. Secondly, if
time can advance by At in one step from state q to state q', then there exists a trajectory
assignment that maps all times in the interval At = [tiit tfin] to automaton states in a con-
sistent manner in order to explain the evolution of the system from state q to state q'. For
hybrid systems, these trajectories usually have physical significance. They often describe
physical parameters that evolve in a continuous fashion with respect to time, such as posi-
tion, velocity, acceleration, flow of information, etc. In such cases, the trajectories,
denoted by T, are descriptions of continuous functions of time. However, no such assump-
tion is made in this formulation, and the trajectories are not required to be continuous. If
we regard the time argument as ranging over the interval t e {0} u {R'} u 00, that is, the
positive real numbers, along with zero and infinity, we can define a trajectory formally
over a left-closed interval I E [tini, tfin) on the range of t such that:
r(tI) t2 -' > )(t 2 ) for allt 2 , t1 E I such that t, < t2 (3.20)
Note that with this definition, it is required that the latest time of the open-ended inter-
val Is [te ,, tfin) be the supremum of I. If I is an infinite interval, then the latest time is
regarded as being infinity. So the trajectory over the interval is such that q = 'r(tini,) and
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q' = T(sup(tfn)). Thus, the trajectory assigns a state to each time in the interval I in a con-
sistent manner.
The two mathematical properties of hybrid traces can be specified as the following
axioms [83]:
Axiom 1:
If q At' > q' and q' si2 > q" then q At 1+At 2  q #
(3.21)
Axiom 2:
Over the interval At = [tini, tfn), in which no discrete action occurs, there exists the
trajectory such that
=r(tini, q ' >q'= r(sup(tfi))
(3.22)
Essentially, Axiom 1 allows for the combination of time intervals that possess no inter-
vening discrete actions, and Axiom 2 allows for the assignment of states to intervening
instances in time in the aforesaid intervals. The case of the zero-time interval (with no
intervening discrete transition) can be considered to be the case such that:
q > ) q ' q = q '
(3.23)
With the notion of trajectories defined, in order to map the evolution of the continuous
states during time passage in the SpecTRM-RL framework, it now becomes possible to
specify hybrid systems using SpecTRM-RL.
The general form of a SpecTRM-RL model must be augmented to include an addi-
tional section which captures the continuous nature of the evolving hybrid trajectory of the
system. A new heading, entitled Inferred System Trajectory, is added to the generic Spec-
TRM-RL model form (see Fig. 3.4 on next page):
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Figure 3.4: Form of a Hybrid SpecTRM-RL Model
The Inferred System Trajectory consists of trajectory elements. These trajectory ele-
ments can be comprised of combinations of input, output, interface or state variables.
Taken together as a whole, the trajectory elements reflect the continuous trajectory of the
system over time. The same sorts of logical predicates that can be formed with state vari-
ables can be formed with trajectory elements (Conjunction, Intersection, Negation etc.).
The trajectory elements have a far reaching impact on the system's reachability. No longer
is the reachability of the system quantized into discrete states, it is mapped onto regions or
reachable space. These issues are further examined in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 4
I could be bounded in a nutshell and count myself a king of
infinite space...
William Shakespeare, Hamlet, II.ii.270-273
Reachability
The notion of reachability spans several disciplines, such as automata theory, operations
research, control theory, and mobile computing, to name a few. While the general concept
of reachability is intuitively the same in most topics, a rigorous study of the idea yields
some surprising results. Techniques for identifying reachable states in some disciplines
(i.e. control theory) are mathematically formulated and relatively easy to implement,
while in others (i.e. automata theory) the entire state space may need to be generated. The
ability to convert finite automaton models to state space models allows for reachable
states to be more easily identified. This helps to curtail the state explosion problem
encountered in most reachability analyses.
4.1 Finite Automaton Models
For a deterministic finite automaton, M = (Q, Y, 8, q0, F) as introduced in Section 3.1.1,
the reachability of a state, can be formally defined as:
A state qj in a DFA is reachable from the state qi if there is a
sequence of inputs a = I02... ak that enables the automaton
to transition from qi to qj through a valid set of states.
Thus, in order to find out whether or not one state is actually reachable from another, a
search must be performed through the reachability graph of the automaton. One classifica-
tion of search techniques is forward or backward [71]. A forward, or inductive, search
takes an initiating state and traces it forward in time. The result is a set of states or condi-
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tions that represent the effects of the initial event. Tracing a state forward can generate a
large number of states, and the problem of identifying a particular reachable state from an
initial state may be unsolvable using a reasonable set of resources. For this reason, for-
ward analysis is often limited to only a small set of initial states. In a backwards, or deduc-
tive, search, the analyst starts with a final event or state and identifies the preceding events
or states. However, the backwards reachability graph that is generated may be even larger
than the forwards reachability graph.
Another classification of search technique is depth-first and breadth-first. Depth-first
searches take an initial state, and then pursue one successor-path to its completion, and
checks whether or not the path has encompassed the desired state. It is obvious that unless
you are very lucky, and the desired state is on the first path pursued, a great many
unneeded paths are generated, which is computationally intensive. Breadth-first searches
generate all successor states to the initial states, check to see if the desired state is within
that set, and then generate all the successor states to the previous set, in order to check
again. As before, it can be very computationally intensive to generate a growing number
of successor states, and this approach rapidly leads to state explosion.
Thus, it can become very computationally intensive in order to determine whether or
not a particular state is reachable within a DFA, or to even generate the set of reachable
states.
4.2 Markov Models
A discrete Markov process or chain can literally be thought of as a finite automaton with a
probabilistic description of its inputs. A Markov process is a stochastic system for which
the occurrence of a future state depends only upon the immediately proceeding state.
Thus, if to < ti < ... < tn represent points in time, and ,, is the random variable which char-
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acterizes the state of the system at tk, then the probability that the system is in the state x,
at t, given that it was in x,- at t,_ is given by: p,(, _ 1),x,, = P{ ,, = x, I(t(,, _1) = xn _ 1) .
This is called the transition probability, or one step transition probability. Given these
one-step transition probabilities for each state of the system, it is possible to construct a
transition matrix P where pij is the one step transition probability from state x; to state xj.
This is a pivotal notion, in that it introduces the idea that given a state xi, all of the possible
successor (or predecessor) states can be identified using a simple matrix operation.
Final states of a finite automaton are represented as absorbing states of the Markov
0 00 0chain, that is, pii=l. Initial states are represented in the vector a ={ai, a 2, ..., an} of initial
probabilities associated with the likelihood of starting in any given state xi. Thus, the tran-
0 00 0sition matrix P together with the initial probabilities a ={aI, a2 , ... , an} associated with the
states X={xI, x 2 , ---, xn} completely define a Markov chain. The notion of reachability for a
Markov chain can be defined as:
A state xj in a Markov chain is reachable from a state x, if it
is possible to go from xi to xj in a finite number of transi-
tions.
The concept of Markov chains and reachability acts to bridge the gap between finite
automata and the next topic, state space systems.
4.3 Discrete Time State Space Systems
A detailed understanding of how inputs impact the states of a given system can be termed
as a discussion of the reachability of the system. Consider an n-th order discrete time sys-
tem, as defined in Section 3.2:
x(i+ 1) = Ax(i)+ Bu(i) (4.1)
Now, for an arbitrary initial condition x(O), in k steps the system will be in the state:
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k-i
x(k) = Akx()+ E Ak-i-IBu(i) (4.2)
i=O
or more explicitly:
u(O)
x( k) = A k x() )+ [A k - IB|A k-2 B|...|B ]u( 1) 43
u(k- 1)
x(k) = A kx(O) + 91kUk (4.4)
where 91k and Uk are defined from inspection of (4.3) and (4.4). Now, consider
whether one may choose the input sequence u(i), i e [0, k - 1], so as to move the system
from x(O) to a desired target state x(k)=d at a given time k. If there is such an input, it can
be said that the state d is reachable in k steps. Now, assuming there are no constraints
placed on the input, the set of reachable states from the origin in exactly k steps is pre-
cisely the range of the matrix 9 1k. The k-reachable set is therefore a subspace, and the
matrix 91k is called the k-step reachability matrix.
Theorem 4.1:
For k s n s 1,
Range(91) G Range(91n) = Range(911) (4.5)
so the set of states reachable from the origin in some finite number of steps by appro-
priate choice of control input is precisely the subspace of states reachable in n steps.
Proof:
The fact that Range(9lX) c Range(91n) for k n follows trivially from the fact that the
columns of 91k are included among those of 91,. To show that Range(91n) = Range(911) for
1 n, the Cayley-Hamilton theorem says that A' for i n can be written as a linear combi-
nation of A -1, A 2 , ... , A, I, so that all the columns of 911 for 1 !n are linear combinations
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of the columns of 9,. Thus, the result Range(9i4) _ Range(91n) = Range( 1;) follows
directly.
In view of Theorem 4.1, the subspace of states reachable in n steps Range(9 1n) is
referred to as the principle reachable subspace. Hence, any reachable target state exists in
Range(91n), and is reachable in n steps or less. The matrix
91 = [A B|A n-2B|...IB ] (4.6)
is termed the reachability matrix. If the entire n x n space is reachable, then the condi-
tion:
Rank(91n) = n (4.7)
that is, the columns of 9, are linearly independent, and span the entire space.
Note that (4.4) shows that getting from a non-zero starting state x(O)=s to a target state
x(k)=d requires that there be a Uk such that:
d-A kS = 1kUk (4.8)
For arbitrary d and s, the requisite condition is the same as that for reachability from
the origin. Thus, we can get from an arbitrary initial state to an arbitrary final state if and
only if the system is reachable from the origin, and we can make the transition in n steps or
less, when the transition is possible.
Now, it follows from the previous analysis that the reachable subspace Range(91n) is A-
invariant. That is, if
x e Range(9n) -> Ax e Range(91) (4.9)
This can easily be seen from the fact that
A91n = [A"BIA" B|... JAB] (4.10)
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where the last n-1 blocks are present in 91, and the Cayley-Hamilton theorem allows
A"B to be expressed as a linear combination of blocks in 9.. This establishes the fact that
Range(A91n) c Range(91,) (4.11)
It follows directly that
x = 9aa -> Ax = A91na = 9,U G Range(91n) (4.12)
It is generally true that any A-invariant subspace is the span of some eigenvectors and
generalized eigenvectors of A. It turns out that Range(91n) is the smallest A-invariant sub-
space that contains Range(B), but this shall not be proven or pursued. The upshot of this
result is that an interpretation of the reachable space of the system can be realized using
the eigenvectors or generalized eigenvectors of the matrix A. Thus, the system represented
by equation (4.1) may be thought of as having a collection of "Jordan chains" or general-
ized eigenvectors at its core. Reachability, which was first introduced in terms of reaching
target states, turns out also to describe the ability of the system to independently "excite"
or drive the Jordan chains. This is the implication of the reachable subspace being an A-
invariant subspace. The critical issue for achieving reachability of a particular chain, is to
be able to excite the beginning of the chain; this excitation can then propagate down the
chain. An additional condition is needed if several chains have the same eigenvalue; in
this case, we need to be able to independently excite the beginning of each of these chains.
With distinct eigenvalues, we do not need to impose this independence condition; the dis-
tinctness of the eigenvalues permits independent motions.
4.4 Continuous Time State Space Systems
The definition of continuous time reachability is identical to that of discrete time reach-
ability. However, while in the discrete time case reachability can be checked through sim-
ple matrix conditions, it is not so clear that one can derive simple matrix conditions for
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continuous time systems. It is somewhat surprising to find that the reachability condition
for continuous systems is the same as for discrete systems.
Consider now the n-th order continuous time model:
c(t) = Ax(t) + Bx(t) (4.13)
Consider whether one can choose the input u(t),t E [0, L], so as to move the system
from x(O)=O to a desired target state x(L)=d at a given time L>O. If there is such an input,
we say that the state d is reachable in time L. It can be shown that the choice of L is not
critical, similar to the discrete time scenario. The relationship of x(L) to u(t) under the
above conditions is given by:
x(L) = [e(L-t)A]Bu(t)dt (4.14)
0
x(L) = F T(t)u(t)dt (4.15)
0
x(L) = (F(t), u(t))L (4.16)
where F T (t) = [e(L - t)A]B and the Gram product of F(t) and u(t) is defined in (4.15). The
set 91 of reachable states forms a subspace, because:
xa(L) = (F(t), Ua(t))L 1 OtXa(L) + fXb(L) = (F(t)
Xb(L) = (F(t), Ub (t))L x Ftua(t)+ 1 xbHt))L
that is, any linear combination of reachable states is reachable. This assumes, of
course, that there are no constraints placed on u(t). Thus, 91 is referred to as the reachable
subspace of the system. Strictly speaking, 91 is the reachable space for target states at time
L, but the choice of L, it will soon be shown, turns out to be irrelevant.
Now, let us define the reachability Gramian (at time L) of the system as:
PL = (F(t), F(t))L (4.18)
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Theorem 4.2
The reachable subspace 91 is related to the reachability Gramian (at time L) PL as fol-
lows:
91 = Range(PL)
1 = Ranget F(t)F(t)dt)
(4.19)
(4.20)
Proof:
To first show that
91 c Range(PL) (4.21)
it is equivalent to show that:
Range (PL) c 9 1 (4.22)
For this, note that:
q PL = T = 0
(F(t)q, F(t)q) = 0
co q F (t) = 0
(4.23)
-> q x(L) = 0
where the last implication comes from equations (4.2-4). So, any vector in Range- (PL) is
also in 91'. Now, it can be shown that 91 = Range(PL) by showing that any target state
d e Range(PL) is also in 91'. Suppose d = PLa, and pick u(t) = F(t)a. Then:
x(L) = F T(t)F(t)axdt
0
(4.L4)
From here, a further conclusion about the state space system can be drawn:
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= PLa
Range(PL) = Range([n B|An 2B|...|B])
= 91 (4.25)
Proof:
This can be proved by showing that the orthogonal complements of the above two sub-
spaces are equal.
T T A(L-t)qa P t=h fq e B = 0
as in the proof of Theorem 4. 1. Then:
q Te A(L -t)
q B = 0 set t = L
0 -> qT AB = 0 differentiate and set t = L
q An-I B = 0 differentiate n times and set t = L
ce q T9
(4.26)
(4.27)
Conversely:
q T 9= 0 > q Te B = 0 (4.28)
since by Cayley-Hamilton, eA(L-t) can be written as time varying combinations of
A , A , ... , A, I. This leads directly to:
q T9 = 0=>q eA(L-t)B = 0 T>q PL = 0 (4.29)
Note that from Theorem 4.2 and the fact that 91n does not depend on L, the reachable
subspace is independent of the choice of L. However, the characteristics of the control
input used to attain a particular target state will depend on L; the smaller L is, the "larger"
u(t) is expected to be, in some sense.
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Theorem 4.3
Thus, it has been shown that the overall conditions for reachability of both continuous
and discrete time systems are the same. Hence, any reachability analysis applied to dis-
crete models can also quite easily be extended to continuous or hybrid models.
4.5 Converting DFA models into State Space Models
The heart of analyzing a system from a safety perspective is identifying and analyzing the
system for hazards, which are states or conditions of the system that combined with some
environmental conditions can lead to an accident or loss event. Once hazards are identi-
fied, steps can be taken to eliminate them, reduce the likelihood of their occurring, or mit-
igate their effects on the system [71]. A hazard analysis requires some type of model of the
system, which may be an informal model in the mind of the analyst, a written informal or
formatted specification of the system, or a formal mathematical model. Different models
allow for different types of analyses and for additional rigor and completeness in the anal-
ysis. The specification model can also be analyzed with respect to specific known hazards.
Different model types facilitate different types of analyses. From the previous sections, it
is observed that substantial techniques exist for determining the reachability of states
when a model is expressed in a state space formulation. The goal of this section is to see
how a deterministic finite automata can be converted into a state space formulation in
order to determine reachability properties. Coupled with the notion of abstraction, the
computational intensity of calculating the reachability of a given state becomes greatly
reduced.
4.5.1 Motivation for System Reformulation
A state is said to be reachable from another state if there is a path from the first state to the
second. In most systems, all desired states must be reachable from the initial state. If a
state is unreachable, there are two possibilities:
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1. The state has no function in the system and can be eliminated from the model
2. The state should be reachable and the model is incorrect and should be modified
accordingly.
Theoretically, if the entire state space of a model were to be generated, it would be
possible to identify all hazardous states, and all the paths involving these aforesaid states.
Doing so would involve a forward search, as described in Section 4.1, which would have
the drawbacks mentioned. Utilizing a backwards search from a hazardous state to see
whether or not the initial state can be reached can also fall prey to similar difficulties. The
number of backward paths for hazardous states is still enormous for real systems. In com-
plex systems, complete reachability analysis is often impractical, but Leveson and Stolzy
have shown that it is possible to devise algorithms that reduce the necessary state space
search by focusing on a few properties. Their solution is to start from the hazardous state
and only work far enough backwards along the path to determine how to change the model
to make the hazardous state unreachable. Thus, only a subset of the actual reachablility set
will need to be generated [73]. Hence, if the state machine model of a system with n states
were reformulated as a state space model, determining the reduced reachability set would
only involve at most n matrix multiplications of an n x n matrix.
4.5.2 A Simple Example: The Gambler's Ruin
Consider first a very simple discrete example upon which to apply the previous theory.
The classical problem of the Gambler's Ruin involves gambling against a bank with capi-
tal A, in the following fashion:
A coin is flipped, and if the outcome is heads, the bank pays
one dollar to the player, but if the outcome is tails, the
player pays one dollar to the bank.Consider the probability
of flipping a head as p, and that the player has a capital A2-
The game terminates if either the bank or the player loses all
of their capital.
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The problem becomes:
Is it possible to break the bank?
This problem can be modeled as a simple deterministic finite automata (DFA), where
there are two accepting states: when the capital is zero for either the player or the bank.
Consider flipping a head to be an input of 0, and a tail to be an input of 1. The automaton
becomes (Fig 4.1):
S01
1( 2) (A+1,A2) A2_1) 0
90=(AAA2)
Figure 4.1: Finite Automaton of the Gambler's Ruin Problem
It is obvious from this automaton that the absorbing state of breaking the bank is reach-
able. However, there are Ai+A 2+1 states in the entire automaton. By unwinding the
automaton and reformulating it into a state space notation, and then applying the concept
of abstraction, the number of states can be greatly reduced, and computational resources
can be saved.
In order to create a state space model of the automaton, first let us consider reframing
the DFA as a Markov chain. For generality's sake, consider the probability of flipping a
head as being p, and the probability of flipping a tail as being (1-p). The final states of
breaking the bank become absorbing states, and the initial state becomes the only state in
the initial state vector, with a probability of one. A similar diagram of the Markov chain
becomes:
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Figure 4.2: Markov Chain of the Gambler's Ruin Problem
From elementary mathematics, it is seen that the probability of breaking the bank is:
(ipjA21
P(Breaking Bank) = , p # 1 -p (4.30)
1- p+ 2
P
A1
P(Breaking Bank) = A+ A 2  p =1p (4.31)
Again, it is obvious that it is theoretically possible to break the bank, and thus the final
state is reachable. The Markov chain also has Ai+A 2+1 states. It seems that little progress
has been made, but in reality, a fundamental step has been taken. For, in the creation of the
Markov chain, the one-step transition matrix P has been formulated. If we consider x, to
be the absorbing state of breaking the bank (i.e. the bank has zero dollars and the player
has A1+A2 dollars), and xA I+A +, to be the absorbing state of the player going broke, fill-
ing in the requisite number of states in-between, while taking the probability of flipping a
head as being one-half, the transition matrix P would look something like this:
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Transition Matrix P
state transition matrix A in the state space formu-
the state space equivalent model (as described in
Section 3.2) to the finite automaton becomes trivial. Consider Ai+A 2+1 state variables x,
at the kth coin flip. The
1 dollars at the kth flip.
x,(k + 1)
X2 (k + 1)
x 3 (k + 1)
x 4 (k + 1)
XA +A(k + 1)
XA,+A (k + 1)
XA +A1(k + 1)
state variable x,(k) represents the likelihood of the player having i-
The discrete time state space formulation now looks like:
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Figure 4.4: State Space Formulation of the Gambler's Ruin Problem
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Now, this system is still very large, possessing A1 +A2+1 state variables, so that calcu-
lating the range space condition would seem to be very computationally intensive. Thus,
to avoid this, we must now use the concept of abstraction, in order to reduce the number of
state variables.
4.5.3 Abstraction
In order to formulate the Gambler's ruin problem in state space format, one might begin by
creating Ai+A 2+1 state variables in order to mimic the states in the finite automaton.
However, it is much cleverer to consider approaching the problem more abstractly. Instead
of considering each combination of (Banker'sCapital, Player'sCapital) in Fig 4.1 as a
distinct state, and writing out the entire state space, let us view the problem in terms of
winning and losing. Each time the player flips a head, s/he wins a dollar, and each time s/
he flips a tail, a dollar is lost. If we return to the notion that the probability of flipping a
head is p, and that of flipping a tail is (1-p), and let u(i) represent the probability of the
player breaking the bank with i dollars, then, for 1 <i <A 1 + A2 - 1:
u(i) = pu(i + 1) + (1 -p)u(i - 1) (4.32)
isolating for u(i+ 1) gives
u(i + 1) = -u(i) - - u(i - 1) (4.33)
P P
which implies
u(i + 2) = u(i + 1) - 1 u(i) (4.34)
P P
Note that the boundary conditions are expressed as:
u(O) = 0 (4.35)
u(A 1 + A2) = 1 (4.36)
that is, if the player has zero dollars, s/he has lost, and if the player has A1+A2 dollars, s/he
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has won.
Then let x 1(i) = u(i+ 1) ,x 2 (i) = u(i) be the state variables in order to get:
Xi(i+ 1)1 F
X2(i + 1)]
1
p
1
-1(1 -P)l
p x2(i)
0 j.x 2(i_
or
(4.38)
which is in standard state space format. By inspection, it can be seen that the matrix A is
full rank (for p # 1 ), as is the matrix A2 . Now, applying the reachability conditions of equa-
tion (4.7) we determine that the entire state space is reachable. Hence, we can conclude
that the state of the player breaking the bank is reachable. This is accomplished by doing a
very simple matrix multiplication on a very small matrix. Hence, the act of determining
reachability becomes very reasonable.
As an aside, using the boundary conditions in equations (4.35-6) we can solve for the
probability the player breaks the bank given an initial capital of A2 dollars:
x(i) = A'x(O), (0) = LPu(2) (4.39)
so with initial player capital of A2 dollars,
x(A2) = A A2u(2)j
0
where the probability of the player breaking the bank is given by x2(A2)-
(4.40)
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(4.37)
x(i + 1) = AI(i)
So, it is easily observed that the probability of breaking the bank is not zero, and thus it
is confirmed that this final state is reachable. Note that this approach is identical to formu-
lating the problem using Ai+A 2+1 state variables.
From the perspective of the bank, the state in which the player breaks the bank is haz-
ardous. Thus, using the technique of Leveson and Stolzy [73] outlined in Section 4.5.1, the
bank would begin the analysis from that hazard, and attempt to find the first state from
which this disaster could be averted, which would occur in the state where the bank has
one dollar, and the player has AI+A 2-1 dollars. The issue of backwards reachability
becomes simple, because from our formulation we are carrying the predecessor state con-
tinuously with us in the state vector x. Thus, in order to determine what the reachable pre-
decessor states were, we need only look to the second element of the state vector. Hence,
given this state (or family of states), we can determine their usefulness in escaping the
hazard. It is obvious that the predecessor state (1,Ai+A 2-1) is important, because it leads
directly to the hazardous state and to another non-hazardous state (2, Ai+A 2 -1). Hence,
guarding conditions must be put around the critical state of (1, A1+A2+1) by the bank in
order to limit the potentially hazardous situation. In reality, of course, the bank would
determine a margin of safety, say $100, and declare that to be the hazardous state, as no
bank wishes to have its capital diminish to $1. So a family of hazardous states would be
formed (all those states in which the bank has capital less than $100), leading to the cre-
ation of a safety envelope for the problem.
This technique of generating backwards states from the hazardous state in order to
determine the first escape path is developed using the Leveson-Stolzy algorithm [73],
which was originally designed to work on Petri Nets. A Hazard Automaton Reduction
Algorithm is developed from the Leveson-Stolzy algorithm by implementing modifica-
tions which allow the concepts of Leveson-Stolzy to be efficiently applied to automata and
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state machines. The formal definition of the Hazard Automaton Reduction Algorithm
along with several of its properties and their proofs are detailed in depth in the following
chapter.
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CHAPTER 5
When asked what it was like to set about proving something,
the mathematician likened proving a theorem to seeing the
peak of a mountain and trying to climb to the top. One
establishes a base camp and begins scaling the mountain's
sheer face, encountering obstacles at every turn, often
retracing one's steps and struggling every foot of the jour-
ney. Finally when the top is reached, one stands examining
the peak, taking in the view of the surrounding countryside
and then noting the automobile road up the other side!
Robert J. Kleinhenz
A State Machine Hazard Analysis and
Backwards Reachability
Whereas system reliability deals with the problems of ensuring that a system, includ-
ing all hardware and software subsystems, performs a required task or mission for a speci-
fied time in a specified environment, system safety is concerned only with ensuring that a
mishap does not occur in the process. Usually there are many possible system failures that
have relatively little "cost" associated with them. Others have such drastic consequences
that an attempt must be made to avoid them at all costs, perhaps even at the cost of attain-
ing some or all the goals of the system.
5.1 Motivation
While software itself cannot be unsafe, it can issue commands to a system it controls that
place the system in a unsafe state. Furthermore, the controlling software should be able to
detect when factors beyond the control of the computer place the system in a hazardous
state and to take steps to eliminate the hazard, or, if that is not possible, initiate procedures
to minimize the hazard.
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A mishap is an unplanned event or series of events that results in death, injury, illness,
or damage to or loss of property or equipment. Mishaps can be classified according to
their severity from catastrophic to negligible.
A hazard is a set of conditions within a state from which there is a path to a mishap.
Hazards can be categorized by the aggregate probability of the occurrence of the individ-
ual conditions that make up the hazard and by the seriousness of the resulting mishap.
Together, these constitute a measure of the risk of the situation. Risk is formally defined as
the hazard level combined with the likelihood of the hazard leading to an accident (some-
times called danger) and hazard exposure or duration (sometimes called latency).
The first step in safety analysis is to identify the system hazards and assess their sever-
ity and probability (i.e. risk). Often early in the design of a system, the probabilities are
unknown and the analysis is done considering only severity. For simplicity, the states of
the system will be divided into two groups: high risk and low risk. High risk states are
states that lead to catastrophic or unacceptable losses (hazards). It is important to note that
in many, if not most, realistic systems it is impossible to completely eliminate risk: the
goal is to design a system with "acceptable" risk.
The overall goal in designing a safety-critical system is to eliminate hazards from the
design or, if that is not possible, to minimize risk by altering the design so that there is a
very low probability of the hazard occurring. To show that a system is safe, or low risk, it
is necessary to first ensure that given that the specifications are correctly implemented and
no failures occur, the operation of the system will not result in a mishap. Second, the risk
of faults or failures leading to a mishap must be eliminated or minimized by using special-
ized procedures. If it is not possible to eliminate completely the possibility of a hazard
occurring, then in order to reduce risk the exposure time of the hazardous conditions must
be minimized.
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In order to determine whether or not a system can actually "reach" any high risk states,
all possible states that a system can reach from the initial state due to a legal set of transi-
tion can be generated. This is called a forward reachability graph. However, generating the
entire reachability graph may well be impractical due to the size of the graph for a com-
plex system.
5.2 Informally Defining the Hazard Elimination Algorithm
One way to do a safety hazard analysis is to work backwards from the hazardous state
to determine if it is reachable. This approach is useful when the goal of the analysis is to
prove only that the system cannot reach certain hazardous states, which is often a require-
ment for safety-critical systems. Fault tree analysis is a similar technique used for the
same purpose. The backward approach is itself practical only if one considers a relatively
small number of high risk states. It must be noted that the concern here is with system
safety, not with the correctness of the system. A system is "safe" if it is free from mishaps
even if it does not accomplish its mission or functional objectives.
Now, if a deterministic finite automaton is considered, as defined in Section 3.1, the
transition relation between a pair of states is defined as being a function. The transition
function of the DFA can be used to determine if the hazardous state is reachable by using
the hazardous state as the initial state and determining whether the original initial state is
reachable. It is possible for the backward reachability graph to be as large as the original
graph. Thus, a solution must not require the entire backward reachability graph to be gen-
erated. One possible solution defines and uses a type of state called a critical state.
Consider separating the states in a finite automaton into two disjoint sets:
1. States from which it is possible to reach only low risk states
2. States from which it is possible to reach high risk states and possibly also low risk
states
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A critical state is a low risk state from which it is possible to reach both a hazardous
state and a low risk state. Thus, if a hazardous state is reachable, there must be a critical
state on the path from the initial state to the hazardous state (including the possibility that
the critical state is the initial state, as long as the initial state is low risk). Otherwise, the
design needs to be completely redone since all executions result in hazardous states.
To ensure that a particular hazardous state can never be reached, it is possible to sim-
ply work backwards to the first critical state and to use design techniques to ensure the bad
path is never taken. This technique is conservative, because in order to reduce the large
amount of computing to produce the entire reachability graph, hazardous states may be
eliminated that in reality may not have been reachable. However, it does no harm to elimi-
nate the possibility of a mishap that would not have occurred. Moreover, eliminating a
nonexistent path may have the effect of eliminating or lessening the possibility of mishaps
caused by extraneous faults and failures.
The algorithm starts with the set of hazardous states. For each member of this set, the
immediately prior state or states are generated. Each of these "one-step backward" states
is then examined to see if it is a potential critical state and can be used to eliminate one
path to the hazardous state. Finally, there exists only the need to look forward one step
from each potentially critical state in order to label it as critical. This is because if the
escape path used to eliminate the hazardous state in question leads eventually to another
hazardous state, the hazardous part of escape path will be eliminated by a critical state that
is a successor to the one being used to eliminate the original hazard in question.
5.3 Defining Hazard Automata
Let us define a Hazard Automaton A as being:
A = (Q, q0, QL, QH, Z, X, 8) (5.1)
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where Q represents the states of the system, qO the start state of the system,
QH Z Q
and
QL C Q
and
Z C QH,
and
6: Q x I -+ Q
so that 6 is the transition function that maps the present state to the next state where Z
is the input alphabet. Recall that the set of finite strings of elements of I is denoted by X*.
Consider the states QH, QL to be the set of high risk states and low risk states, respec-
tively, that are pre-determined by the engineer or system designer. These states obey the
following properties:
Q = QH uQL
QHn QL = 0
that is, Q, and QL form a partition of Q. Furthermore, we assume:
if q e QL then 3(oy E Z) such that 8(q, o) e QL
Z Qi QH
The initial state of the system must all be an element of the set QL.
gO QL
(5.6)
(5.7)
(5.8)
(5.9)
That is:
(5.10)
Let us next define the notion of predecessor states, successor states and reachable
states.
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(5.2)
(5.3)
(5.4)
(5.5)
5.3.1 Predecessor, Successor and Reachable States
Predecessor, successor and reachable states can be defined quite easily in a Hazard
Automaton A. Given a state q, the predecessor states of q are all of the states from which
there exists a legal transition under a single given input that takes the predecessor state to
the state q. Similarly, the successor states of q are all of the states for which there exists a
legal transition under a single given input that takes the state q to the successor state. The
reachable states of q are all of the states for which there exist a sequence of legal transi-
tions, under a given input string that takes the state q to the reachable state. More for-
mally:
Define the set of successor states Sq for a state q as:
Sq = U a ({5(q, a)} (5.11)
Define the set of predecessor states Pq for a state q by:
q' e Pq ce q e Sq' (5.12)
Define the reachability function S* such that:
S*(q, aw) = S(6 *(q, w), ) (5.13)
S*(q,X) = q
where
6*: Q x X* -> Q (5.14)
for a e I , w = wIw 2 .-. w, being a string over the alphabet of E, and X being the empty
input string. Thus, the set of reachable states Rq from the state q can be defined as:
q' e Rq < Bw e X* [ 8*(q, w)= q'] . (5.15)
All states in Rq can be considered to be descended from, or have the common ancestor
state q. Similarly, the set of ancestor states Aq can be defined as:
q e Aq c< q e R. (5.16)
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5.3.2 Critical States
Recall that the Hazard Automaton A possesses three sets of states, QH , QL and Z. The
goal in a hazard analysis is to identify and remove hazards. This is equivalent to rendering
all of the states in Z unreachable. The algorithm outlined in the next section attempts to
do so by utilizing the notion of a critical state.
Define the set of critical states C such that:
f e QLA
q E C<-> 3q' E QH such that q' e Sq A (5.17)
3z e Z such that z e Rq
5.4 Hazard Automaton Reduction Algorithm
The Hazard Automaton Reduction Algorithm (HARA) takes a hazard automaton
A = (Q, qo, QL, QH, Z, X, 8) as an input, along with a single identified hazardous state z e Z
and produces as an output a "reduced" Hazard Automaton A' = (Q', qo', QL', QH', Z, X, 8')
with the hazardous state rendered unreachable 3. A hazard automata
A' = (Q', qo', QL', QH', Z, X', 8') is a reduction of the hazard automata
A = (Q, qo, QL, QH, Z, Y, 8) if:
Q= Q (5.18)
qO' = o (5.19)
QL' = QL (5.20)
QH' QH (5.21)
Z =Z (5.22)
Z' = (5.23)
' C 8 (5.24)
3. HARA returns a "reduced" HA if it is possible to remove the hazard from the original HA with-
out damaging the functionality of the design.
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HARA disables the transitions in 5 that lead to the hazardous state z. Repeated appli-
cation of the Hazard Automaton Reduction Algorithm can be used to render all identified
hazards in the automaton unreachable, as long as there exists at least a single path of low
risk states from the initial state to a final state.
Given the inputs of a Hazard Automaton A = (Q, qo, QL, QH, Z, Z, 8) and a hazardous
state z e Z to HARA, and the output of a reduced Hazard Automaton
A' = (Q', qo', QL', QH', Z, E', 6') by HARA, the correctness condtions on HARA are as fol-
lows:
Q' = Q (5.25)
qo' = go (5.26)
QL' = QL (5.27)
QH' = QH (5.28)
Z = Z (5.29)
Z = X (5.30)
S-':{(q, a, q')|(q E QL A q' E QH such that q' e Sq A z e Rq,)} (5.31)
This last condition can also be stated in the form that:
-,]w1'*(qO, w) = z (5.32)
indicating that the hazardous state z is no longer reachable in the reduced Hazard
Automaton A'.
Consider the Hazard Automaton:
A = (Q, qO, QL, QH, Z,I, ) (5.33)
The following describes the details of the algorithm to identify and render the hazard-
ous state of the Hazard Automaton unreachable 4
A'=HARA(A = (Q, qO, QL, QH, Z, Y, 6) ,z)
4. The DFA has a transition enabled under all inputs, and a transition exists for all inputs.
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% Initialize variables and Reduced Hazard Automata
StatestoProcess = {Iz
StatesProcessed =
AncestorStates =
% These are the ancestor states of the hazardous state z in the automata A'
PredecessorStates = $
% These are the predecessor states of the state q in the automata A'
6' = 6
A' = (Q, qO, QL, QH, Z, 8')
%Render Hazard z unreachable in Automata
do while StatestoProcess -StatesProcessed # $
choose q e StatestoProcess
%Find Predecessor States of q with respect to the automata A': Pq, A'
PredecessorStates = Pq, A'
%Eliminate each path from the predecessor state to the state q, consider each element of Pq case by case
begin case
Case 1: Pq, A'= A q # q
%State q is unreachable from any other state.
StatestoProcess = StatestoProcess - q
StatesProcessed = StatesProcessed + q
Case 2: Pq, A'# $ A (Pq,A' r AncestorStates) = P ,A
%No new Predecessor states found; State is in an unreachable cycle
StatestoProcess = States toProcess - q
StatesProcessed = StatesProcessed + q
Case 3: Pq, A' # $ A (q, A' n AncestorStates) # PqA
%New Predecessor states found.
AncestorStates = AncestorStates u Pq, A'
StatestoProcess = StatestoProcess - q
StatesProcessed = StatesProcessed + q
for all a e (AncestorStates-StatesProcessed)
choose a E AncestorStates-StatesProcessed
if a e QL
% a is Critical State because it is a low risk state, has low risk sucessor (by definition of low risk state) and
%has the hazard z in its reachability graph.
%Disable hazardous transition by removing from 6
6' = 8'- (a, a, q) where ((q e QH) A (z E Rq))
else
%Go one more step backwards
StatestoProcess = StatestoProcess u {a} - StatesProcessed
endif
endfor
Case 4: Pq= $ A q = q0
% State q is initial state which is defined as a low risk state. This case should have been caught in Case 3,
%and the initial state should have been used as a critical state. An error has occurred.
Terminate Algorithm and Return Error Message
end case
end while
Terminate algorithm and Return A' = (Q, qO, QL1 QH, Z, , 5')
end
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The Hazard Automaton Reduction Algorithm takes as input the Hazard Automaton A
and a single identified hazardous state z. It returns as an output the Reduced Hazard
Automaton A', in which the hazard z is no longer reachable. The first section of the algo-
rithm initializes some useful variables, and creates the Reduced Hazard Automaton A'. A
while loop is then set up to terminate when the hazard z is no longer reachable in A'. The
set of predecessor states of the hazard z with respect to the automaton A' (also referred to
as Pq,A ) is generated. If there are new predecessor states generated, then the algorithm
goes to Case 3, where the attempt is made to remove the reachability of the hazard z by
disabling the transitions from the predecessor states to the hazardous state z. Case 3
attempts to accomplish this by considering each predecessor state individually, which is
accomplished in thefor loop. Each predecessor state is identified as being either high risk
or low risk. If the predecessor state is low risk, then the transition between the low risk
predecessor state to the hazard is removed, causing the transition function 6' in the
Reduced Hazard Automaton A' to be modified. All further actions in the algorithm are
taken with respect to this newly modified A'. If all of the predecessor states to the hazard
z are low risk, then the for loop in Case 3 will eliminate all transitions to the hazardous
state, and the algorithm will terminate at the while condition and return the Reduced Haz-
ard Automaton A' = (Q, qo, Q, QH , z, 6') .
However, some of the predecessor states of z may be high risk. These high risk prede-
cessor states must be treated as hazardous states, and are added to the set of
StatesToProcess. The algorithm then reencounters the while condition and continues on
as if all of the states in StatesToProcess are hazardous, and the reachable paths to each
one must be eliminated.
The algorithm is guaranteed to terminate due to the fact that, for any hazard automaton
that posesses a path of low risk states from the initial state to the final state, a critical state
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must exist along the path from the inital state to the final state (if the hazard is reachable).
This is clear because the initial state itself is a low risk state and has a low risk sucessor
(due to the fact that there is a low risk path from the initial state to the final state), which
means that if there is no other low risk predecessor to the hazard other than the initial state,
the initial state itself will become the critical state for the hazard. If the hazard is not
reachable from the initial state, then it will be identified by either Case1 or Case 2 of the
algorithm. Case 1 deals with the situation where a path to the hazard is composed of only
high risk states, and is not reachable from the initial state. Case 2 deals with the situation
where the path to the hazard is trapped in a cycle of high risk states which is not reachable
from the initial state. These paths are then removed from consideration in the algorithm,
and do not result in a non-termination situation. Since these paths were never reachable to
begin with, they do not impact the overall reachability of the hazard in question from the
initial state. Case 4 should never be encountered, and is included for completeness' sake.
Hence, it can be concluded that the Hazard Automaton Reduction Algorithm can take
the Hazard Automaton A = (Q, qO, QL, QH, z, Z, 8) along with the hazardous state z e Z and
produce a reduced automaton A' = (Q, qo, QL, QH, Z, Y, 8'), where the hazardous state z has
been rendered unreachable. All of the hazardous transitions from the low risk critical
states leading to the high risk states that eventually lead to the hazard have been disabled.
5.5 Functionality of the Hazard Automaton Reduction Algorithm
Now, given the algorithm above, it is desirable to show that, if a Hazard Automaton has a
path of low risk states from the initial state to a final state, then the Hazard Automaton
Reduction Algorithm is capable of removing all of the hazards in the automaton. Given
this sort of automaton, the Hazard Automaton Reduction Algorithm, when applied repeat-
edly, will produce a reduced automaton with the critical transitions excised. Hence, it can
be said that the Hazard Automaton Reduction Algorithm can eliminate all hazardous
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behaviour in an automaton, if that automaton possesses a path of low risk states. More
formally, this theorem can be stated:
Theorem 1:
Given a Hazard Automaton A capable of exhibiting a path of low risk states from the
initial state to a final state, the Hazard Automaton Reduction Algorithm can eliminate all
identified hazardous behaviour of the automaton. All identified hazardous behaviour of A
being eliminated is equivalent to saying that all identified hazards are no longer reachable.
This second framing of the statement shall be proved by contradiction.
Proof:
Suppose not.
This means that:
Ez E Z|&*(q0, w) = z (5.34)
The entire argument by contradiction hinges on the fact that there is a critical state
along the path between each hazardous state and the initial state for any hazard automaton
A that is capable of exhibiting non-hazardous behaviour. Without a critical state on the
path between the hazardous and initial state in the original automaton A, the reachability
of the hazardous state cannot be eliminated. If no critical state exists on the path between
qO and z, then there is no low risk state on the path between qO and z that possesses any
low risk successors. Thus, the initial state qO has no low risk successors, and thus can lead
only to hazardous behaviour. This is in contradiction to the assertion that A posseses a
path of low risk states starting from the initial state and ending in a final state (a state that
has no outgoing transitions).
The only way for there to be no critical state in the set of ancestor states of the hazard
would be if no initial state was an ancestor state of the hazard. If there is no path existing
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between the hazard and the initial state in the original automaton A, then the hazard is
already unreachable:
,-]*(qO, w) = z, z E Z (5.35)
and since:
' C 6 (5.36)
we have a contradiction of (5.34).
Hence, we can say that HARA renders all identified hazards unreachable in the new
automaton A', which is equivalent to saying that all identified hazardous behaviour in the
reduced automaton A' is eliminated.
5.6 Optimality of the Hazard Automaton Reduction Algorithm
As well as eliminating all identified hazardous behaviour in an automaton, the HARA also
ensures that no reachable, strictly desirable behaviour is eliminated. This is equivalent to
saying that no sequence of purely non-hazardous, low risk states is eliminated. Thus, for
an automaton A which is capable of exhibiting low risk behaviour, not only are all of the
hazards removed, but no desirable low-risk behaviour sequences are removed in A. Thus,
in some fashion, HARA can be construed as being optimal, in the sense that it removes all
of the hazards whilst removing the minimum amount of non-hazardous behaviour traces at
the same time5 . More formally:
5. A sequence of desirable, low risk behaviour is defined as being a path or sequence of states, all
of which are low risk. That is, this sequence of purely low-risk states does not have a hazardous
predecessor along the path from initial state to final state.
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Theorem 2:
Given a Hazard Automaton A capable of exhibiting a path of low risk states from the
initial state to a final state, the Hazard Automaton Reduction Algorithm does not elimi-
nate any sequence of reachable, desirable, non-hazardous low risk behaviour starting from
the initial state.
Proof:
By contradiction. Suppose not.
Then,
3(qoalq1 ...oYqL), Vi E N, og E 1, q; E QL (5.37)
in the original Hazard Automaton A and qL E QL. However, in A':
,3(S'*(q, w)= qL), w e * (5.38)
This means that, at some point, a transition must have been disabled in the original
automaton, upstream of the low risk state, rendering it unreachable from the initial state in
the new automaton A'. If there is no path from qO to qL, then we have a contradiction to
(5.37), as qL was unreachable to begin with.
So there must be a critical state somewhere along the path from qO to qL in the original
automaton A in order for a transition to be disabled, thereby cutting off the reachability of
the low risk state qL. Thus,
8*(qo, w)= 6 *(6 *(q0 , w'), w")
= S*(qc, w") (5.39)
qL
where qC e C, qc n Rq0 *
In order for the path to qL to have been eliminated, a hazard must exist somewhere along
the reachable path from qO to qL and beyond. Now, if we recall from the definition of a
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critical state, only a path of high risk states must exist between the critical state and the
hazardous state. The critical state is the first low risk state (with a low risk predecessor)
encountered along the path from the hazard to the initial state. So, each critical state elim-
inates only the path of high risk states (and all of their successors) leading to the hazard.
So, we must have, in A:
3(qciqi---i + n n+ 1z) (5.40)
where
Vi e N, a, E 1, qC E QLZ ZE Z, q, E QH (5.41)
There are two possible ways that the path of low risk states to qL could have been
eliminated.
1. The path of low risk states leading from qc to qL is a successor of one of the high
risk states q, c QH leading to the hazardous state z, or is a successor of z itself.
2. The hazard lies after the path of low risk states to qL (z is successor to q).
5.6.1 Case 1
If the path of low risk states from qc to qL is a successor of one of the high risk states
q, e QH or of the hazard z itself, then the low risk state qL has a hazardous or high risk pre-
decessor along the direct path from the critical state to the low risk state in the original
automaton A. Thus, the behaviour exhibited by the sequence of states, from the low risk
critical state to the low risk eliminated state evinces a hazardous or high risk state. This is
a contradiction to the assertion that a sequence of desirable, low risk, non-hazardous
behaviour beginning in the initial state qO and terminating in the final state qL is elimi-
nated (5.37). After all, if in order to get to the low risk state qL one has to pass through a
high risk state q, e QH, the sequence of states that takes you from one to the other is not
purely low risk.
5.6.2 Case 2
The hazardous state z lies after the state qL. By definition of a low risk state:
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And now we are saying:
3w 15*(qL, W) = z (5.43)
then we have by definition that qL is a critical state. Since qC = *(qc, w'), the state qL
is encountered before the critical state qc in HARA, making qL the first low risk state with
a low risk successor encountered due to the hazard z. Thus, the critical state qL would be
used to eliminate the hazard z in HARA, and hence could not itself be eliminated in the
process6 . Thus we have a contradiction, as qc is no longer the first low risk state encoun-
tered in the backwards path search due to the hazard z.
5.7 Hybrid Extension of the Hazard Automaton Reduction Algorithm
Now, for the case of a hybrid automaton, we consider the LSVW [84] model:
A = (W, X, Q, 8, E, H, D, T) (5.44)
as defined in Section 3.3.1. The question becomes whether or not we can reduce the
hybrid case into the form of the discrete case, in which case the proceeding two proofs for
functionality and optimality would still hold. The added difficulty of the hybrid case is
that a hazardous state can occur either through a discrete transition or through continuous
time evolution.
However, this problem can be circumvented. Let us create an augmented LSVW
automaton HA = (W, X, Q', E', E, H, D', T) which considers the matter of risk. First augment
the internal state variables X of the hybrid automaton H to X, by adding a single internal
variable, called Risk. This is a variable which can possess one of three values: Low, High
or Hazard. Depending on the state of V = W u X at any given point in the continuous tra-
6. Note that the critical state is no longer critical due to hazardous state z as z would have been
eliminated using ..
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3q'IS8(qL, CY) = q', q' e QL, CY E X (5.42)
jectories T, or before and after a discrete transition, the variable Risk is assigned a value
by an external engineer, depending on whether the state is low risk, high risk, or hazard-
ous. So, for the augmented LSVW A', we have that:
X = X u {Risk} (5.45)
Q'c val(X') (5.46)
E'= val(X') (5.47)
D' = val(X') x {E u H} x val(X') (5.48)
T is the set of valuations for V = W u X' that obey suffix, prefix and concatenation closure in A' (5.49)
Once this assignment has been made, a hybrid Hazard Automaton HA can be created
from the LSVW automaton A'. The hybrid Hazard Automaton can be defined as:
HA = (W, X', Q', E', E, H', D", T') (5.50)
where X, Q', e' are defined as in Equations (5.45-5.47) and:
H' = Hu{ E } (5.51)
D" Q' x {E u H'}'x Q' (5.52)
T' is the set of valuations for V = W u X that obey suffix, prefix and concatenation closure in HA (5.53)
A discrete e -transition can be inserted into the transition map D' of the hazard autom-
aton HA each time the state variable Risk changes in order to create the transition map D'.
This acts to augment the discrete transition relation D' to include dummy transitions that
do not affect the valuation V of the automaton, but signal a change in the risk behaviour of
the automaton.
With the augmented state set V = W u X and the augmented transition relation D", we
can assert that a hazardous state can only occur as the result of a discrete transition. Thus,
a coarse discretization of the continuous system with respect to risk has been achieved.
The Risk variable acts to abstract away the behaviour of the continuous trajectories, and to
create a superstate that possesses a commonality due to risk behaviour. Hence, a trajectory
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with risk behaviour "Low" can be seen as a superstate consisting of the infinite number of
valuations within the trajectory. It can move to another superstate with Risk behaviour
High via a discrete transition only. Thus, if we encapsulate the trajectories into superstates
based on risk, the application of the Hazard Automaton Reduction Algorithm occurs just
as it did in the discrete case.
5.7.1 Functionality Proof Sketch
Recall that the definition of functionality in the discrete case only guarantees that all haz-
ards are removed from the automaton. No promises are made with respect to maintaining
the operability of the automaton. Because the hybrid Hazard Automaton is discretized
with respect to the Risk variable, it follows directly from the discrete proof that all of the
hazardous superstates can be removed. For each hazardous superstate, if the predecessor
superstate is achieved by an actual transition in the original D, then the calculation of suc-
cessor superstates and an evaluation of their risk level determine whether or not the prede-
cessor superstate is a critical superstate, and so on. If the predecessor superstate is
achieved solely by an e -transition, then this predecessor superstate is treated as having
only the one hazardous superstate as a successor, and a further one-step backwards calcu-
lation must be performed.
Now, given the algorithm above, it is desirable to show that, if a hybrid Hazard
Automaton HA is capable of exhibiting non-hazardous behaviour, the Hazard Automaton
Reduction Algorithm is capable of removing all of the hazards in the hybrid Hazard
Automaton. Given this sort of automaton, the Hazard Automaton Reduction Algorithm
will produce a Reduced hybrid Hazard Automaton HA' with the the discrete transitions
leading to eventual hazardous trajectories excised. Hence, it can be said that the Hazard
Automaton Reduction Algorithm can eliminate all undesirable behaviour in a hybrid Haz-
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ard Automaton, if that hybrid Hazard Automaton is capable of exhibiting non-hazardous
behaviour in its present design form.
5.7.2 Optimality
As with the previous subsection, the same argument applies with respect to the optimality
of the hybrid Hazard Automaton. As well as eliminating all identified hazards in a Hazard
Automaton, the Hazard Automaton Reduction Algorithm also ensures that no reachable,
strictly desirable behaviour is eliminated. This is equivalent to saying that no sequence of
purely non-hazardous, low risk behaviour is eliminated. Thus, for a hybrid Hazard Autom-
aton HA capable of exhibiting low risk behaviour, not only are all of the hazards removed,
but no desirable low-risk behaviour sequences are removed in HA'. Thus, in some fashion,
the Hazard Automaton Reduction Algorithm can be construed as being optimal, in the
sense that it removes all of the hazards whilst removing the minimum amount of non-haz-
ardous behaviour at the same time7 .
5.7.3 Simulation Relation
The key to the hybrid proofs for functionality and optimality lies in the simulation
relation between the original hybrid LSVW automaton which has a risk variable as a part
of its internal variables X and the hybrid Hazard Automaton which has the extra epsilon
transitions between continuous trajectory segments of different risk designations. If the
hybrid automaton model of Lynch et al. [84] is considered for the purposes of the proof,
the the augmented LSVW automaton which has Risk as a part of its internal variable set X
can be denoted by:
A' = (W, X, Q, E, E, H, D, T) (5.54)
and the hybrid Hazard Automaton with the augmented transition map can be denoted by:
7. A sequence of desirable, low risk behaviour is defined as being a path or sequence of trajecto-
ries, all of which are low risk. That is, this sequence of purely low-risk trajectories does not have a
hazardous predecessor along the path from initial state to final state
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HA = (W, X, Q, 8, E, H', D',T) (5
where:
H' = Hu{e} (5.56)
D'c Q x {E u H'} x Q (5.57)
T is the set of valuations for V = W u X that obey suffix, prefix and concatenation closure in HA (5.58)
such that E is the dummy action which precipitates the discrete epsilon transition between
continuous trajectory segments of different risk. Note that the states of the system for each
automaton are identical, it is only the transition map that has been augmented.
Theorem 3:
A simulation relation R exists between the augmented LSVW hybrid automaton [84]
A' and the hybrid Hazard Automaton HA. That is, HA implements A'.
Proof:
The mapping between the two hybrid automata is essentially the identity mapping.
The only difference between the two automata exists in the addition of the "dummy" epsi-
lon action and the "dummy" transition to the transition map of the hybrid Hazard Automa-
ton. However, this epsilon transition can be mapped onto a continuous trajectory without
problem, due to several properties of trajectories in the hybrid automaton model. The
existence of point trajectories, and the fact that trajectories obey prefix, suffix and concat-
enation closure aid in creating a map from A' to HA. The three properties the simulation
relation must obey are checked below.
5.7.3.1 Equivalence of Start States
Obviously, since the states Q of both A' and HA are identical, the start states ® of A'
and HA are identical.
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.55)
5.7.3.2 Equivalence of Discrete Steps
The discrete transition map D' of HA contains all of the discrete transitions in the map
D of A'. That is, D c D'. So, if a is an execution fragment of A' consisting of one discrete
action surrounded by two point trajectories, with the first state in of the execution frag-
ment being x,, then there is obviously a corresponding execution fragment P of HA
which has the first state of the execution fragment p as XHA = XA' Similarly the last states
in the executions a, p are identical. Since the external actions of both A' and HA are iden-
tical, then trace(a) = trace(s).
5.7.3.3 Equivalence of Trajectories
It needs to be proved for a an execution fragment of A' consisting of one trajectory,
with the first state of a being x,, there exists a closed execution fragment p of HA with
the first state of p being XHA , trace(s) = trace(a), and the last state of a mapping to the
last state of P via the relation R.
The trajectories of A' and HA are identical, except for the existence of discrete epsilon
transitions in HA. We must show that the introduction of the discrete epsilon transition in
HA does not disrupt the correspondence of trajectories in A' via the relation R.
Consider the execution fragment a in A' which corresponds to the moment at which a
discrete epsilon transition is taken in HA. The discrete epsilon transition is instantaneous,
so there is no continuous evolution of the trajectory in A' taking place as it occurs. The
execution fragment a consists of two points: the point xA, before the transition occurs and
the point after the transition occurs. The corresponding trajectory P in HA consists of the
discrete epsilon transition surrounded by two point trajectories. The first point in the tra-
jectory XHA of p is equivalent to the point XA in a. A similar correspondence exists for the
final points in the trajectories. The leftmost endpoint of any trajectory can have its external
variables manipulated, due to the existence of point trajectories and because all trajecto-
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ries are defined over a right-open interval. Given that the external actions and variables for
A' and HA are identical, and that the E action is internal, the leftmost endpoint of p can be
manipulated if necessary in order to ensure trace(a.) = trace(s).
Thus, a simulation relation exists between A' and HA. From Lynch et al. [84] we have
that:
tracesHA C traceSA. (5.59)
The coarsely discretized automaton HA exhibits the same external behaviour as A'. If
we consider aggregate superstates based on risk, derived from trajectory fragments, the
proofs for functionality and optimality of the Hazard Automaton Reduction Algorithm in
hybrid automata resemble their discrete counterparts. If we classify trajectories based on
their risk designation, we have two sets: TL, TH corresponding to low risk trajectories and
high risk trajectories. That is:
Ti projected on X e QL - T E TL (5.60)
'r projected on X E QH -- >, E TH
The set of all hazardous trajectories z is a subset of the set of high risk trajectories. If
we consider an execution fragment a, where c = Toa 1 T1 a 2T 2 a 3 T3 a 4 T4 ... is an action-trajec-
tory sequence, we see that trajectories can be considered to have successors and predeces-
sors. That is, in the execution fragment x, T2 has the successor trajectory T3 and the
predecessor trajectory t1. It also has the ancestor trajectory ro and the descendent trajec-
tory 14 . Again, the sets of predecessor, successor, ancestor and descendent trajectories can
be denoted by T,, Ts, TA, TD respectively. We add the condition that a low risk trajectory
must have at least one low risk successor trajectory. The first state in the trajectory T, is
denoted by firstgqt and the final state in the trajectory is denoted by lastqTi. So, the rela-
tion:
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firstqt,, + = S(lastqT,, a) where a e {E U H'}
holds.
A critical trajectory is the first low risk trajectory which precedes a hazardous trajec-
tory, and has an immediate low risk successor trajectory. That is, rj = Tc is a critical tra-
jectory if there exists the execution fragments a, a', ax" E fragsHA such that:
a = T agiIT 1... Tj where tj e TL (5.62)
and
aa'E fragsHA where
(5.63)
a' = a'l IT' ... T' and T'k E Z
and
aa" e fragsHA where
(5.64)
a" = a"j+1T + j+ 1 and"j+1 E Tt
The set of critical trajectories is denoted by C.
The hybrid form of the Hazard Automaton Reduction Algorithm takes the hybrid Haz-
ard Automaton HA = (W, X, Q, E, E, H, D, T) and produces the Reduced hybrid Hazard
Automaton HA' = (W, X, Q, E, E, H, D', T) where:
D' = D - (lastqT, afirstqTH) (5.65)
where:
lastqrc E CfirstqT E TH (5.66)
and
-3(a e fragsAI Tia...T,, where firstqTi = firstqTH and T, E Z (5.67)
5.7.4 Proof of Functionality
Now, given the Hazard Automaton Reduction Algorithm, it is desirable to show that, if a
hybrid hazard automata is capable of exhibiting non-hazardous behaviour, the Hazard
Automaton Reduction Algorithm is capable of removing all of the hazards in the automa-
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(5.61)
ton. Given this sort of automaton, the Hazard Automaton Reduction Algorithm will pro-
duce a reduced hybrid hazard automaton with the critical transitions excised. Hence, it can
be said that the Hazard Automaton Reduction Algorithm can eliminate all undesirable
behaviour in a hybrid hazard automaton, if that hybrid hazard automaton is capable of
exhibiting non-hazardous behaviour in its present design form. More formally, this theo-
rem can be stated:
Theorem 4:
Given a hybrid Hazard Automaton HA capable of exhibiting low risk behaviour, the
Hazard Automaton Reduction Algorithm can eliminate all identified hazardous behaviour
of the hybrid hazard automaton. All identified hazardous behaviour of HA being elimi-
nated is equivalent to saying that all identified hazardous trajectories are no longer reach-
able. This second framing of the statement shall be proved by contradiction.
Proof:
Suppose not.
This means that there exists some execution ax with the trajectory ti = tf where:
-k; E ZIc = T0 a 1 T... a;Tg (5.68)
The entire argument by contradiction hinges on the fact that there is a critical trajec-
tory along the path between each hazardous trajectory and the initial trajectory for any
automaton that is capable of exhibiting non-hazardous behaviour. If no critical trajectory
exists on the path between ro and rH, then there are no low risk states on the path between
ze and TH that possesses any low risk successors. Thus, the initial state Oo = firstq'ro has
no low risk successors, and thus can lead only to hazardous behaviour. This is in contra-
diction to the assertion that HA is capable of exhibiting low risk behaviour.
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So, given that there must exist a critical trajectory r, along the path from 00 to TH
there exists the execution cH such that:
as = Toaltli...ajt a +I...tH (5.69)
where
a' = a' T I', ...T' and ' EZc a'j+1 j+1'~ k adT'k
and ,= TC Ec. This means that:
3a" e fragsHA where
xa" e execs(HA) (5.71)
a" = a"+1 1 t j+ 1 and T"j 1 E TL
which means there must have been, in the original automaton HA:
]1astqa lfirstq' = 8(lastqx,a) where aE {EtuH'} (5.72)
However, if 'rc is the first critical trajectory encountered in the execution aH in a back-
wards reachable fashion from hazardous trajectory T, on the path to the initial trajectory
to, then the transition in (5.69) should have been disabled by HARA. If rc is not the first
critical state encountered, that is, there is a prior critical trajectory encountered in a back-
wards reachable fashion from the hazardous trajectory tH on the path to the initial
trajectory, then the hazardous trajectory should already have been rendered unreachable
by HARA using this prior critical state, and the execution aH should no longer be hazard-
ous. Thus, there is a contradiction.
Hence, we can say that HARA renders all identified hazards unreachable in the new
automaton HA', which is equivalent to saying that all identified hazardous behaviour is
eliminated.
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5.7.5 Proof of Optimality
As well as eliminating all identified hazards in an automaton, HARA also ensures that no
reachable, strictly desirable behaviour is eliminated. This is equivalent to saying that no
sequence of purely non-hazardous, low risk behaviour is eliminated. Thus, for an automa-
ton HA which is capable of exhibiting low risk behaviour, not only are all of the hazards
removed, but no desirable low-risk behaviour sequences are removed in HA'. Thus, in
some fashion, HARA can be construed as being optimal, in the sense that it removes all of
the hazards whilst removing the minimum amount of non-hazardous behaviour at the
8same time
Theorem 4:
Given a hybrid hazard automaton HA capable of exhibiting low risk behaviour, HARA
does not eliminate any execution of purely low risk behaviour.
Proof:
By contradiction. Suppose not.
Then,
CLI(aL E execSHA)] A [(3ctL) E execsHA.] (5.73)
How would this come to pass? This would mean that in the original automaton HA
{aItL = Toa I. . r such that (Vi) (T e TL) (5.74)
but the corresponding execution no longer exists in HA'.
This is clearly impossible as the only way for any execution fragment to be eliminated
would be if a transition were removed from the transition map D". Transitions are
removed by HARA clearly only between low risk trajectories and high risk trajectories.
8. A sequence of desirable, low risk behaviour is defined as being a sequence of action-trajectory
pairs, for which all trajectories are low risk.
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The purely low risk execution aL has no change in risk behaviour, and thus no transitions
would need to be removed. Thus, we have an obvious contradiction.
E
Hence, we have proved that HARA is both functional and optimal for both regular and
hybrid hazard automata.
In the next two chapters, the Hazard Automaton Reduction Algorithm will be used in
conjunction with backwards reachability controls techniques to remove hazardous behav-
iour from two aeronautical systems. The first example is the Altitude Switch, which is dis-
crete in nature. The second example is the Medium Term Conflict Detection algorithm for
aircraft conflicts, which is a hybrid system.
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CHAPTER 6
How can it be that mathematics, being after all a product of
human thought independent of experience, is so admirably
adapted to the objects of reality?
Albert Einstein (1879 - 1955)
Altitude Switch Example
In the next two chapters, a backwards reachability hazard analysis will be performed on
two examples: an aircraft altitude switch and an aircraft Medium Term Conflict Detection
algorithm. The altitude switch is a discrete system, in that it involves only discrete transi-
tions in order to change states. The altitude switch is converted from a SpecTRM-RL
model into a state space model, and then the Hazard Automaton Reduction Algorithm is
applied in conjunction with the controls reachability techniques outlined in Chapter 4. A
hazardous state is then analyzed in the context of the algorithm. The backwards reachable
path of the hazardous state is calculated until a critical state is reached, and then a con-
straint is postulated in order to eliminate this hazardous path.
6.1 The Altitude Switch
The altitude switch (ASW) is a reusable component that turns power on to a device of
interest (DOI) when the aircraft descends below a threshold altitude (2,000 feet) above
ground level. The ASW receives altitude information from an analog radio altimeter and
from two digital radio altimeters, with the altitude taken as the lowest valid altitude seen.
If the altitude cannot be determined for more than two seconds, the ASW indicates a fault
by failing to strobe a watchdog timer. A fault is also indicated if internal failures are
detected in the ASW. The detection of a fault turns on an indicator lamp within the cock-
pit.
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The ASW receives a status indication from the DOI indicating whether the DOI is
powered on. If the DOI does not indicate that it is powered on within two seconds after
power is applied, a fault is indicated by failing to strobe the watchdog timer. The ASW
does not apply power to the DOI if the DOI is already powered on. If the DOI is powered
off after the aircraft descends below the altitude threshold, the ASW does not reapply
power to the DOI unless the aircraft again descends below the threshold altitude.
The ASW also accepts an inhibit signal that prevents it from turning on power to the
DOI or indicating a fault. All other ASW functions are unaffected by the inhibit signal.
The ASW also accepts a reset signal that returns it to its initial state [96].
The ASW interfaces with the following external devices, as currently implemented:
two digital altimeters, one analog altimeter, the watchdog timer, the cockpit interface and
the DOI (See Fig. 6.1).
Analog altitude
Altimeter status
Reset Signal
DOI Status S gnal
Figure 6.1: Altitude Switch Component Diagram
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The DOI can be any aircraft component that can receive an electrical signal to control
its operation and provide information about its status. The watchdog timer is used to deter-
mine the failure of the altitude switch or the inability of the altitude switch to ascertain the
aircraft altitude within a certain period of time. Input messages to the ASW contain the
altitude and status from the analog radio altimeter and the altitude and status from the two
digital radio altimeters, along with the inhibit and reset signals from the cockpit interface,
and the DOI status from the DOI. Output messages include the Power-on signal to the
DOI and the strobe signal to the watchdog timer.
Safety analysis of the ASW depends on the DOI. If the DOI is non-safety critical, for
example, a dimmer switch for passenger reading lights, then there are no real safety impli-
cations due to the ASW. However, if the DOI is the landing gear, then the ASW becomes
safety critical. For the purposes of this dissertation, it shall be assumed that the DOI is a
safety critical device, which must be activated once the altitude threshold has been
breached.
6.2 SpecTRM-RL Model of the Altitude Switch
A state machine diagram of the ASW in the SpecTRM-RL modeling language is
shown in Figure 6.2 (see next page). There are state variables for the statuses of each of
the three altimeters, which have three possible values: Unknown, Valid or Invalid. There is
a state variable for the status of the device of interest, which can assume the values
Unknown, On, Off or FaultDetected. The state variable Altitude has four possible values,
Unknown, Below Threshold, AtOrAboveThreshold and CannotBeDetermined. The initial
state of all state variables upon startup is Unknown.
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AnalogAltimeter DigitalAltimeter1 DigitalAltimeter2
AnalogAltStatus DAlStatusSignal DA2StatusSignal
AnalogAltSignal DA1AltSignal DA2AltSignal
SUPERVISORY MODE INFERRED SYSTEM STATE DOI
DOI-STATUS ALTITUDE
Statual
~I~EonroIL.JSi nal
Inhib 0 BelowThresholdCONTROL MODE I0 MOEAtOrAboveThreshold DOI
CoultDetected CannotBeDeterminedControls DOIK ~OperationalCoan
Rese ANALOG-ALT DIG ALT1 
DIGALT2 Command
- IValid Valid
WatchdogStrobe
Watchdog Timer
Figure 6.2: SpecTRM-RL Model of Altitude Switch upon Startup
There are three control modes in which the ASW can be operated: Startup, Opera-
tional, and FaultDetected. The ASW can also transition to the Inhibited control mode if
the pilot presses the inhibit button on the cockpit interface. The ASW begins in Startup
mode upon initialization, then transitions into Operational mode if no faults are detected.
The ASW transitions into FaultDetected mode if there is a failure of the DOI to turn on, or
if the altitude cannot be determined, or if there is an internal fault, such as remaining in
Startup for more that 3 seconds. The default control mode of the ASW is Startup. The truth
tables governing all of the transitions for the Altitude Switch Model in SpecTRM-RL are
given in Appendix A.
6.3 Analysis of Hazardous Situation
Consider the obviously hazardous state of the system whereby the state variable Alti-
tude has the value BelowThreshold and state variable DOIStatus is Off (see Figure 6.3).
In addition, assume that the rest of the ASW is behaving normally, that is, the system is in
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Operating control mode, and the inhibit command has not been invoked. This means that
the aircraft has passed below the minimum altitude of 2,000 feet but the landing gear has
failed to deploy. The question becomes, is it possible to reach this state?
AnalogAltimeter DigitalAltimeter1 DigitalAltimeter2
AnalogAltStatus DA I StatusSignal DA2StatusSignal
AnalogAltSignal DA I AltSignal DA2AltSignal
SUPERVISORY MODE INFERRED SYSTEM STATE DOI
DO$_STATUS ALTITUDE Status
Cockpit Controls Unknown Unknown Si nal
FIhb CONTROLINMODE O AtOrAboveThreshold DOI
Cockpit Startup FaultDetected
Controls DOI
K ~ tetetedUnkown ~ow r~ n Cmmand
Rese ANALOG-ALT DIG ALTI DIGALT2Re -* Falteete nknow~n 
~~Unknown 
-~Unknown
L hibited -F I d - ivalid Invalid
, WatchdogStrobe
Watchdog Timer
Figure 6.3: Hazardous State of Altitude Switch Model
Ideally, to answer this question, the state machine model of the Altitude Switch must
be converted into a state space model, as per Section 4.5, and the state transition matrix A
and input matrix B must be constructed. Consider a single component of the altitude
switch model, for instance, the DOI. Recall that the state variable DOIStatus has four
possible values: Unknown, On, Off and FaultDetected. The latent variables xi correspond-
ing to the state values must be created: x, corresponding to the value Unknown, x 2 corre-
sponding to On, x 3 corresponding to Off and x4 corresponding to FaultDetected. If the
value of the latent variable is non-zero, then it is possible for the DOIStatus to assume the
state machine value corresponding to the latent variable. For instance, given an initial state
x(0), after k transitions, if the latent variables xi,x 2,X3 and x 4 are, respectively, 1,0,1 and 1,
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this means that at the kth step, the value of DOI_Status can be Unknown, Off or FaultDe-
tected. The valuation On is not reachable in k steps from the initial state x(O) as x2(k)=0,
and thus the state variable cannot assume that value.
Examining the logic of the ASW upon startup, the value of DOI_Status is initialized to
Unknown. The ASW then receives an input from the DOI. If no input is received, the
DOI_Status remains in Unknown until an input is received from the DOI regarding its sta-
tus. This input received can either be On or Off. The DOI must continually send feedback
to the ASW as to its status. If more than two seconds pass since the last signal was
received from the DOI regarding its status, the variable DOI_Status will transition to
Unknown, unless the present value is FaultDetected.
Consider the input values received by the ASW from the DOI to be either On or Off.
Depending on which value the input takes, the DOI_Status value transitions from
Unknown to On or Off just after startup. The DOI_Status can transition to FaultDetected
only under two scenarios. The first situation occurs as follows:
1. The ASW sends a signal to the DOI commanding it to turn on
2. Feedback is received from the DOI within two seconds stating that the DOI has not
turned on (i.e. DOI status is still off),
3. A fault is then detected, and the variable DOI_Status transitions to Fault Detected.
The second circumstances occur as follows:
1. The ASW sends a signal to the DOI commanding it to turn on
2. Two seconds elapse and no feedback has been received from the DOI regarding its
status
3. A fault is then detected and the variable DOIStatus transitions to FaultDetected.
If three input variables, u1 , u2 and u3 are created, corresponding respectively to the
DOI_StatusSignal values of On, Off and Unknown, the behavior of the state variable
DOI_Status can be represented in control state space as:
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1 5 u3(k)x 4 (k + 1) 0L0 4(k) -
0 0 0 1 _ _ 
F 2 J _
where the columns of A and B have been normalized, and the presence of input is indi-
cated by ui(k) = 1.
So, for instance, if we start in the Off configuration of the DOIStatus (i.e. x3=1,
x1=x 2=x 4=0), and then receive an input of On (i.e. u1=1 and u2=u3=0), the final configura-
tion becomes xi=x3=x 4 =0 and x2=1. Thus, the DOIStatus has changed from Off to On
from the kth step to the k+1th step. Using equations (4.6) and (4.7) from Chapter 4 the
reachable space of the DOI after any number of steps can be determined.
However, the components of the ASW are highly coupled. The status of the DOI
changes from On to Off when the value of the Altitude state variable becomes
BelowThreshold. The value of the Altitude variable can become BelowThreshold only if
all three altimeter statuses are valid, and all three altimeters input a value below the thresh-
old of 2000 feet. The altimeter statuses are valid only if the ASW has received inputs
within 2 seconds of the last input. It becomes immediately apparent that the entire state
transition matrix must be constructed simultaneously, not on a component by component
basis. However, the block-like nature of each component is preserved in the structure of
the A matrix, and with the appropriate choice of latent variables xi. This leads to a struc-
ture of Jordan chains in the A matrix, which is a direct indicator of the modal behaviour of
the system. Each Jordan chain represents a mode which can be excited independently,
given a judicious choice of input (See Appendix B for full A and B matrices).
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6.4 Finding the Critical State
In a manner similar to that outlined above, the overall twenty-two row by twenty-two
column state transition matrix A can be constructed, as well as the input matrix B (See
Appendix B). Once these matrices are known, the entire state space can be quantified by
performing twenty-two matrix multiplications using equation (4.6). However, perform-
ing twenty-two matrix multiplications is still a laborious task. Instead of exploring the
entire state space, we wish to simply explore the reachability of a hazardous state until a
critical state is reached. Exploring the reachability graph to a critical state would greatly
reduce the number of matrix multiplications required, since it becomes unnecessary to
reach the initial state and generate the entire graph. The technique would be to encode the
hazardous state as an initial state, propagate the matrix multiplication backwards by one
step, and then translate the latent variables back into their state variables to recover all of
the predecessor states. Then the risk level of each decoded state can be determined. If the
state is revealed to be a low risk state, then only one simple forward multiplication of the
matrix is necessary in order to determine if it has low risk successors. Essentially, the
backwards reachability of a hazardous state x(k) is determined by calculating:
u(O)
x(k) = Akx(O)+ [Ak~1 BIAk- 2BI...B] [ u(1) (6.2)
_u(k- 1)
If the columns are calculated sequentially from right to left, and each column is
unwound into its states, which are then tested to determine their criticality, the computa-
tional intensity of the algorithm is mitigated. Note that this calculation is performed under
all inputs u(i), so that a subspace vector is generated in each multiplication with the input.
A critical state can be found for the hazard depicted in Figure 6.3, in which the altitude
dips below the threshold value but the DOI does not turn on. This critical state occurs
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when the altitude is at or above the threshold value, and the DOI-Status is Off (see Figure
6.4). This is a critical state because it is a low risk state, but has a high risk descendant, the
aforementioned hazard. To control the reachability of the hazardous state from the critical
state, one need only ensure that the logical specification of the ASW has a predicate which
couples the change in the value of the Altitude variable to an enforced change in the value
of the DOIStatus variable. If the valuation for the Altitude variable changes from
AtOrAboveThreshold to BelowThreshold, then the value of the DOIStatus variable must
change either to On, or the control mode of the ASW must change from Operational to
FaultDetected.
AnalogAltimeter DigitalAltimeter1 DigitalAltimeter2
AnalogAltStatus DAlStatusSignal DA2StatusSignal
AnalogAhSignal DA1AltSignal DA2AltSignal
SUPERVISORY MODE INFERRED SYSTEM STATE DOI
DOISTATUS ALTITUDE Status
Cockpit Control Unknown Unknown Si nal
Inhibi On BelowThreshold
CONTROL MODEDO
Cockpit StarFautDetctd CannotBeDetennied
C L s C o n u 1a n d
Reset--1 ANALOG ALT DIG ALT1 DIG ALT2
- aketce Unknown ~~Unknown -Unknown
- niie L nvalid -L Invald - Inalid
WatchdogStrobe
Watchdog Timer
Figure 6.4: A Critical State Corresponding to Previous Hazard
The change due to the imposed coupling constraints should become apparent in the
structure of the state transition matrix A. Recall that each state machine value is a latent
variable xi. The latent variable corresponding to the value BelowThreshold of the state
variable Altitude should have its transition coupled with the transition of the latent vari-
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able corresponding to the On value of the state variable DOIStatus. Otherwise, the latent
variables that represent the control modes of the ASW should be forced to change if the
DOIStatus does not transition. That is, the state transition matrix A in the control formu-
lation of the ASW should not possess a vector in its subspace that has the latent variables
for the Altitude, DOI and/or control modes decoupled. Under no circumstances can Alti-
tude be changed without changing either DOIStatus or control modes.
These coupling constraints will change the reachability matrix seen in equation (6.2),
acting to make some of the columns linearly dependent of each other, thereby illustrating
that some of the state space is no longer reachable.
The technique of searching backwards in a control state space is a generic method,
which has the potential to scale up for very large systems. There are already a great many
matrix manipulation packages available, some of which are adept at handling very large
matrices (Matrix X, Matlab etc.). Control theorists have many tools that automatically
check for the reachability of continuous controls state spaces, and these tools can be
adapted to check for the reachability of state machines. The fact that there are so many
established control tools is useful in the sense that a great deal of the development work
has been done, and commercial off-the-shelf technology can be employed once an inter-
face has been written to accurately translate state machine specifications into control the-
ory state space representations.
6.5 Comparison with Other Methods of Hazard Analysis
Commonly used methods for software hazard elimination in industry are still the vet-
eran techniques of simulation and testing. Although provably effective in the very early
stages, when the design is still infested with many hazards, the effectiveness of testing and
simulation drops as the design becomes cleaner, and requires an alarming amount of time
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to discover increasingly more subtle bugs. These techniques are dependent on the human
who is creating the test cases or simulation scenarios. If that person never considers a cer-
tain given aspect of the environment of the system, then large amounts of the program
may never be tested or simulated. A serious problem is that we are never sure when the
techniques have reached their limits and have no estimate of how many hazards may still
lurk in the design. As the complexity of designs increase, it is possible for these methods
to completely collapse due to their inability to scale up properly [25].
An alternative to simulation and testing is the approach of formal verification. Formal
verification conducts an exhaustive exploration of all possible behaviors of the system.
Hence, when a design is pronounced correct by a formal verification method, it implies
that all behaviors have been explored, and questions of adequate coverage become irrele-
vant. Several approaches to formal verification exist. There is considerable research on the
subject of theorem proving, term rewriters and proof checkers for verification. However,
these techniques can be computationally intensive. Additionally, an extensive background
in logic and theorem proving is required in order to efficiently use a theorem prover [104].
Alternatively, model checking is an approach to verification in which a desired behav-
ioral property is checked over a given system model through exhaustive enumeration of
all the states reachable by the system. Model checking is fully automated, and its applica-
tion requires no user supervision. Anyone qualified to run a simulation of the model is
equally qualified to run the model checker. A model checker will provide a counterexam-
ple that demonstrates the behavior that violates the property being checked [90]. The main
disadvantage of model checking is that state explosion can occur if the system being veri-
fied has many components that make transitions in parallel. In this case the number of glo-
bal system states may grow exponentially with the number of processes. Because of this
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problem, some researchers in formal verification believe that model checking may not be
practical for very large complex systems.
The most successful technique, to date, for dealing with these software model check-
ing problems is based on partial order reduction [45], whereby concurrently executed
events appear arbitrarily ordered with respect to one another. As a result, the number of
states that are needed for model checking is reduced. The methods of compositional rea-
soning [27], induction [17], symmetry [24] and abstraction [7] have also been used to try
to reduce the state explosion problem in model checking with varying success.
Although symbolic representations and partial order reduction has greatly increased
the size of systems that can be verified, many realistic systems are still too large to be han-
dled. Thus, it is important to find techniques that avoid the need to explore the entire state
space of the model. The Hazard Automaton Reduction Algorithm allows hazards to be
controlled or eliminated without generating the entire reachability graph. This vastly
reduces the state explosion problem, making the problem of hazard elimination more trac-
table. When employed with state space control theory reachability results, the problem
reduces to performing a finite number of matrix multiplications. Hence, an approach
based on the Hazard Automaton Reduction Algorithm coupled with control theory results
seems to be a promising method by which to control or eliminate hazards in very large
complex systems.
For smaller models, the Hazard Automaton Reduction Algorithm could be coupled
with model checking techniques to remove hazards. However, when the hazards become
farther removed from their critical states, as sometimes happens in large models, the bene-
ficial effects of Hazard Automaton Reduction Algorithm are greatly diminished and the
state explosion problem emerges once again. This is not the case if the state space controls
technique is employed, as all of the cost goes into the creation of the large transition
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matrix. Each successive step backwards involves only one n by n matrix manipulation, so
computational cost does not increase drastically with the distance between the hazard and
the critical state.
The benefits are even greater for hybrid models. SpecTRM-RL has been extended to
include models of a continuous nature. A hybrid model of a Medium Term Conflict Detec-
tion algorithm for aircraft is next analyzed using Hazard Automaton Reduction Algorithm
and controls reachability techniques. For hybrid models, the Hazard Automaton Reduc-
tion Algorithm cannot be coupled with model checking techniques because there are no
termination guarantees in backwards reachability using model checking.
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CHAPTER 7
Knowledge must come through action; you can have no test
which is not fanciful, save by trial.
Sophocles (495 BC - 406 BC), Trachiniae
Medium Term Conflict Detection
Example
Medium Term Conflict Detection (MTCD) is a conflict detection algorithm which will be
used to support Air Traffic Controllers (ATCOs) in their task of monitoring and separating
aircraft. MTCD can be modelled as having both continuous and discrete parts, and falls
under the rubric of hybrid modelling. In this chapter, some background regarding the pur-
pose and function of MTCD will be given, as well as highlighting certain artifacts of the
algorithm which make it difficult to uniquely determine whether a conflict has occurred.
The evolution of a hazard in the hybrid SpecTRM-RL model of MTCD, and its ultimate
elimination using the Hazard Automaton Reduction Algorithm will be detailed.
7.1 MTCD Background
In today's air traffic control (ATC) environment, controllers monitor flights by scanning
flight progress strips and radar displays, in order to predict future air situations. The con-
trollers are monitoring one aircraft and relating its movements to the total air situation at
all moments in the near future through the sector airspace. Controllers are also responsible
for resolving any conflicts that occur. Currently, the majority of flights use fixed point
routings along fixed air traffic service (ATS) routes with limited capacity. One possible
way to increase the capacity of an airspace is to allow random point routings, i.e., routings
that do not follow the fixed ATS routes. Increasing air traffic and increasing use of random
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point routings impose an even greater workload on controllers, especially in high density
areas. Automated support can help to keep the workload of controllers within acceptable
and safe limits.
The Medium Term Conflict Detection function will assist controllers in monitoring the
air situation continuously and provide conflict data to the controllers through the human
machine interface (HMI). Controllers monitor this operational data on situation displays.
Controllers also remain responsible for the assessment of conflicts, as well as reacting to
them. MTCD must provide controllers with enough time to assess, and, if necessary,
resolve the conflict by deliberate action.
MTCD supports conflict detection for all flights for which a system trajectory is avail-
able. Since the trajectory data that MTCD receives is accurate to only a certain degree,
MTCD creates an uncertainty area around the trajectory data, and uses this expanded vol-
ume for the purposes of conflict detection. MTCD begins conflict detection for a flight
when it is a pre-defined time from entering the area of operation, and continues conflict
detection until the flight leaves the area entirely.
nominal -
routes
segment 2 (
Figure 7.1: Aircraft Conflict (Buffer Violation)
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MTCD detects four types of conflicts:
1. Aircraft Conflicts: Loss of separation between probable positions of two aircraft,
based on system trajectories and uncertainty areas, the latter are introduced to take
minor deviations into account
2. Nominal Route Overlaps: Loss of separation between system trajectories of two air-
craft
3. Special Use Airspace Penetrations: Loss of the required distance between probable
positions of an aircraft and a special use airspace.
4. Descent Below Lowest Usable Flight Level: Probable positions of an aircraft within
an airspace is below the minimum altitude proscribed for that airspace.
norminal
route
-- - - - %- - -
Figure 7.2: Special Use Airspace Penetration
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Figure 7.3: Descent Below Lowest Usable Flight Level
MTCD is a planning tool with a typical detection horizon of zero to twenty minutes for
aircraft conflicts, twenty to sixty minutes for nominal route overlaps, and zero to sixty
minutes for special use airspace penetrations and descents below lowest usable flight
level. MTCD is not a conflict alert tool. Conflict alert, with a typical horizon of zero to
two minutes is covered by Eurocontrol by a separate function, called Safety Nets. MTCD
covers all phases of flight. In arrival and departure phases, different separation criteria
apply. MTCD should allow for different separation distances between individual flights
that have been sequenced for arrival or departure.
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Figure 7.4: MTCD and its Input/Output Environment
MTCD calculations are based on system trajectories of flights, flight plan data and air-
craft data. This data is provided by the Real-Time-Flight Data Processing and Distribution
function. Trajectories can be either system trajectories or tentative trajectories. To be able
to end existing conflicts, Real-Time Flight Data Processing and Distribution must inform
MTCD when a flight leaves the area of operation, or when a tentative trajectory has been
deleted. In addition to trajectory data, MTCD requires environment data, which is pro-
vided by the Environment Data Processing and Distribution function.
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7.2 Modelling Concerns
In principle, MTCD is quite simple. The traffic and its evolution is specified by a set
of trajectories so all it needs to do is examine these trajectories in pairs and report when-
ever such trajectories come too close.
Complications occur because of the:
1. Model uncertainties in aircraft behaviour
2. Introduction of filtering mechanisms so that high traffic situations can be handled
The following sections discuss how these concerns were addressed and also consider
how a number of fundamental design choices were made.
7.2.1 Evolutive versus Analytical Approaches
Conflicts can be detected through either analytical or evolutive means. An evolutive
algorithm steps through the traffic development at regular intervals (every 10 seconds) and
at every snapshot looks for aircraft that are too close to one another. In contrast, the analyt-
ical approach computes the relative dynamics of trajectories and determines the precise
start and end time of conflicts. The analytical approach is more accurate and in general
faster than the evolutive approach. The evolutive approach is simpler and more extensible
than the analytical approach. It is extensible in the sense that if the detection of other prob-
lems or situations that might occur aside from conflicts needed to be accomplished, then
an evolutive approach might be the only way in order to achieve these additional goals.
MTCD uses the analytical approach. It should be noted that the evolutive approach can
be used to check results obtained analytically.
7.2.2 Uncertainty Modeling
At a specified future time, the position of an aircraft is not known for sure. The
approach used in MTCD is to construct a buffer shape that notionally surrounds an air-
craft's future position. The approach is called geometric because, although the buffer sizes
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may embody uncertainties, their ultimate values are determined through an optimization
process that involves controller assessment of the MTCD tool.
The current philosophy is that each trajectory segment has uncertainty information
that is derived from the airspace in which the segment is contained. The trajectory seg-
ments should not span more than one airspace. The European Air Traffic Control Harmo-
nization Integration Program (EATCHIP) technical program (TP) drafting group has
decided that the trajectory will be augmented by the uncertainty information (i.e. x, y, z
variances at each point), thereby simplifying MTCD's task. In the approach taken, hori-
zontal and vertical uncertainties are treated separately.
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Figure 7.5: Trajectory and Buffer
Horizontal uncertainties are embodied in a buffer shape that is centered on the air-
craft's nominal position. The shape is a rectangle aligned to the aircraft's path with the cor-
ners rounded by a circle with diameter equal to the long axis of the rectangle. The
dimensions of the buffer shape vary with predictive time in a linear fashion for a given tra-
jectory segment. Conflicts occur when such shapes overlap and this aspect can be easily
demonstrated to controllers. In some ways an ellipse would have been more elegant as a
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buffer shape, but a satisfactory well conditioned algorithm that predicts the times of over-
laps of expanding ellipses has not been found.
Note that in addition to including aircraft position uncertainty, the buffer shape
includes an allowance for half the separation standard. In this way it is only needed to
determine when buffers overlap in order to detect a conflict, rather than determining when
buffers come within a certain distance (e.g. the separation standard) of each other.
Vertical uncertainty modelling is a fairly simple affair. If a particular altitude separa-
tion threshold is infringed, then a vertical conflict occurs. This altitude separation thresh-
old will depend on the respective aircraft's behaviour (whether the craft is level, climbing,
descending, above or below 2950 feet etc.), and the uncertainty is directly dependent on
that behaviour.
7.2.3 Filters
In terms of computer processing, conflict detection is potentially the most demanding
of automated ATC functions. It involves comparison between pairs of trajectories. This
effort will increase as the square of the number of flights. Thus, for 200 flights there will
be 19 900 comparisons. Determining the exact details of a conflict depends on uncertainty
models, which in turn depend on segment containment in airspace volumes. The amount
of processing is large. Now, in the 200 flight scenario there may only be 100 contemporary
conflicts. Thus, 19800 of the comparison checks would lead to a "no conflict" assessment.
Filters constitute a quick test that easily eliminates most of the non-conflicts from consid-
eration.
The filter compares two trajectories for a given time interval to be checked and indi-
cates whether or not a conflict is possible. If a conflict is possible, the procedure indicates
a filtered time interval in which any conflict must occur. The filtered time interval is deter-
mined by the earliest and latest timeslices in which conflicts may occur, clipped if neces-
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sary by the time interval checked. For MTCD it may be necessary to perform conflict
checks for up to 60 minutes in advance of the current time, in order to detect nominal route
overlaps.
7.3 Continuous Model of the Aircraft
The basis for analysis, computation or simulation of the unsteady motions of an aeroplane
is the mathematical model of the vehicle and its subsystems. An aeroplane in flight is a
very complicated dynamic system. It consists of an aggregate of elastic bodies so con-
nected that both rigid and elastic relative motions can occur. The external forces that act
on an aeroplane are also complicated functions of its shape and its motion. It seems clear
that realistic analyses of engineering precision are not likely to be accomplished with a
very simple mathematical model.
YY
L N
z
Figure 7.6: Linear and Angular Position and Velocity of Aircraft
To begin formulating the model, first treat the vehicle as a single rigid body with six
degrees of freedom. This body is free to move in the atmosphere under the actions of grav-
ity and aerodynamic forces. It is primarily the nature and complexity of the aerodynamic
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forces that distinguish flight vehicles from other dynamic systems. If the gyroscopic effect
of spinning rotors is next factored in, along with a discussion of structural distortion, the
complexity of the model increases. If the Earth is treated as being flat and stationary in
inertial space, the model is simplified enormously. This assumption is quite acceptable for
most aeroplane flights.
In the interest of completeness, the rigid-body equations are derived from first princi-
ples. The velocities and accelerations are relative to an inertial frame of reference. The
position and orientation of the airplane are given relative to the Earth-fixed axis frame
(FE), and the center of gravity of the aeroplane (cg) has co-ordinates (x,y,z). The orienta-
tion or the aeroplane is given by a series of three consecutive rotations (W,0,$), the Euler
Angles, whose order is important (Fig 7.6). Any orthogonal axes whose origin is fixed at
the center of gravity of the aeroplane are termed body axes (FB). Since most aircraft are
very nearly symmetrical, it is usual to assume exact symmetry, and to let Cxz be the plane
of symmetry. Then, Cx points forward, Cz downward and Cy to the right. In this case, the
two products of inertia, IXY and Ixz are zero. The directions of C, and Cz are chosen to
coincide with the principal axes of the vehicle, so that the remaining product of inertia Izx
vanishes.
Denote the aerodynamic force exerted on the aircraft body in the body-referential axis
frame as AB = [X y Z] . Let G, = [L M N] represent the total aerodynamic moment of the
aircraft in the body-referential axis frame. Symbolize the body-referenced linear velocity
and angular velocity of the aeroplane as (u, v, w) and (p, q, r). Represent the relative angu-
lar momentum of aircraft rotors as h' = [h' h', h'j . The wind speed in the Earth-reference
frame is given by W = [wx w, Wj . Indicating the mass of the aeroplane as m, the gravita-
tional constant as g, and the inertia of the aeroplane as:
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I =
the equations of motion become [40]:
[' _Ix -Ix
-IY IY -IiL :I -X _I : ]
E E EX-mgsin(O) = m( +qw -rv
Y+mgcs(0)sin($) = m(E +ruE -pw E
Z+mgCOS(0)COS($) = m(V'VE +pvE -qu E
L = I +Izx +qr(Iz -y)-Izxpq+phz'+rh',
M = Iq+ rp(I - )+Izx(p - r2) + rh'x -ph'z
N = I -- Ij + pq(I, - Ix) + Izxqr + ph', - qh'x
p = -Wsin(0)
q = eCOS($) + SfcOs(0)sin($)
r = wCOS(0)cOs ($) - 0 sin($)
= p + q( sin(0) + r Os (p)) tan(0)
0 = qCOS() - rsin($)
= (qsin ($) + r COS($)) sec(0)
E = uECOS(O)COS(f) + VE (sin($)sin(0)COS(N) - COS(p)sin(i)) +
w E(COS()sin(0)sin((4f) - sin($) COS(W)))
E E
YE = u COS(0) sin (W) + vE( sin ($) sin (0) sin (W) + COS($) COS(i)) +
w E(COS()sin(0)sin(xg) - sin($) COS(1))
.E E E E
z = -u sin(0) + vEsin($)cOS(0) + w COs($)COs()
uE = u+ W
(7.1)
(7.2)
(7.3)
(7.4)
(7.5)
(7.6)
(7.7)
(7.8)
(7.9)
(7.10)
(7.11)
(7.12)
(7.13)
(7.14)
(7.15)
(7.16)
VE = V+ W, (7.17)
wE = w+Wz (7.18)
There are several assumptions contained in the above equations. The aeroplane is assumed
to be a rigid body, which may have attached to it any number of spinning rotors. The Cxz
plane is regarded to be a plane of mirror symmetry. The axes of any spinning rotors are
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assumed to be fixed in direction relative to the body axes, and the rotors have constant
angular speed relative to the body axes.
The equations above consist of fifteen coupled nonlinear ordinary differential equa-
tions in the independent variable t, and three algebraic equations. It is clear that the aero-
dynamic forces and moments depend in some manner on three things:
1. The relative motion of the aeroplane with respect to the air
2. The control variables that fix the angles of any movable surfaces
3. The settings of any propulsion controls that determine the thrust vector
A ieron down
0 Aileron up
Roll
Elevator up
Pitch
Rudder deflected
Yar 7 N
Figure 7.7: Control Angles: Aileron, Elevator and Rudder
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Thus it is universally assumed that the six aerodynamic forces and moments are functions
of the six linearly and angular velocities (u,vw,p,q,r) and of a control vector c =
(6, e, 5,, 8,), of which the first three are the aileron, elevator and rudder angles, and the
last is the throttle control. The control variables, from a mathematical standpoint, are arbi-
trary functions of time. The wind vector would be supplied by the environmental data.
The true implicit variables of the system become:
1. Centre of Gravity Position: XE, YE' ZE
2. Attitude: W, 0, 4
3. Velocity: uE ,E E
4. Angular Velocity: p, q, r
Of the fifteen differential equations (7.1-7.15), three are dependent (7.10-7.12), which
leaves twelve independent differential equations. Thus, the number of independent equa-
tions equals the number of independent variables, and the system is mathematically com-
plete.
The equations of motion must be linearized in order to fit them into a linear state
space description. The equations are linearized by using small-disturbance theory. It is
assumed that the motion of the airplane consists of small deviations from a reference con-
dition of steady flight. The reference value of all the variables are denoted by the subscript
zero, and the small perturbations are denoted by the prefix A. When the reference value is
zero, the A is omitted. All disturbance quantities are assumed to be small, and their
squares and products are negligible compared to first order quantities. The reference flight
condition is assumed to be symmetric and with no angular velocity, so
v0 = Po = q0 = ro = $o = 0. If the stability axes are selected as the body axes for the
aeroplane, then wo = 0, with uo being the reference flight speed, and 00 the reference
angle of climb. Furthermore, the effects of spinning rotors are deemed negligible and the
wind velocity is assumed to be zero.
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Using the mathematical notation for differentials where:
L a L (7.19)
a = 0
and realizing that in symmetrical flight, the side force Y, the rolling moment L, and the
yawing moment N will be zero, it can be concluded that v, p, r, <, W, YE are all zero. The
derivatives of the asymmetrical or lateral forces and moments YL,N with respect to the
symmetric or longitudinal motion variables u,w,q are zero. The derivatives of the symmet-
ric forces and moments with respect to the asymmetric motion variables may be neglected
in all calculations. All derivatives with respect to rates of change of motion variables may
be neglected, except for Z, and M,. The derivative X, is negligibly small, and the density
of the atmosphere is assumed not to vary with altitude. The linear forces and moments
become:
AX = XUAu+X w+ AXe (7.20)
AY = Yvv+Ypp+ Yrr+ AYc (7.21)
AZ = ZuAu + Zvw + Zw + Zqq + AZe (7.22)
AL = Lvv + Lp + Lr + AL, (7.23)
AM = MuAu + Mww + MI; + Mq + AMc (7.24)
AN = Nvv + Np + Nr + ANc (7.25)
In the preceding equations, the terms on the right with the subscript c are control forces
and moments that result from the control vector c. Using equations (7.20-5) and small dis-
turbance theory, the linear equations of motion become:
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(7.30)
(7.31)
with ix'= (I I ' I = () and I' =-.I ' I, Z (IIz - IAZ)
As a consequence of the simplifying assumptions made in their derivation, the preced-
ing equations can be divided into two categories: longitudinal (7.26-8) and lateral (7.29-
31). Suppose that <, v, p, r, A YE, ALc and ANc are zero. Then equations (7.29-3 1) are satisfied.
The remaining equations (7.26-8) form a complete set of six homogeneous variables
Au, w, q, AO, AXE, AYE. Modes of motion are possible in which only these variables differ
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[A]
[A
[AU]
q
-AO
(7.26)
[~]
1<
W
(7.27)
(7.28)
(7.29)
from zero. Such motions are called longitudinal or symmetric motion, and the correspond-
ing equations and variables are named longitudinal. Conversely, if the longitudinal vari-
ables are set to zero, the remaining six equations (7.26-8) form a complete set for the
determination of the variables 0, w, v, p, r, YE* These variables are known as the lateral vari-
ables. The existence of pure longitudinal motions depends on two assumptions: the exist-
ence of a plane of symmetry and the absence of rotor gyroscopic effects. The existence of
pure lateral motion depends on three conditions: the linearization of the equations, the
absence of rotor gyroscopic effects and the ability to neglect all aerodynamic cross cou-
pling.
The equations (7.26-7.31) are in state space format x = Ax + Bc. The state vector for
the longitudinal and lateral systems are, respectively:
x [Au w q r]T  (7.32)
x= [v p r j] (7.33)
and the A matrices can be read from equations (7.26) and (7.29). The control vector can
also be broken down into longitudinal and lateral modes respectively:
C= [, 8, (7.34)
c = [a 8] (7.35)
where the elevator angle and throttle are used for longitudinal control, and the aileron and
rudder angles are used for lateral control. To calculate the B matrices, control theory trans-
fer function response techniques must be employed. For the case of the longitudinal
response, from equation (7.26):
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BAc =
F AXC
m
AZC
m - Z
AM, M. AZc
I I +m-Z.
0
(7.36)
Assume that the incremental aerodynamic forces and moment that result from control
actuation can be given by a set of control derivatives in the form:
[ ce [ ' ' ASe
AZ = Z8, M6 ' Al
AMC M, M cm
From equation (7.37) and (7.36) the B matrix becomes:
B
X6 ,
m
Z6 ,
(m - Z)
M8,
Iy
+ A
I,(m-Z)
0
x8 ,
m
Z,
(m - Z)
M, +
I,
MiZ6,
I,(m- Z)
0
(7.37)
(7.38)
for the longitudinal equations.
Similarly, for the lateral equations, assume the aerodynamics associated with the two
lateral controls are given by the set of control derivatives:
AY1 Y Y6 8-
A L C = L . L 8 , a
ANJ c N8 N8j~
(7.39)
so B is given by:
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Y8. Y8,
m m
L8 L6,
B - + I N8, '+ Izx'N8 (7.40)
IzLx.' + N8 a Izx' L6 , + N
0 0
The complete state space description of the linearized model of aircraft dynamics has now
been elucidated. These are the continuous equations used in the SpecTRM-RL model to
calculate the potential trajectories of the aircraft between data updates. At the instant of
data update, the values of the variables are the values that are read in from the Real Time
Flight Data Processing and Distribution system. These values are then taken as the nomi-
nal values for the equations above. During the following time interval, before the next
update, the above equations are propagated forward to determine the trajectory of the air-
craft. At the next update, the trajectory is rectified, and the process begins again.
7.4 Hybrid Model of Medium Term Conflict Detection Algorithm
The dynamic model can be used in conjunction with the flight data, to calculate the contin-
uous trajectory of the aeroplane given the correct initial states and inputs. With these cal-
culated aeroplane trajectories, the algorithm determines whether or not the trajectories will
conflict (either with the trajectory of another aeroplane or with a lowest flight level or
restricted airspace). MTCD also factors in uncertainty in the modeling technique and
flight data, thereby creating buffers around the trajectories, as well as providing a number-
ing and updating convention to account for conflicts and trajectories, enabling their cre-
ation and removal when the plane enters and exits the appropriate sector. An overview of
the SpecTRM-RL model of MTCD is seen below (Fig. 7.8).
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Figure 7.8: SpecTRM-RL Model of MTCD
The SpecTRM-RL model of MTCD incorporates the notion of hybrid trajectories by
creating a new component to the generic model form, entitled Inferred System Trajectory.
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The inferred trajectories are a model of the continuous processes or plants including
state variables and measured or manipulated process variables as reflected by the inputs
and outputs to the controller. In the case of MTCD, each aircraft has its own unique tra-
jectory.
The continuous input variables included in the trajectory are the position (x,y,z) and
velocity (u,v,w) of the center of mass of the aircraft, angular position (pitch, roll, yaw) and
velocity (pitch rate, roll rate, yaw rate) of the aircraft. The control variables included are
the aileron, elevator and rudder angles, and throttle control. The forces and moments act-
ing on the aeroplane are also included in the trajectory, as is the uncertainty in the modeled
data and the conflict status (Unknown, Buffer Violation, Descent Below Altitude, Special
Airspace Violation, Nominal Route Overlap, No Conflict). Evaluated over time these vari-
ables act to form the continuous trajectory of the system for each aircraft. Combining all
of these aircraft trajectories yields the system trajectory of the entire airspace sector that
MTCD is operating upon.
The logical specification for determining if a conflict has occurred can be expressed
explicitly in the disjoint normal form of the truth tables in SpecTRM-RL. The four differ-
ent types of conflicts are handled separately, with a different function performing the iden-
tification of each type of conflict. For example, in order to determine if an aircraft will
infringe upon a restricted airspace, MTCD employs the Medium Term Area Proximity
Warning (MTAPW) system. The MTAPW sub-algorithm of MTCD determines all poten-
tial special airspace violations for all identified restricted airspaces and all included trajec-
tories. The logical flow of the algorithm is detailed below in Figs 7.10-11. The conditions
in the two diagrams can easily be converted into logical predicates involving only the cal-
culated trajectories and the specified special airspaces. Similar logical diagrams can be
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drawn for the conflict situations of buffer overlap (aircraft conflict) and descent below
lowest usable flight level. The full SpecTRM-RL description is contained in Appendix C.
YesConflict, 7
Figure 7.10: MTAPW Shell
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Figure 7.11: MTAPW Kernel
The 4-D position described above refers to the spatial and temporal coordinates of the air-
craft. The sampling step refers to the update rate of the algorithm, which is dependent on
the number of aircraft in the sector. The look-ahead time refers to the 20-60 minute time
horizon on conflict detection for special airspace violations.
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7.5 Hazard Automaton Reduction Algorithm Applied to MTCD
Consider the case of an aircraft conflict between a plane and a restricted airspace,
which can clearly be defined as the hazardous state that occurs when the trajectory buffer
of the plane overlaps the buffer zone of the special use airspace. MTCD checks for this
condition by modeling the separation distances and uncertainties in a buffer about the
nominal trajectory of the plane, and then tests to see if the plane buffer overlaps the speci-
fied special airspace buffer. Since no reasonable algorithm for calculating the overlap in
varying elliptical buffers is known, MTCD uses first the box test, and then the circle test,
to determine if a conflict has arisen. If both the box and circle tests are positive, then a
conflict is detected by MTCD, and the controller must take appropriate action.
In the present model of the two-aircraft system, more information is necessary in order
to apply the Hazard Automaton Reduction Algorithm. Begin by recalling that the Hazard
Automaton Reduction Algorithm only considers the risk of the states of the system. Create
an internal variable for MTCD called Risk that is a function of the state of the aircraft tra-
jectories in the system, as well as various inputs. The variable Risk is a discrete variable,
and can possess only three values { Low,High,Hazard }. Next, consider augmenting the set
of discrete transitions S. Each time the Risk variable changes value, a discrete transition is
needed. If there is already a discrete transition enabled at this point, then no further work
need be done. If there is no discrete transition, a "dummy" transition must be inserted. An
internal "dummy" trigger predicate P, is created, which is only used in conjunction with
the internal "dummy" transition. This "dummy" trigger enables the "dummy" transition,
causing the system state to change by a discrete action (not simply through a continuous
evolution). The final state of the trajectory prior to the "dummy" transition is identical to
the first state of the trajectory following the "dummy" transition except for the value of the
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Risk variable. This ensures that the Risk value of the system can only change via discrete
transitions, and not through a continuous evolution of variables.
The Risk variable is used to group multiple aircraft trajectory configurations into fam-
ilies related by their apparent risk and to artificially create "dummy" discrete transitions
which act to coarsely discretize the system. The Hazard Automaton Reduction Algorithm
can be applied to this partially discretized system. It remains only to find the critical con-
figurations of MTCD corresponding to the hazard of loss of separation between an aircraft
and a restricted airspace. Recall that a hazard occurs when the buffer of the plane infringes
upon the buffer of the airspace. The critical state would occur at the last point where it is
possible for the plane to recover and assume a trajectory that would not infringe upon the
buffer of the airspace. If the MTCD algorithm has not detected that a conflict is imminent
past this critical point, then the conflict detection scheme is flawed.
Starting with the hazardous point in the trajectory where the two buffers overlap but no
conflict is detected, the state can be propagated backwards until the point at which discrete
input-enabling is restored. This point can be found because all of the aircraft trajectories
can be uniquely described using their 18 differential equations that define their state
within the system at any given instant. For n aircraft, the backwards reachable space of the
differential equations can be determined by examining the entire reachable range of the
matrix corresponding to the A and B matrices in equations (7.26,7.29,7.38,7.40) defined
by the aircraft differential equations. The initial hazardous condition is encoded as x(O),
and the range of the backwards trajectories is calculated by multiplying out each column
in the reachability matrix using the initial conditions as the nominal flight state for the A
and B matrices in the differential equations. After the entire reachability matrix has been
computed, the state space description for 91, is converted into its equivalent reachable
region in the map of hybrid trajectories. The boundaries of the region can then be checked
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to see if they are input enabled. If not, then all enabled discrete transitions are taken, and a
new set of nominal flight values is used to calculate the new A and B matrices. The reach-
ability set of the new dynamic equations is calculated, and the region is checked to see if
input enabling is restored. If not, another round of discrete transitions must be taken and
the process begins again. Thus, the full reachability set of the model need never be gener-
ated, the graph need only be generated until it intersects the critical region where input
enabling has been restored.
The point at which input-enabling is restored occurs at the last possible moment when
a controller command to the aircraft in question would be able to avert a potential conflict.
The situation is critical, but not hazardous, if a potential conflict has not been detected and
action can still be taken by the controller in order to avert the conflict. The controller still
has enough time to plan a resolution to the conflict if it were detected. Therefore, the con-
flict is still avoidable even though it has not yet been detected. However, once the control-
ler is no longer able to plan in order to avoid an upcoming conflict, the situation has
become hazardous due to the lack of detection of the potential conflict.
The system designers can use the information from the hazard analysis to redesign the
system to be safer or to assist in making trade-offs between alternative designs. For exam-
ple, to mitigate the identified hazard of a potential conflict going unidentified by MTCD,
the controller might be given a warning every time a plane's trajectory is about to become
inflexible as well as an advisory about how to route other planes accordingly. This design
effectively eliminates the hazardous paths out of the identified critical states. It has draw-
backs, however, because many of these warnings would be unnecessary. Resolving such
trade-offs and perhaps generating better solutions, is the job of the design engineer.
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CHAPTER 8
It is unwise to be too sure of one's own wisdom. It is healthy
to be reminded that the strongest might weaken and the
wisest might err
Mohindas Gandhi (1869 - 1948)
Conclusions
8.1 State Explosion and Scalability
The Hazard Automaton Reduction Algorithm can reduce the depth of searches needed
to be employed upon complex state spaces in order to eliminate and control hazards.
Instead of testing to see if a hazardous state is reachable from an initial state, the Hazard
Automaton Reduction Algorithm enables the user to search back just sufficiently far in the
reachability graph to determine a state from which the hazard can be successfully con-
trolled or eliminated. Thus, the state explosion problem can be avoided in many instances,
if the critical state is close enough to the hazardous state.
Techniques from modem state space controls theory are particularly suited for deter-
mining the reachability of a state. It becomes necessary to perform only a finite number of
matrix multiplications to determine whether or not a state is reachable from another state.
A state machine model can be converted into a controls state space formulation and a state
transition matrix can be created. In addition, a simple rank calculation can be performed at
the start of the process to determine whether or not the entire state space is reachable at all,
thereby eliminating from consideration all hazards that are not realistic combinations of
state values, and mitigating the state explosion problem.
The Hazard Automaton Reduction Algorithm allows hazards to be controlled or elimi-
nated without generating the entire reachability graph. This vastly reduces the state explo-
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sion problem, making the problem of hazard elimination more tractable. When employed
with state space control theory reachability results, the problem reduces to performing a
finite number of matrix multiplications. Hence, an approach based on the Hazard Automa-
ton Reduction Algorithm coupled with control theory results is a promising method by
which to control or eliminate hazards in very large complex systems.
For smaller models, the Hazard Automaton Reduction Algorithm could be coupled
with model checking techniques to remove hazards. However, when the hazards become
farther removed from their critical states, as sometimes happens in large models, the bene-
ficial effects of Hazard Automaton Reduction Algorithm are greatly diminished and the
state explosion problem emerges once again. This is not the case if the state space controls
technique is employed, as all of the cost goes into the creation of the large transition
matrix. Each successive step backwards involves only one n by n matrix manipulation, so
computational cost does not increase drastically with the distance between the hazard and
the critical state.
The benefits are even greater for hybrid models. For hybrid models, the Hazard
Automaton Reduction Algorithm could not be coupled with model checking techniques
because there are no termination guarantees in backwards reachability using model check-
ing.
8.2 Hybrid Systems and Hazard Elimination
At present, many linear hybrid model checkers possess the same approach to verifica-
tion [25]. The main function the model checker performs is the verification of safety prop-
erties: given an initial region and an unsafe region, the model checker verifies whether the
system starting with the initial region ends up within the unsafe region. The verification is
done by forward or backward reachability analysis. The verification procedure is not nec-
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essarily decidable, i.e., the computation could go on with no guarantee of termination. The
lack of termination can result from the model checker using the "Fixed Point" iteration
method in the following fashion [3,25,91]:
For a state assertion $, let Pre($) be a state assertion that is
true for a state q if and only if there exists an f-state q' such
that (q, q') is either a jump or a flow of the system. If the
state assertion 1 =Pre(unsafe) can be computed, then all
states that will enter the unsafe region by trajectories of
length 1 are characterized. The backwards reachability anal-
ysis is carried out by successively applying the Pre operator
to the current reachable region, starting with the unsafe
region. The computation stops whenever the reachable
region intersects the initial region, or there is no new reach-
able region discovered.
It is possible to continue indefinitely using this approach, as it is very difficult to quan-
tify the point at which no new reachable region is discovered. Determining the equality of
the present reachability set to the previous reachability set involves a computation that can
be influenced by the slightest numerical imprecision. Thus, there can be no guarantee that
the terminating condition will ever be reached.
Reachability analysis is not necessarily decidable even for linear hybrid automata. In
fact, it is not decidable except for some special cases. It is decidable for timed automata
(systems which have only clocks that run with an identical rate) or simple multi-rate sys-
tems. And even for the problems that are decidable, most of them are PSPACE-hard
[3,25]. Hence, carrying out a full backwards reachability analysis in a hybrid automaton is
very difficult. The notion of propagating back a limited number of steps until a critical
region is reached is very appealing for hybrid automata because the full reachability of the
system need never be explored.
A formulation in the SpecTRM-RL language for modeling hybrid systems was pre-
sented. The notion of backwards reachability was outlined, in terms of how it could be
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used to create constraints that would avoid hazardous states in a process control system. A
control theory technique was postulated to calculate the backwards reachable region of a
continuous set of differential equations. These techniques were illustrated by applying
them to a Medium Term Conflict Detection algorithm under development for aircraft col-
lision avoidance. The hazardous condition of a missed detection was investigated, and a
critical region was found. Constraints were then suggested in order to remove the hazard-
ous situation from the forward reachability flow of the critical region. The issue of non-
termination was never encountered due to the close proximity of the critical region to the
hazardous region.
The MTCD model can scale up, simply by adding more aircraft trajectory inputs to the
MTCD interface. Of course, the more aircraft added, the more computationally complex
the algorithm becomes, eventually swamping out the effects of the Hazard Automaton
Reduction Algorithm due to the increased coupling of the continuous state variables.
Additionally, the Hazard Automaton Reduction Algorithm is conservative, which leads to
unreachable hazards being designed out of the system. Future efforts must focus on being
able to manage the computational complexity of the hybrid version of the Hazard Autom-
aton Reduction Algorithm.
8.3 A Final Word
The coupled method of the Hazard Automaton Reduction Algorithm and state space
control reachability guarantees a solution to the control or elimination of hazards in a
purely discrete system design. This strong statement can be made because after a finite
number of matrix multiplications, either the critical state is reached and the hazard can be
controlled or eliminated, or it can be concluded that no such state exists, and therefore the
entire design is hazardous. Thus, after the design has been analyzed using this method,
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either all the hazards are controlled or the entire system must be redesigned, as there is no
possible solution given the current design.
For hybrid systems, the statement is not as strong. If the critical state cannot be found,
it is entirely possible that it exists on a boundary or region that has yet to be explored.
However, this difficulty in finding the critical region is most likely indicative of a sub-
optimal design. This statement can be made because it is usually best to have control over
a flow of low risk behaviour as near as possible to hazardous behaviour, so that the path
leading to hazardous behaviour can be diverted as late as possible. This would translate, in
some sense, to using the minimum magnitude of input in order to divert the control from
the path toward the hazardous behaviour onto the path of low risk behaviour. Thus, system
redesign should be re-considered if a critical state is not found corresponding to any haz-
ard.
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The secret to creativity is knowing how to hide your sources.
Albert Einstein (1879 - 1955)
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Appendix A
... the source of all great mathematics is the special case, the
concrete example. It is frequent in mathematics that every
instance of a concept of seemingly great generality is in
essence the same as a small and concrete special case.
Paul R. Halmos, 1985
Level 3 SpecTRM-RL Model of Altitude
Switch
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-IState Value
DOI-Status
Obsolescence: 2 seconds
Exception-Handling: Goes into unknown state
Description:
Comments:
References:
There is nothing in the requirements that says what to do if a power-off message is sent and
no status message is received from the DOI within 2 seconds. I decided it was safest to have
this indicate a possible fault so the watchdog will time out and light the fault indicator lamp in
the cockpit.
Appears in: DOI-Power-On, Watchdog-Strobe
DEFINITION
= On
I DOI-status-signal = On
= Off
DOI-status-signal = Off
= Unknown
Powerup
Controls.Reset = T
DOI-status-signal = obsolete
I
T
T
T
= Fault-Detected
Time >= (Time sent DOI-Power-On Message) + 2 seconds T T
DOI-status-signal = Off T
Time > Time received DOI-status-signal + 2 seconds T
Column 1: Sent power on message but DOI did not turn on
Column 2: Sent power on message but never got feedback
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State value---
Altitude
Obsolescence: 2 seconds
Exception-Handling: Because the altitude-status-signals change to obsolete after 2 seconds,
altitude will change to Unknown if all input signals are lost for 2 seconds.
Description:
Comments:
References:
Appears in: DOI-Power-On
DEFINITION
= Unknown
Powerup
Controls.Reset
Analog-ALT = Unknown
Dig-Alt1 = Unknown
Dig-Alt2 = Unknown
T
T
T
T
T
= Below-threshold
Analog-Valid-and-Below
Dig1-Valid-and-Below
Dig2-Valid-and-Below
=At-or-above-threshold
Analog-Valid-and-Above
Dig1-Valid-and-Above
Dig2-Valid-and-Above
= Cannot-be-determined
Analog-Alt = Invalid
Dig-Alt1 = Invalid
Dig-Alt2 = Invalid
T
T
T
T T T F T F F
T T F T F T F
T F T T F F T
T
T i
184
-State Value
Analog-Alt
Obsolescence: 2 seconds
Exception-Handling: Will change to unknown when analog-alt-signal becomes obsolete
(more than 2 seconds elapse since last message from Analog Altimeter)
Description:
Comments:
References:
Appears in: Altitude
DEFINITION
= Valid
LAnalog-Alt-Status = Valid
= Invalid
[Analog-Alt-Status = Invalid
= Unknown
Analog-Alt-Status = Obsolete
Powerup
Controls.Reset = T
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1wT
T
T
T
- State Value-
Dig-Alt1
Obsolescence: 2 seconds
Exception-Handling:
Description:
Comments:
References:
Appears in: Altitude
Will change to unknown when DA1 -Status-Signal becomes obsolete
(more than two seconds elapse since last mesage from Digital Altimeter 1).
W
DEFINITION
= Valid
DAl-Status-Signal = Norm Eli
= Invalid
DAl-Status-Signal = {Fail, NCD, Test} Eli1
= Unknown
DA1 -Status-Signal = Obsolete
Powerup
Controls.Reset = T
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T
T
IT
I
State Value
Dig-Alt2
Obsolescence: 2 seconds
Exception-Handling: Will change to unknown when DA2-Status-Signal becomes obsolete
(more than two seconds elapse since last mesage from Digital Altimeter 2).
Description:
Comments:
References:
Appears in: Altitude
DEFINITION
= Valid
DA2-Status-Signal = Norm
= Invalid
DA2-Status-Signal = {Fail, NCD, Test}
= Unknown
DA2-Status-Signal = Obsolete
Powerup
Controls.Reset = T
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T
T
T
Input Value
DOI-Status-Signal
Source: DOI
Type: Enumerated
Possible Values (Expected Range): {On, Off}
Exception-Handling:
Arrival Rate (Load): ??
Min-Time-Between-Inputs:
Max-Time-Between-Inputs:
Obsolescence: 2 seconds
Exception-Handling: Assumes value Obsolete
Description:
Comments:
References:
Appears in: DOI-status
DEFINITION
= FIELD (Status in DOI-Status-Message)
Receive DOI-Status-Message FROM DOI T
= PREV (DOI-Status-Signal)
Receive DOI-Status-Message FROM DOI F
Time <= Time (DOI-Status-Message arrived) + 2 seconds T
= Obsolete
Receive DOI-Status-Message FROM DOI F
Time > Time (DOI-Status-Message arrived) + 2 seconds T
Powerup T
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Input Value
Anal og-Alt-Statu s
Source: Analog Altimeter
Type: Enumerated
Possible Values (Expected Range): {lnvalid, Valid}
Exception-Handling:
Arrival Rate (Load): ??
Min-Time-Between-inputs:
Max-Time-Between-Inputs:
Obsolescence: 2 seconds
Exception-Handling: Assumes value Obsolete
Description:
Comments:
References:
Appears in: Analog-Alt
DEFINITION
= FIELD (Status in Analog-Alt-Message)
Receive Analog-Alt-Message FROM Analog-Altimeter
= PREV (Analog-Alt-Status)
Receive Analog-Alt-Message FROM Analog-Altimeter
Time <= Time (Analog-Alt-Message arrived) + 2 seconds
= Obsolete
Receive Analog-Alt-Message FROM Analog-Altimeter
Time > Time (Analog-Alt-Message arrived) + 2 seconds
Startup
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1WI
T
F
T
m-Input Value
Analog-Alt-Signal
Source: Analog Altimeter
Type: Enumerated
Possible Values (Expected Range): {Above, Below}
Exception-Handling:
Arrival Rate (Load): ??
Min-Time-Between-Inputs:
Max-Time-Between-Inputs:
Obsolescence: 2 seconds
Exception-Handling: Assumes value Obsolete
Description:
Comments:
References:
Appears in: Altitude
DEFINITION
= FIELD (Altitude in Analog-Alt-Message)
Receive Analog-Alt-Message FROM Analog-Altimeter
= PREV (Analog-Alt-Signal)
Receive Analog-Alt-Message FROM Analog-Altimeter
Time <= Time (Analog-Alt-Message arrived) + 2 seconds T
= Obsolete
Receive Analog-Alt-Message FROM Analog-Altimeter F
Time > Time (Analog-AIt-Message arrived) + 2 seconds T
Powerup (eT
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Input Value
DA1 -Status-Signal
Source: Digital Altimeter 1
Type: Enumerated
Possible Values (Expected Range): (Fail, NCD, Test, Norm}
Exception-Handling:
Arrival Rate (Load): ??
Min-Time-Between-Inputs:
Max-Time-Between-Inputs:
Obsolescence:2 seconds
Exception-Handling: Assumes value Obsolete
Description:
Comments: Four possible values can be sent signifying Failure Warning, No Computed Data,
Functional Test, and Normal Operation.
References:
Appears in: Dig-Alt1
DEFINITION
= FIELD (Status in DA1 -Message)
Receive DA1-Message FROM Digital-Altimeter-1 j j
= PREV (DAl-Status-Signal)
Receive DA1-Message FROM Digital-Altimeter-1
Time <= Time (DA1 -Message arrived) + 2 seconds T
= Obsolete
Receive DA1 -Message FROM Digital-Altimeter-1
Time > Time (DA1-Message arrived) + 2 seconds T
Powerup T
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C InputVau
DA1 -Alt-Signal
Source: Digital Altimeter 1
Type: integer
Possible Values (Expected Range): -20..2500
Exception-Handling: Values below -20 are treated as -20 and values above 2500 as 2500
Units: ??
Granularity: ??
Arrival Rate (Load): ??
Min-Time-Between-Inputs:
Max-Time-Between-Inputs:
Obsolescence: 2 seconds
Exception-Handling:
Description:
Comments:
References:
Appears in: Altitude
DEFINITION
= FIELD (Altitude in DA1 -Message)
Receive DA1-Message FROM Digital-altimeter-1
= PREV (DAl-Alt-Signal)
Receive DA1-Message FROM Digital-altimeter-1 nF
= Obsolete
Receive DA1 -Message FROM Digital-Altimeter-1 F
Time > Time (DA1 -Message arrived) + 2 seconds T
Powerup T
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-- nput Value
DA2-Status-Signal
Source: Digital Altimeter 1
Type: Enumerated
Possible Values (Expected Range): {Fail, NCD, Test, Norm}
Exception-Handling:
Arrival Rate (Load): ??
Min-Time-Between-Inputs:
Max-Time-Between-Inputs:
Obsolescence: 2 seconds
Exception-Handling: Assumes value Obsolete
Description:
Comments: Four possible values can be sent signifying Failure Warning, No Computed Data,
Functional Test, and Normal Operation.
References:
Appears in: Dig-Alt2
DEFINITION
= FIELD (Status in DA2-Message)
Receive DA2-Message FROM Digital-Altimeter-2
= PREV (Dig2-Status-Signal)
Receive DA2-Message FROM Digital-Altimeter-2 F
Time <= Time (DA2-Message arrived) + 2 seconds T
= Obsolete
Receive DA2-Message FROM Digital-Altimeter-2 F
Time > Time (DA2-Message arrived) + 2 seconds T
Powerup T
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InputVau
DA2-Alt-Signal
Source: Digital Altimeter 2
Type: integer
Possible Values (Expected Range): -20..2500
Exception-Handling: Values below -20 are treated as -20 and values above 2500 as 2500
Units: ??
Granularity: ??
Arrival Rate (Load): ??
Min-Time-Between-Inputs:
Max-Time-Between-Inputs:
Obsolescence: 2 seconds
Exception-Handling:
Description:
Comments:
References:
Appears in: Altitude
DEFINITION
= FIELD (Altitude in DA2-Message)
Receive DA2-Message FROM Digital-altimeter-2
= PREV (DA2-Alt-Signal)
Receive DA2-Message FROM Digital-altimeter-2 I
= Obsolete
Receive DA2-Message FROM Digital-Altimeter-2 F
Time > Time (DA2-Message arrived) + 2 seconds T
Powerup T
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Control Input
Inhibit
Source: Cockpit Inibit Button
Type: Enumerated
Possible Values (Expected Range): {on, off}
Arrival Rate (Load):
Min-Time-Between-Inputs:
Max-Time-Between-Inputs:
Obsolescence: None
Description:
Comments:
References:
Appears in: ASW
DEFINITION
= FIELD (Value in Inhibit-Message)
Receive Inhibit-Message from CockpitI
= PREV (Inhibit)
Receive Inhibit-Message from Cockpit
= Obsolete
Powerup
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Control Input
Reset
Source: Cockpit Reset Button
Type: Signal
Possible Values (Expected Range): {High}
Arrival Rate (Load):
Min-Time-Between-Inputs:
Max-Time-Between-Inputs:
Obsolescence: Not applicable (lasts only one step)
Description:
Comments:
References:
Appears in: Analog-Alt, DOI-Status, Altitude, Analog.Alt, Dig-Alt1, Dig-Alt2, ASW
DEFINITION
= True
IReceive Inhibit Signal I W
= False
Prev (Reset) = True T
Powerup T
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LMacro
Analog-Valid-and-Below
Description:
Comments:
References:
Appears in: Altitude2
DEFINITION
Analog-alt = Valid
Analog-Alt-Signal = below
TTW
I Macro F
Analog-Valid-and-Above
Description:
Comments:
References:
Appears in: Altitude2
DEFINITION
Analog-alt = Valid
Analog-Alt-Signal = above
TTi
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Macro
Dig1 -Valid-and-Below
Description:
Comments:
References:
Appears in: Altitude2
DEFINITION
Dig1-alt = Valid T
DAl-Alt-Signal < 2000 THRES ]
Macro
Digi -Valid-and-Above
Description:
Comments:
References:
Appears in: Altitude2
DEFINITION
Dig-Alt1 = Valid
DAl-Alt-Signal >= 2 0 0 T HRES T
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dMacro--
Dig2-Val id-and-Below
Description:
Comments:
References:
Appears in: Altitude2
DEFINITION
Dig2-alt = Valid T
DA2-Alt-Signal < 2000 THRES
Macro
Dig2-Valid-and-Above
Description:
Comments:
References:
Appears in: Altitude2
DEFINITION
Dig-Alt2 = Valid
DA2-Alt-Signal >= 2 0 0 THRES T
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Output Command
DOI-Power-On
Destination: DOI
Acceptable Values: {high}
Initiation Delay: 0 milliseconds
Completion Deadline: 50 milliseconds
Exception-Handling: (What to do if cannot issue command within deadline time)
Feedback Information:
Variables: DOI-status-signal
Values: high (on)
Relationship: Should be on if ASW sent signal to turn on
Min. time (latency): 2 seconds
Max. time: 4 seconds
Exception Handling: DOI-Status changed to Fault-Detected
Reversed By: Turned off by some other component or components. Do not know which ones.
Comments: I am assuming that if we do not know if the DOI is on, it is better to turn it on again, i.e., that
the reason for the restriction is simply hysteresis and not possible damage to the device.
This product in the family will turn on the DOE only when the aircraft descends below the
threshold altitude. Only this page needs to change for a product in the family that is
triggered by rising above the threshold.
References:
CONTENTS
= discrete signal on line PWR set to high
TRIGGERING CONDITION
Operating Mode Operational T
Not Inhibited T
State Values DOI-Status = On F
Altitude = Below-threshhold T
Prev(Altitude) = At-or-above-threshold T
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Output Command
DOI-Power-On
Destination: DOI
Acceptable Values: {high}
Initiation Delay: 0 milliseconds
Completion Deadline: 50 milliseconds
Exception-Handling: (What to do if cannot issue command within deadline time)
Feedback Information:
Variables: DOI-status-signal
Values: high (on)
Relationship: Should be on if ASW sent signal to turn on
Min. time (latency): 2 seconds
Max. time: 4 seconds
Exception Handling: DOI-Status changed to Fault-Detected
Reversed By: Turned off by some other component or components. Do not know which ones.
Comments: I am assuming that if we do not know if the DOI is on, it is better to turn it on again, i.e., that
the reason for the restriction is simply hysteresis and not possible damage to the device.
This product in the family will turn on the DOE only when the aircraft descends below the
threshold altitude. Only this page needs to change for a product in the family that is
triggered by rising above the threshold.
References:
CONTENTS
= discrete signal on line PWR set to high
TRIGGERING CONDITION
Operating Mode Operational T
Not Inhibited T
State Values DOI-Status = On F
Altitude = Below-threshhold T
Prev(Altitude) = At-or-above-threshold T
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Watchdog-Strobe
Destination: Watchdog Timer
Acceptable Values: high signal (on)
Min-Time-Between-Outputs: 0
Max-Time-Between-Outputs: 200PERIOD msec
Exception-Handling:
Feedback Information: None
Reversed By: Not necessary
Comments:
References:
CONTENTS
= High signal on line WDT
TRIGGERING CONDITION
Operating Mode Operational
Startup
Inhibited
State Values Time <= (Time sent Watchdog Strobe) + 200 msec
DOI-Status = Fault-detected
Time >= (Time entered Altitude.Cannot-be-determined) + 2 nL secs.
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T
T
T
T
T
F
F
-0perating M~ode
ASW
Description:
Comments: No information about how an internal fault is detected, what types detected, etc.
References:
Appears in: DOI-power-on, Watchdog-strobe
DEFINITION
= Startup
Powerup M
= Operational
Controls.Reset = T T
Startup T T T
Analog-Alt = Valid T
Dig-Alt1 = Valid T
Dig-Alt2 = Valid T
= Internal-Fault-Detected
Internal-fault -detected
Startup
Time >= Time entered Startup + 3 secs
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Appendix B
omnia apud me mathematicafiunt.
Rend Descartes (1596-1650)
Matrices for State Space Description of
the Altitude Switch
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Appendix C
Does anyone believe that the difference between the Leb-
esgue and Riemann integrals can have physical signifi-
cance, and that whether say, an airplane would or would
not fly could depend on this difference? If such were
claimed, I should not care to fly in that plane.
Richard W. Hamming, 1988
Level 3 of Hybrid SpecTRM-RL Model of
MTCD
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